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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON INTERFIRM INTERDEPENDENCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE  
Shiva Agarwal 
Harbir Singh & Rahul Kapoor 
            This dissertation explicitly examines the structure of interdependencies that firms 
are subjected to within a platform-based ecosystem and its implications for firm 
performance. Two theoretical themes emerge from this dissertation: (1) a firm’s 
interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem matters both for its performance and 
the sustainability of its superior performance; and (2) a manager’s understanding of 
these interdependencies can have significant implications on firm performance and the 
choice of governance structures. The first essay explores how a firm’s innovation differs 
with respect to its interdependence with various elements of the ecosystem and 
examines its implications on the innovation’s commercialization success. The core set of 
data is based on all the apps that were launched in the Apple iPhone ecosystem from 
2008 to 2013. The results suggest that firms can enhance the value of their innovation 
by drawing on the broader set of complementary technologies that are available in the 
ecosystem. But, these complementarities also subject firms to an array of bottlenecks 
limiting their innovation’s value creation. The second essay examines how ecosystem-
level interdependencies affect the extent to which firms can sustain their value creation 
in a platform-based ecosystem. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of top-
performing app developers in the iOS and Android ecosystems from January 2012 to 
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January 2014. The results suggest that a firm’s ability to sustain its superior performance 
is facilitated by the technological interdependence faced by its innovation within an 
ecosystem and the experience gained within the ecosystem, but hampered by 
technological transitions initiated by the central firm. The third essay addresses the 
performance consequences of misrepresentation of interdependence structures in the 
alliance context using an agent-based simulation. The results suggest that the 
misrepresentation of interdependence structures plays an important role in determining 
performance consequences of various governance modes to manage the alliance 
relationship. Specifically, overrepresentation of interdependence structures requires fully 
integrated or more hierarchical governance modes, whereas underrepresentation of 
interdependence structures requires more decentralized governance modes. 
Collectively, these essays contribute to the literature on ecosystems and alliances, 
shedding new light on the role of structure of interdependence ins shaping firm’s 
performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The strategy literature has long explored how firms generate rents by 
combining resources that lie outside their boundaries (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati 
1998). The bulk of the attention has been on the bilateral nature of interdependence, 
such as those between buyers and suppliers. However, in today’s world, with the rising 
prominence of ecosystems often fueled by technology platforms, the nature of 
interdependence between firms is becoming increasingly multilateral, involving a 
network of suppliers and complementors (Teece 2007; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor 
and Lee 2013; McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017).  In this dissertation, I focus on this 
emergent phenomenon of platform-based ecosystems and examine how the structure of 
multilateral interdependencies shapes firms’ value creation. Scholars in economics and 
strategy have studied platform-based ecosystems primarily through theories of direct 
and indirect network effects, where the main line of inquiry has been to understand how 
the platform firm orchestrates interactions between different players (e.g., Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986; Schilling, 2000; Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 
2006). While complementor firms are considered key enablers of value creation in these 
ecosystems, their strategies and performance have been largely understudied (Kapoor, 
2013; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). This dissertation focuses on complementor firms 
participating in platform-based ecosystems and explores how the structure of 
technological interdependencies with respect to platform and other elements in the 
ecosystem impact their performance.  
Two theoretical themes emerge from this dissertation: (1) a firm’s 
interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem matters both for its performance and 
2 
 
the sustainability of its superior performance; and (2) a manager’s understanding of 
these interdependencies can have significant implications on firm performance and the 
choice of governance structures to manage these interdependencies. The dissertation 
comprises three essays. The first essay focuses on complementors participating in 
platform-based ecosystems via their innovations. It considers the structure of  
complementors’ innovations with respect to the platform and other complements in the 
ecosystem. It introduces the notion of connectedness to refer to the extent to which a 
given innovation interacts with the platform (i.e., platform connectedness) and also with 
the other complements in the ecosystem (i.e., complement connectedness). For 
example, while all software applications (apps) launched by developers on the iPhone 
platform interact with the iPhone’s core mobile computing module, there is considerable 
variation in terms of whether they interact with the iPhone’s other components (e.g., 
camera,GPS, accelerometer), as well as with other complementary apps (e.g., Google 
Maps, Dropbox, Facebook). The core set of data for this first essay is based on all the 
apps that were launched in the Apple iPhone ecosystem from 2008 to 2013 within the 
U.S. market. The results suggest that firms can enhance the value of their innovations 
by drawing on the broader set of complementary technologies that are readily available 
in the ecosystem. Still, these complementarities also subject firms to an array of 
bottlenecks that limit their innovations’ value creation.  
The second essay examines how ecosystem-level interdependencies affect the 
extent to which complementor firms can sustain their performance in a platform-based 
ecosystem. In this chapter, I offer a novel perspective on firms’ ecosystem-level 
interdependencies that is rooted in the structural and evolutionary features of the 
ecosystem. The structural feature is based on the technological interdependence 
between firms’ products and other components of the ecosystem. I incorporate the 
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evolutionary feature by taking into account the technological transitions initiated by the 
central firm that governs the ecosystem and the experience gained by complementors 
within an ecosystem over time. The analysis is based on a unique monthly panel dataset 
of top-performing app developers in the iOS and Android ecosystems from January 2012 
to January 2014. The results suggest that a firm’s ability to sustain its superior 
performance is facilitated by the technological interdependence faced by its innovation 
within an ecosystem and its experience gained within the ecosystem, but hampered by 
technological transitions initiated by the central firm.  
The third essay takes a more behavioral perspective and examines the 
implications of an incorrect understanding of interdependence structures.  Specifically, it 
uses an agent-based simulation model to gain insights into the behavioral biases that 
may exist when interdependent firms form strategic alliances.  The model simulates 
managers’ understanding of underlying task interdependencies within an alliance under 
different levels of complexity and governance modes. The findings suggest that the 
misrepresentation of interdependence structures plays an important role in determining 
performance consequences of various governance modes to manage the alliance 
relationship. Specifically, I find that overrepresentation of the interdependence structures 
requires fully integrated or more hierarchical governance modes, whereas 
underrepresentation of the interdependence structures requires more decentralized 
governance modes. Additionally, I find that the complementary effect of both types of 
misrepresentation and governance modes on exploration and coordination can explain 
the performance differences of various governance modes.  
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2. TWO FACES OF VALUE CREATION IN BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS: 
LEVERAGING COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MANAGING 
INTERDEPENDENCIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is increasing recognition among strategy scholars and practitioners that 
firms are dependent on their ecosystems for creating value from their innovations (Iansiti 
and Levien, 2004; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, Kelly, 2015). In many cases, the basis of 
value creation in ecosystems involves a platform that serves as a foundation upon which 
other firms can build complementary products or services (i.e., complements). Scholars 
have explored this phenomenon primarily from a perspective of a platform firm, 
emphasizing how platform-based architectures encourage innovations by complementor 
firms and enhance the overall value proposition of the platform (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Evans et al., 2008).  While having a large number of 
complementors innovating around a platform is uniformly acknowledged as an important 
driver of the platform’s success, the implications for complementors themselves 
participating in these ecosystems with their innovations remain less clear.  There are 
often significant differences in the extent to which a given innovation is commercially 
successful in an ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010), and yet, what makes a 
complementor’s innovation successful in a platform-based ecosystem is not well 
understood.  
In this study, we start with the premise that a given innovation does not stand 
alone. Rather it is connected with other elements in the ecosystem that impacts its value 
creation (Rosenberg, 1982; Hughes, 1983; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 2016). We draw on 
this premise and take the perspective of a complementor firm innovating around a 
platform to explain the commercial success of its innovation. To do so, we introduce the 
notion of connectedness to refer to the extent to which a given innovation interacts with 
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the platform (i.e., platform connectedness) and also with the other complements in the 
ecosystem (i.e., complement connectedness).  For example, while all software 
application (apps) launched by developers on the iPhone platform interact with iPhone’s 
core mobile computing module, there is considerable variation in terms of whether they 
interact with iPhone’s other components (e.g., camera, GPS, accelerometer), as well as 
with other complementary apps (e.g., Google Maps, Dropbox, Facebook).   
On the one hand, higher connectedness may allow the innovation to leverage a 
broader set of complementarities in the ecosystem.  Firms will be able to enhance the 
value of their innovations by drawing on complementary technologies that are readily 
available in the ecosystem (Teece, 2006; Kapoor and Furr, 2015).  On the other hand, it 
may subject the innovation to an array of interdependencies that may limits its value 
creation.  An innovation that is interdependent on other complementary technologies 
may not achieve its desired functionality either because of the challenges in managing 
the interdependencies (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), or 
because of being subject to the bottlenecks that may arise with respect to other 
complementary technologies in the ecosystem (Ethiraj, 2007; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 
2016).  In the context of platform-based ecosystems, these challenges are especially 
salient when there is a change in the platform architecture triggered by platform firms 
through the introduction of a new platform generation.  
We explore our arguments in the context of Apple’s iPhone ecosystem between 
2008 and 2013 within the U.S. market. This context provides a relevant and important 
opportunity to study the commercialization success of complementors’ innovations in a 
platform-based ecosystem. The focal firms are app developers launching their apps for 
the iPhone. The iPhone ecosystem represents one of the largest and most valuable 
business ecosystems with the App Store revenue estimated to be more than $10B in 
2016. Hundreds of thousands of app developers participate in this ecosystem by 
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frequently launching new apps. Moreover, apps launched by developers vary in terms of 
leveraging both the iPhone components and other complementary apps, providing us 
with significant variance to test our predictions with respect to platform and complement 
connectedness. Finally, we are able to exploit yearly changes in the iPhone platform 
through Apple’s introduction of new platform generations to consider the 
commercialization challenges that app developers may face with the new generation of 
the platform. 
The analysis is performed on a newly assembled dataset of 249,305 iPhone 
apps launched by 20,391 developers with detailed information on the focal app and the 
app developer, along with novel measures for each of the app’s platform and 
complement connectedness. An app’s successful commercialization is measured based 
on the likelihood of it being listed in the Top 500 list by revenue (e.g., Kapoor and 
Agarwal, 2017; Davis et al., 2016). The Top 500 list is an important indicator of an app’s 
successful commercialization as apps that make it into this list represent approximately 
95 percent of the total revenue generated by apps in the iPhone ecosystem 
(SensorTower, 2016). Such a list is also keenly followed by industry observers and 
analysts as a reference for successful apps. We find that higher platform connectedness 
and higher complement connectedness is associated with a higher likelihood of app’s 
successful commercialization. However, the benefit of platform connectedness is 
negated during the initial period of the new iPhone generation. In contrast, the benefit of 
complement connectedness with respect to iPhone’s generational evolution is much 
more nuanced.  The benefit is strengthened when Apple introduces the new platform 
generation and if the complements that the focal app is connected to have low platform 
connectedness whereas it is weakened when Apple introduces the new platform 
generation and if the connected complements themselves have high platform 
connectedness. 
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These findings highlight the two facets of value creation in ecosystems, and the 
implications for complementor firms innovating around a platform. Firms in platform-
based ecosystems can enhance the value of their innovations by leveraging a broad 
array of platform components and other complements.  However, this interconnected 
architecture of value creation can subject the firm to challenges with respect to 
managing the technological interdependencies especially when there is a new platform 
generation.  Further, the distinction between platform connectedness and complement 
connectedness helps in explaining the puzzling difference within innovations with high 
complement connectedness.  Our results suggest that the technological 
interdependencies due to complement connectedness have a negative impact on the 
innovation’s commercialization only when the connected complements themselves have 
high platform connectedness.  In contrast, when the connected complements have low 
platform connectedness, the new platform generation actually facilitates the innovation’s 
commercialization.  In so doing, the study contributes to the emerging literatures on 
ecosystems and platforms, examining both the opportunities and the challenges faced 
by complementors in creating value from their innovations (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; 
Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Kapoor, 2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Altman, 2016; Cennamo, 
Gu, and Zhu, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 2016; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). More broadly, the 
study contributes to the complementary assets framework (Teece, 1986) that has been 
instrumental in explaining innovators’ commercialization outcomes.  As Teece (2006) 
points out in his reflection of the original article, the extant literature has been somewhat 
limited in its examination of complementarities, confining them to enterprise-level value 
chains (i.e., manufacturing, sales, marketing, and distribution), and not considering 
complementarities within the broader ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2016; 
Kapoor and Furr, 2015). Our findings offer compelling evidence of how such 
complementarities impact the innovation’s commercial success. Moreover, while the 
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extant literature has emphasized the usefulness of specialized complementary assets for 
innovators to benefit from their innovations, we show that in the context of platform-
based ecosystems, even generic complementary assets (i.e., platform, complements) 
can influence innovators’ value creation and appropriation. 
 
INNOVATION IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS 
A platform-based ecosystem encompasses a central platform firm and a network 
of complementor firms who build products around the platform. A platform represents an 
underlying technical architecture that acts as a foundation upon which other firms can 
develop their products, and offer them to the users.1  Gawer (2014) highlights two 
distinct approaches to studying platforms in the extant literature.  One approach 
focusses on platforms as creating value through network effects or multisided markets 
(e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Schilling, 2002; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). The other approach focusses on platforms as technical 
architectures that facilitate innovation by complementors within the ecosystem (Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2002; Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Boudreau, 2010).  Scholars from 
both streams of research have considered the focal platform or the focal platform firm as 
the primary object of attention.  While these scholars have also acknowledged the role of 
complementors and their innovation in driving platform’s success, there has been in 
general a lack of emphasis in examining the outcomes of complementors and their 
innovations. There are often significant differences in the extent to which a given 
innovation is commercially successful in an ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010), and 
yet, what makes a complementor’s innovation successful in a platform-based ecosystem 
is not well understood.  
                                                          
1
 In this paper, the focus is primarily on platforms that provide a foundation upon which other firms 
develop complementary products (e.g., platforms focusing on enterprise software, genomics, smart homes, 
internet of things), and not on platforms that purely facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers (e.g., 
eBay. Amazon). 
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An emerging stream of work has started paying attention to complementors, 
which are critical to value creation within the platform-based ecosystem (e.g., Kapoor, 
2013; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Boudreau, 2010, 2012; Altman 2016; Cennamo, Gu, 
and Zhu, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 2016). While scholars have started shedding some light on 
the complementors’ strategies and performance, they have largely been agnostic to the 
technological interactions that exist between a complementors’ innovation and other 
elements of the ecosystem. In this study, we focus on complementors’ innovation and 
the vast array of its technological interactions within the ecosystem. For example, an app 
in the iPhone ecosystem can interact with multiple components from the iPhone (e.g. 
camera, GPS, accelerometer) as well as with other apps from the ecosystem (e.g. 
Google maps, Facebook, Dropbox). We use the notion of connectedness to refer to 
these technological interactions of a complementor’s innovation with the platform (i.e., 
platform connectedness) and other complements (i.e., complement connectedness). We 
explore how an innovation’s platform connectedness and its complement connectedness 
shape its commercialization success within the ecosystem. 
For the platform connectedness, we consider the level of hierarchy within the 
platform architecture. In addition to being a modular system, a platform is also a 
hierarchical system and can be decomposed into core and optional components. There 
are some components in the platform that represent the core architecture of the 
platform, and all the complements participating in the ecosystem leverage these core 
components. In other words, firms develop their products using the core components of 
the platform. The rest of the components are optional, and complements may (or may 
not) leverage them. For example, in the video game ecosystem, the console consists of 
the central processing unit (CPU), the graphics processing unit, the memory controller, 
and the video decoder. These are the core components of the console that enable 
games developed by third-party developers to be played on the console. In addition to 
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the core components, the console also provides access to a number of optional 
components (such as motion detectors, camera, and Bluetooth) that game developers 
can leverage to enhance features of their games. The game developers use the core 
components, and may also use some of the optional components, to develop different 
games for the console users. Such an architectural hierarchy that involves core and 
optional platform components exists in many settings such as in the cases of computing 
hardware, enterprise software, genomics technologies and mobile payments. We 
consider this characterization of the platform to understand variation in ways a 
complementor’s innovation can be connected with the platform.  
  In addition to platform connectedness, we also examine the role of complement 
connectedness in impacting an innovation’s commercial success. The extant literature 
has considered the interaction between the platform and the complements primarily 
through the theoretical lens of indirect network effects (e.g., Schilling, 2002; Zhu and 
Iansiti, 2012). However, complements in an ecosystem can be connected not only with 
the platform but also with the other complements in the ecosystem. For example, the 
Uber app in the smartphone ecosystem is connected with Google Maps for its navigation 
purposes. Figure 2.1 illustrates the two types of connectedness that we consider in this 
study using a simplified schema. We now explore how the nature of connectedness for 
the focal innovation within the ecosystem may affect its commercialization success.   
----------------------------------------- 
 Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Platform Connectedness 
We consider an innovation as having high platform connectedness if it leverages 
the optional components of the platform in addition to the core module of the platform. 
For example, in the iPhone ecosystem, the ‘QR reader’ app that allows scanning of QR 
codes, barcodes, and documents through the app has high connectedness with the 
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iPhone platform as it leverages the core mobile computing module as well as the 
camera, one of the optional components provided by the smartphone. The optional 
components provided by the platform represent a set of complementary technologies 
that firms can combine with their focal innovation, and achieve superior functionality 
without having to invest in those technologies internally.  Moreover, users are generally 
familiar with platform components, and hence, may not face adoption challenges for 
innovations high platform connectedness.  Finally, access to these components can also 
facilitate experimentation by providing the innovating firm with new options with respect 
to the functionality at little or no cost.  Hence, we expect that innovations with greater 
platform connectedness will be more likely to achieve successful commercialization:  
H1 - The greater is the innovation’s platform connectedness, the higher will be the 
likelihood of its successful commercialization. 
 
Complement Connectedness 
We consider an innovation as having high complement connectedness if it 
interacts with other complements in the ecosystem. For example, in the iPhone 
ecosystem, the “National Park” app, provided by National Geographic Society, has high 
complement connectedness, as it leverages the Google Map app to provide navigation 
facility to its users. Prior work in strategy has considered how complements enhance the 
value of the platform for the user through indirect network effects (e.g., Schilling, 2002; 
Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). We argue that such network externalities can not only exist 
between a platform and complements, but can also exist between complements.   
The focal innovation that is connected to other complements in the ecosystem 
might be more valuable as users can derive additional benefits from combining the 
functionalities of the complements with the focal innovation. Such connections can also 
provide the focal innovation with access to the installed bases of the connected 
complements. Further, having access to the specialized technologies provided by 
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external complements can increase the combinatorial set for experimentation and 
learning for the focal innovation and thus, can facilitate commercialization. Finally, 
developing the complementary technologies on one’s own can be costly and uncertain. 
By leveraging the readily available complementary technologies provided by other firms, 
firms can also avoid commercialization setbacks that can be associated with the launch 
of new innovations within an ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Furr, 
2015). Accordingly, we suggest that:  
H2 - The greater is the innovation’s complement connectedness, the higher will be 
the likelihood of its successful commercialization. 
 
 
Effect of platform evolution (generational change) 
We now consider how the effect of platform and complement connectedness on 
an innovation’s commercialization success might be impacted by the introduction of the 
new generation of the platform. Transitioning to a new platform generation is an 
important mode by which platform firms compete and create value over time. New 
platform generations typically offer improvements in existing functionality as well as add 
new functionality. In so doing, they alter the interfaces through which the complements 
interact with the platform (Venkatraman and Lee, 2004; Ansari and Garud, 2009; Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Hence, a new platform generation may 
represent the instance of an architectural change as discussed by Henderson and Clark 
(1990) but at the level of the ecosystem, where the core design concepts and the 
associated knowledge are not overturned but there is a change in the nature of the 
interactions between the platform and the complements. This, in turn, might affect the 
commercialization success of innovations that are technologically connected with the 
platform for their functioning.  
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The connectedness between an innovation and a platform creates 
interdependence that needs to be managed proactively. Traditional coordination 
mechanisms such as hierarchy and ongoing communications associated with firms are 
typically absent in platform-based ecosystems. The platform firm often relies on the core 
technical architecture to frame interactions and to coordinate activities among 
complementors (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). This is achieved through the design of 
the platform interfaces that provide complementors with access to the platform’s core 
and optional components. The platform firm coordinates activities within the ecosystem 
by managing these interfaces so as to ensure coherent working of the ecosystem. As 
firms build their innovations using the components provided by the platform, they 
repeatedly interact with the platform through these interfaces. To maximize value 
creation, they design their innovation specific to the interfaces provided by the platform. 
They develop skills and processes specific to the interfaces provided by the platform. 
This designing of the innovation and routinization of processes specific to the interfaces 
and the platform context can also be referred to as ‘structural embeddedness’ of firms in 
the platform (Karim, 2012).  
When an innovation has a high level of connectedness with the platform, its 
commercialization may be hampered by the newness of the platform generation. Users 
may face challenges as they adopt the focal innovation during a period when there is 
significant uncertainty regarding the overall architecture of the platform. From the 
perspective of the innovating firm, while higher platform connectedness allows for the 
leveraging of additional functionality accorded by the platform firm, it also imposes 
greater technological interdependencies that have to be carefully managed during a 
period of generational transition within a platform (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Such 
additional challenges faced by the users and innovators during a period of generational 
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transition may limit the commercialization success of those innovations with high 
platform connectedness. Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
H3 - The effect of platform connectedness on the innovation’s commercialization 
success will be moderated by platform’s generational evolution such that the 
effect will be less positive when the platform generation is new than when it is 
mature. 
 
The new generation of the platform not only affects innovations that have high 
connectedness with the platform, but it can also affect innovations that are connected 
with other complements in the ecosystem.  On the one hand, the interdependent 
complements enhance the value of the focal innovation; on the other hand, they can also 
act as bottlenecks constraining its successful commercialization especially during 
technology transitions (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 2016). For example, Gawer and 
Henderson (2007) show that the performance of Intel’s microprocessor was constrained 
by the bottleneck in the peripheral complements that supplied data to the 
microprocessor. Similarly, in the semiconductor lithography equipment industry, the 
commercialization success of innovations was negatively impacted by the technological 
bottlenecks in the mask and the resist complements (Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Such 
constraints that limit the commercialization success of an innovation are likely to be most 
prominent in a platform-based ecosystem when a new generation of platform is 
introduced. 
In addition, it is likely that as the connected complements evolve in the face of 
platform transitions, so will the technological interfaces between the focal innovation and 
those complements.  Thus, the focal innovation needs to adapt not only to the changes 
made in the new generation of the platform but also to the changes that the connected 
complement makes in response to the new platform generation. Such additional 
challenges faced by the complementors during a period of generational transition may 
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limit the commercialization success of those innovations with high complement 
connectedness. Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
H4 - The effect of complement connectedness on the innovation’s 
commercialization success will be moderated by platform’s generational evolution 
such that the effect will be less positive when the platform generation is new than 
when it is mature. 
 
METHOD 
 The empirical setting for the study is Apple’s iPhone ecosystem, and the focal 
complementor firms are application software (app) developers who participated in the 
ecosystem from 2008 to 2015 by developing apps for the iPhone within the U.S. market. 
Apple launched its first generation of iPhone in January 2007, and it developed its own 
apps for this generation. However, in March 2008, Apple released the first software 
development kit that allowed external software developers to build apps for the iPhone, 
and started offering apps from these developers through its App Store in July 2008. 
Since this shift towards a platform-based strategy, the number of application developers 
building apps and the number of apps for the iPhone has grown exponentially, and this 
has been a key enabler of iPhone’s success over the past decade. As of June 2015, 
there were more than 1.5 million apps offered in the App Store, and more than 100 
billion copies of apps downloaded by iPhone users.  
The setting provides an important and relevant context to study how the 
commercialization success of complementor’s product innovations is shaped by the 
structure of technological interactions within the ecosystem.  The iPhone ecosystem 
represents one of the largest and most valuable business ecosystems with App Store 
revenue estimated to be more than $10B in 2016.  Hundreds of thousands of app 
developers participate in this ecosystem by frequently launching new apps. Moreover, 
apps launched by developers vary in terms of leveraging both the optional components 
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(e.g., camera, GPS, accelerometer) from the iPhone platform, and the other 
complementary apps (e.g., Google Maps, Dropbox, Facebook) offered by developers in 
the iPhone ecosystem. Finally, between 2008 and 2015, there were six generational 
transitions within the iPhone platform when Apple launched new versions of the 
smartphone operating system and the handset, allowing us to observe the impact of 
platform’s generational evolution on the commercialization success of apps across 
multiple generations.  
 
Data 
The dataset comprises of all the apps that were introduced by developers for the 
iPhone between July 2008 and March 2013. The primary sources of data are App Annie 
(www.appannie.com), iTunes (www.apple.com/itunes/), and AppShopper 
(www.appshopper.com). App Annie and AppShopper are the leading data aggregating 
and archiving sources for information on apps in the iPhone ecosystem. Since 2008, 
they have been independently archiving information on the apps launched in the iPhone 
ecosystem. We first collected information for the apps that were launched until March 
2013. Using two different sources helped us to minimize missing data, and we were able 
to identify 796,876 unique apps. For each of these apps, we collected information on 
launch date, app description, download price, average consumer rating, content rating, 
app size, language, in-app purchases and category.  We supplemented this with 
additional information from iTunes on platform components leveraged by the focal app, 
and all of the version updates up to December 2015. 
In the analysis, we only consider those apps whose primary source of revenue is 
from the App Store through either paid downloads or in-app purchases. We did that for 
two reasons. First, firms from many industries such as retail and financial services offer 
iPhone apps as an additional channel to support their existing business. Hence, the app 
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on its own is not their focal product innovation. Second, many firms also offer apps for 
free and rely on ad-based revenue model. In such cases, apps are the main source of 
ad-based revenue, but these revenues are not captured by the App Store and, hence, 
do not allow us to draw inferences with respect to their commercialization success. This 
reduced the total number of apps to 421,021 apps. In parallel, we gathered information 
about the Top 500 iPhone apps based on downloads and revenues. Apple provides daily 
lists of the Top 500 apps based on the number of downloads and the total app revenue. 
App Annie has archived this daily ranking information from Apple, and we were able to 
access this information from February 2010 to December 2015. To avoid any left 
censoring in the data, we excluded 127,703 iPhone apps that were introduced before 
February 2010.  Finally, we induce the extent of complement connectedness from the 
detailed app description and using a keyword-based approach. This approach made it 
difficult to include apps offered in other languages, and hence, these apps were 
excluded from the analysis.  We also excluded books, news, and reference apps, whose 
description typically include portions of the actual content which made the keyword-
based approach to identifying complement connectedness less effective. The final 
dataset comprised of a total of 249,305 apps launched by 20,391 firms. Because of the 
hypercompetitive nature of this setting, we test our predictions using monthly 
observations for each of the apps.  
 
Measures 
 Dependent variable: We measure successful commercialization of an innovation 
by examining whether the focal app made it to the Top 500 apps list by revenue (e.g., 
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Davis et al., 2016). The revenue distribution for smartphone 
apps is heavily skewed. According to Sensor Tower, a leading vendor for App Store 
marketing and sales tracking software, the top 1 percent of the app developers in the 
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iPhone ecosystem represent approximately 94 percent of total ecosystem-level revenue 
(SensorTower, 2016). Therefore, having an app in the Top 500 list offers clear evidence 
of successful commercialization among hundreds of thousands of apps. Such a list is 
also keenly followed by industry observers and analysts as a reference for successful 
apps. 
Platform connectedness: The iPhone platform comprises of a core mobile 
computing module that all app developers have to leverage for their apps to function on 
the iPhone.  In addition, app developers can leverage a number of iPhone components 
such as Bluetooth, camera, GPS, gyroscope, location services, video camera, and Wi-Fi 
for their apps.  The greater is the number of iPhone components that an app is 
leveraging, the higher will be its platform connectedness. Hence, we measured platform 
connectedness based on the number of non-core components offered by the platform 
that the focal app leveraged. While about 50 percent of apps leveraged only the core 
module of the iPhone platform, 30 percent of apps leveraged one optional component, 
and 20 percent of apps leveraged more than one optional components.  
Complement connectedness: In addition to connectedness with the platform, a 
focal app can also be connected with apps offered by other firms in the ecosystem. For 
example, many apps in the iPhone ecosystem leverage Google’s map app for its 
navigation functionality via the application programming interfaces (APIs).  Similarly, a 
large number of apps leverage Facebook’s apps such as Facebook and Instagram for 
the social networking functionality. The information on the apps that a focal app 
leverages is prominently disclosed in the description of the app.  We searched the 
description of all apps for the mentions of these other apps. For example, one of the 
apps, ReaddleDocs, describes its connectedness with other apps such as MobileMe 
iDisk, Dropbox, and Google Docs in its description:  
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“…readdleDocs is all-in-one document reader for iPhone and iPod 
touch...readdleDocs allows you to download and upload files from MobileMe iDisk, 
Dropbox, Google Docs, and other services....”  
 
Similarly another app, Matg, discusses how it leverages Google Maps: 
“….designed for sales, marketing or finance executives, this app allows you to access 
customers, sales order transactions, accounts receivable statements, item master, and 
item warehouse information...tight integration with other iPhone features, such as e-mail 
and Google Maps, will provide you with the ability to communicate effectively with your 
corporate office about any of your accounts….” 
 
The greater is the number of other complementary apps that the focal app is 
leveraging, the higher will be its complement connectedness in the ecosystem. Hence, 
the variable complement connectedness measures the number of other apps that the 
focal app is connected to in the iPhone ecosystem. While about 13 percent of apps 
leveraged one complement, about 9 percent of apps leveraged more than one 
complement. In some cases, apps would increase their complement connectedness as 
part of their “version update” which includes new features.  Hence, in addition to 
searching through the product description, we also searched through the version update 
history to identify changes in an app’s complement connectedness.  As a robustness 
check, we excluded these apps from the analysis, and found very similar results.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the number of apps based on their platform and 
complement connectedness for all apps in the dataset and for only those apps that 
made it into the Top 500 list by revenue. Apps that leverage at least one optional 
component of the iPhone platform are categorized as having high platform 
connectedness, and low otherwise. Similarly, apps that leverage at least one other 
complementary app are categorized as having high complement connectedness. Of all 
the apps in the dataset, 49.3 percent had high platform connectedness whereas of all 
the Top 500 apps, 64.4 percent had high platform connectedness. This pattern is 
consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 1. Similarly, 21.9 percent of apps in the 
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dataset had high complement connectedness whereas of all the top 500 apps, 41.2 
percent had high complement connectedness. This pattern is also consistent with the 
prediction in Hypothesis 2.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Generational Newness: Between 2008 and 2015, the iPhone platform underwent 
six episodes of generational transitions. These transitions included both changes in the 
operating system (iOS) and in the handset.  More than 90% of iPhone users have been 
shown to migrate to the new operating system within the first month whereas the 
migration to the new handset is much more gradual. From a perspective of an app 
developer, the changes in iOS are a major consideration as it impacts almost the entire 
iPhone user base.  In order to consider the impact of iPhone platform’s generational 
evolution on the successful commercialization of the focal app, we used the variable 
generational newness which is calculated based on the number of months between the 
observation month and the month in which the latest generation of the iPhone platform 
was launched. We multiplied this measure by -1 for ease of interpretation with respect to 
the hypotheses.  Hence, higher values correspond to an early period of a new platform 
generation.   
In order to explore the challenges faced by app developers and users during the 
early period of a new platform generation, we used Google search data reported in 
Google Trends (www.google.com/trends).  Figure 2.2 shows the graphical plot for 
normalized monthly trend of U.S. search volume for the search term “iOS app not 
working” from January 2010 to December 2015. As shown in the figure, there are 
significant spikes in search volume during the months when the new platform generation 
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is launched, suggesting that iPhone users and app developers faced major challenges 
with their apps during this period.  
----------------------------------------- 
 Insert Figure 2.2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Control variables: We control for a number of firm-level and app-level effects that 
can influence the likelihood of successful commercialization for the firm’s app. First, we 
control for firms’ experience in the ecosystem using the variable firm experience, which 
is the total number of months that a firm has been participating in the ecosystem. To 
obtain this measure, we first identified the month in which the firm introduced its first app 
in the ecosystem (i.e., the month of entry) and then calculated the number of months 
between the observation month and the month of entry. Second, app developers often 
try to gain visibility among their potential users by providing free apps. We controlled for 
this firm-level effect through a dummy variable top 500 free that takes a value of ‘1’ if any 
of the apps developed by the firm were also part of the Top 500 ranking based on the 
number of downloads for free apps in a given month.  Further, an app’s successful 
commercialization is likely to be influenced by the overall demand for its submarket 
category (e.g., Games, Productivity, Utility, Business). An app in a high-demand 
submarket category will find it relatively easier to succeed. We account for this possibility 
using the variable category demand, which is the total number of apps from the focal 
firm’s app category in the Top 500 list in a given month. In addition, we also control for 
any category-level differences by using category fixed effects.  
We control for the quality of the app based on consumer ratings received by the 
focal app. Consumers can rate an app from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 being the highest quality. 
In the dataset, we were able to observe the cumulative rating offered by the consumer 
for a given app as of March 2013, but not the changes in the rating over time. We used 
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this time-invariant measure to control for app quality. The variable app rating is the 
cumulative rating received by the focal app as of March 2013. We also control for recent 
investments made by firms in their focal app by measuring the number of updates to the 
focal app in the past three months (3-month updates) and the total number of updates 
before the observation month (Total updates). Additionally, we controlled for other app-
level characteristics like the price for download (download price), recommended age 
rating for the app (content rating), the app’s storage space as a proxy for app 
complexity, and whether the app has an in-app purchase option or not (in-app 
purchase). Table 2.2 provides a brief description of the variables used in the analysis. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Analysis 
We tested our hypothesis using continous time event history analysis to estimate 
the hazard rate of an app achieving successful commercialization. We constructed the 
data in the long form to account for time-varying covariates. We started analyzing all the 
apps since their first month of launch on the iPhone platform. For the apps that entered 
the Top 500 list by revenue, we included information for the months until they first 
appeared in the Top 500 list. For those apps that did not appear in the Top 500 list until 
December 2015, we used two different approaches to identify the censoring month. 
First, many of these apps continue to be available in the App Store without any updates 
akin to the ‘living dead’ phenomenon (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1987).  Censoring 
these apps based on the last month of observation (December 2015) might be 
problematic because the likelihood of them making it to the Top 500 list may be very low 
beyond a certain month. To account for this possibility, we identify these ‘living dead’ 
apps by analysing data on version updates, and we only include monthly observations 
until 12 months after their last update. As an additional robustness check, we also 
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estimated a model where we only include observations for these apps until six months 
after their last update. We report this analysis in the robustness checks section after 
presenting our main results. 
 We used the Cox proportional hazard model, a robust technique for hazard rate 
analysis that does not require making an additional assumption about the shape of the 
baseline hazard, which may be increasing, decreasing, constant, or non-monotonous 
(Cox, 1975). This helps address concerns about the incorrect distributional assumptions 
yielding biased estimates (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002) and the choice of parametric 
specification based on observed data generating inconsistent results (Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000). Further, we tested for the proportionality hazard assumption by checking 
if the slope of the regression equation of scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time is nonzero 
for the full model as well as for all predictor variables (Grambsch and Thermeau, 1994). 
The proportional hazard assumption was satisfied for both the full model and all 
predictor variables.  Finally, apps introduced by the same firm often differed with respect 
to their connectedness within the ecosystem, allowing us to control for unobserved firm-
level heterogeneity by treating each firm as a separate stratum (Allison, 1996). 
 
Results 
We report the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates in 
Table 2.3. The results from the Cox model are reported in Table 2.4. The model 
estimates the hazard of an app achieving successful commercialization as identified by 
its first inclusion in the Top 500 list by revenue. The reported coefficients can be 
exponentiated to obtain hazard ratios, which are interpreted as the multiplier of the 
baseline hazard for the app being included in the Top 500 list when the variables 
increase by one unit (Allison, 2010). An increase in hazard can also be interpreted as an 
increase in the likelihood of an app achieving successful commercialization. All standard 
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errors reported were corrected for noninterdependence across multiple observations for 
the same app by clustering observations for each app. All the models include category-
fixed effect and firm-level stratification to control for any unobserved time-invariant 
differences across categories and firms. Model 1 is a baseline model with only control 
variables. In Models 2 and 3, we include the variables platform connectedness and 
complement connectedness to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. In Model 4, we 
include the interaction term between platform connectedness and generational newness 
to test Hypothesis 3. Similarly, we include the interaction term between complement 
connectedness and generational newness in Model 5 to test Hypothesis 4. Model 7 is 
the fully specified model with all independent variables and interaction terms.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2.3 and 2.4 about here 
          ----------------------------------------- 
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that the greater is the innovation’s platform 
connectedness, the higher will be the likelihood of its successful commercialization. We 
find support for this prediction in both Models 2 and 4. The estimated coefficient for 
platform connectedness is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). In considering 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in Model 2, we find that a one unit increase 
in platform connectedness is associated with a 17.4 percent higher likelihood of the focal 
app making it into the list of Top 500 apps by revenue within the iPhone ecosystem. 
Similarly, in Hypothesis 2, we predicted that the greater is the innovation’s complement 
connectedness, the higher will be the likelihood of its successful commercialization. We 
find statistical support for this prediction.  The coefficient estimates for the variable 
complement connectedness in Models 3 and 5 are positive and statistically significant (p 
< 0.01). Based on the estimated coefficients from Model 3, an increase in complement 
connectedness by one unit can increase the focal app’s likelihood of making it into the 
list of Top 500 apps by revenue by 15.1 percent.  
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In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effect of platform connectedness on the 
innovation’s successful commercialization will be weaker during the early period of the 
platform generation than when platform generation is relatively mature. The results from 
Model 4 supports the prediction. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term 
between platform connectedness and generational newness is negative and statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). Hence, the effect of platform connectedness on the app’s 
commercialization success is less positive when the platform generation is new than 
when it is mature.  This suggests that the benefits of platform-level complementarities 
that accrue to app developers whose apps have high platform connectedness may be 
buffered by the challenges of managing additional technological interdependencies 
between their apps and the new generation of iPhone platform. 
Finally, in Hypothesis 4, we predicted that the effect of complement 
connectedness on the successful commercialization of an innovation will be weaker 
during the early period of the platform generation than when platform generation is 
relatively mature. We test for the interaction between complement connectedness and 
generational newness in Model 5. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is 
positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of complement 
connectedness on an app’s successful commercialization does not vary with platform’s 
generational evolution. 
 To further explore this non-finding with respect to Hypothesis 4, we conduct a 
post hoc analysis to understand how the connected complement might differ with 
respect to its platform connectedness. Our theoretical arguments were premised on the 
existence of technology bottlenecks and the need for firms to adapt and reconfigure their 
products during generational transition of the platform (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2016). However, it is possible that there is some variation in the 
degree of adaptation required, depending on the level of connectedness between the 
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connected complements and the platform itself. To explore this possibility, we separate 
the variable complement connectedness into two categories depending on the level of 
platform connectedness of the complement that the focal innovation is connected to. 
We identified the complements with high platform connectedness as those that 
used at least one of the optional components offered by the platform. Apps such as 
Google Maps, Waze, and YouTube use one or more optional components provided by 
the iPhone platform, whereas apps like Dropbox and Google Drive use only the mobile 
computing module of the iPhone platform. We measured complement connectedness 
with high platform connectedness as the number of complements with high platform 
connectedness that the focal innovation is connected to within the ecosystem. Similarly, 
we measured complement connectedness with low platform connectedness based on 
the number of complements with low platform connectedness that the focal innovation is 
connected to within the ecosystem.  
In Models 6 and 7, we test for both the direct effect of complement 
connectedness with high and low platform connectedness respectively, and their 
interaction effect with generational newness. The coefficient for the direct effect of both 
types of complement connectedness is positive and statistically significant, providing 
evidence for the argument that complement connectedness increases the likelihood of 
the focal innovation achieving successful commercialization. Further, the coefficient for 
the interaction effect of complement connectedness with low platform connectedness 
and generational newness is positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the 
coefficient for the interaction effect of complement connectedness with high platform 
connectedness and generational newness is negative and statistically significant (p < 
0.05). We illustrate this difference in the effect of the two types of complement 
connectedness through the plots in Figure 2.3. The difference in the effect of 
complement connectedness depends on the extent of connectedness between the 
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platform and the complement that the focal innovation is connected with. The benefit of 
complement connectedness is strengthened when Apple introduces the new platform 
generation and if the complements that the focal app is connected to have low platform 
connectedness whereas it is weakened when Apple introduces the new platform 
generation and if the connected complements themselves have high platform 
connectedness. These findings clearly highlight the two faces of value creation in 
ecosystems – the opportunities associated with leveraging complementarities and the 
challenges associated with managing technological interdependencies.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2.3 about here 
          ----------------------------------------- 
Robustness Checks 
We conduct a number of additional checks to establish the robustness of our 
findings. We report these results in Table 2.5. First, in order to ensure that the results 
are not the artifact of a large number of observations, we conduct an additional analysis 
on the randomly drawn subsample based on the weighted exogenous sampling 
maximum likelihood (WESML) technique suggested by Manski and Lerman (1977).  An 
estimation based on the random exogenous sample was not practical because apps that 
achieve successful commercialization are rare. There are only 4,213 apps out of 
244,034 total apps that achieved successful commercialization during the observation 
period. From the information point of view, it would be desirable to have a greater 
fraction of apps that achieved successful commercialization. A choice-based sampling 
that takes fractions of both successful and unsuccessful apps would not be appropriate. 
Because this stratification would be done on the dependent variable, the estimates 
would be subject to selection bias. Hence, the WESML technique is more suited for rare 
events (Singh, 2005), as it allows for forming a sample with a greater fraction of 
observations with rare events without any selection bias. Intuitively, the idea is to weigh 
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each sample observation by the number of population elements it represents to make 
the choice-based sample simulate a random exogenous sample.   
In order to construct our sample, we followed the WESML technique laid out by 
Singh (2005). We constructed the sample by first selecting all the apps that entered the 
Top 500 list during the observation period and then drawing a random pool of 
approximately 20 percent of the apps that never entered the top list. This generated a 
sample of 50,091 apps. We then assigned weights to the each of these apps based on 
the representation of these apps in the overall dataset. The apps that entered the top list 
were assigned a weight of ‘1,’ as all these apps from the population were included in the 
sample. The apps that did not enter the top list were assigned weights as the ratio of 
total apps in the respective category that were in the sample to that in the entire dataset. 
The results of the analysis based on this subsample are reported in Model 8 and are 
qualitatively similar to our main results.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.5 about here 
         ----------------------------------------- 
Alternative specifications 
We also conduct additional robustness checks with alternative specifications. 
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to the use of categorical variables to categorize 
high or low connectedness (Model 9). The variable takes a value of 1 if the focal app 
connects with a complement or optional platform components, and 0 otherwise. 
Moreover, we test the importance of the degree of connectedness, i.e., whether results 
are driven by the presence of connectedness or whether the degree of connectedness 
matters. We do so by removing all the apps that did not have any connectedness with 
the platform or other complement (Model 10). Further, we also test whether our results 
are sensitive to the window that we have used to specify whether an app is still active in 
the ecosystem or not. As an additional check, we consider an app to be actively 
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contesting for the top position only if it was updated in the previous six months (Model 
11). The results from all of these analyses are consistent with the main results.  
Finally, an important issue to consider in our analysis is the possibility that apps 
self-select into different types of connectedness, which could potentially bias our 
estimates. We use both coarsened exact matching and instrument variable approach to 
test the robustness of our results to this potential endogeneity bias.  
Coarsened exact matching analysis 
Coarsened exact matching approach has been used commonly in economics to 
address concerns related to selection bias. Recently, scholars in management have 
started using this approach to address selection bias in their empirical specifications 
(e.g., Aggarwal and Hsu, 2013; Feldman and Amit, 2014). It is a nonparametric 
approach to reestablish the conditions of natural experiment by comparing statistical 
results between a treatment group and a comparable control group, thus, allowing for 
causal inference. We used this approach to evaluate whether apps with high 
connectedness with the platform or other complements have higher likelihood of 
achieving successful commercialization or not. For the purpose of this analysis, we 
compare apps that have high connectedness with those that have low connectedness. In 
the case of platform connectedness, apps are considered to have high platform 
connectedness if they are leveraging at least one optional component provided by the 
platform, and low otherwise. Similarly, apps that interact with one or more complements 
in the ecosystem are considered to have high complement connectedness, and low 
otherwise. We estimate separate models for platform and complement connectedness. 
The treatment group is defined as the apps that have high connectedness with the 
platform or other complements. Our control group is drawn from the apps that had low 
connectedness with the platform or other complement.  
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 The coarsened matching provides an alternative approach by generating 
counterfactual that closely match with the treatment on the set of observed variables. To 
implement coarsened exact matching, the logistic regression predicting an app 
propensity to have platform or complement connectedness is estimated using coarsened 
values of independent variables, to accurately group innovations that share similar 
values of these variables.  We use cross-sectional data with observations pertaining to 
the last month to estimate an app’s propensity to have platform or complement 
connectedness. We, then, use the weights calculated by coarsened matching estimator 
(cem routine in STATA) in the second-stage model that we used in the main analysis. 
This model estimates the app’s likelihood of entering into the top 500 revenue ranking 
based on its connectedness with platform or complements. The un-coarsened 
observations are weighted according to the prominence of each stratum into which they 
fall. Table 2.6 presents the result from the second-stage model.  The estimates for 
second-stage model for platform connectedness and complement connectedness (with 
high platform connectedness) are statistically significant and consistent with the main 
model. The coefficient estimate for complement connectedness (with low platform 
connectedness) is qualitatively similar to the main model but has large standard error.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.6 about here 
           ----------------------------------------- 
Instrument variable analysis 
While the coarsened exact matching approach matches the apps with and 
without connectedness on the basis of observables, it is possible that these apps’ 
connectedness may be due to some unobserved differences. To further check for any 
potential app-level endogeneity bias, we use instrument variable using ivprobit STATA 
procedure (Bascle, 2008).  
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 We identify an instrument that is likely to be correlated with an app’s likelihood to 
have platform or complement connectedness, but uncorrelated with the app’s 
commercialization success beyond its effect on the endogenous regressor (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008; Bascle, 2008). We use the number of queries posted by developers on 
an online discussion board about the development challenges associated with the 
integration of platform components and other complements with their app. The number 
of queries is reflective of an overall interest within the developer community about the 
platform components and other complements. Hence, it is likely to be highly correlated 
with an introduction of platform or complement connectedness in the new apps or 
existing in the upcoming months. However, it is unlikely that this instrument would be 
correlated with an app’s commercialization success, beyond its effect on the app’s 
connectedness with the platform or complement. Given that our independent variables 
and queries related to these variables are mutually exclusive, we instrumented each 
independent variable separately. In this analysis with instrument variable, we focus only 
on the direct effects as we are not aware of any technique that allows using instrument 
variable for the interaction term. Further, we believe concerns related to endogenous 
selection are mainly associated with the direct effects of the connectedness on an app’s 
successful commercialization. Hence, for this analysis we convert the long-panel data 
into a cross-sectional data by using values of the variables pertaining to the last 
observation month.  
 In Models 15, 17 and 19 in Table 2.7, we show the coefficients of the first stage 
selection model that estimates the effect of the number of queries on the apps’ degree of 
platform and complement connectedness respectively. Models 16, 18 and 20 presents 
results from the second-stage model. The coefficient for platform connectedness and 
complement connectedness are positive and statistically significant (p <0.01). The Cragg 
Donald statistics for three models is greater than 16.28, the recommended threshold 
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provided by Stock and Yogo (2004) to satisfy instrument relevance condition. Overall, 
these additional analyses help to further establish the robustness of our findings.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.7 about here 
             ----------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
A given innovation often does not stand alone. Rather it is connected with other 
elements in the ecosystem that impacts its value creation. In this study, we draw on this 
premise in a platform-based ecosystem in which participating complementor firms 
innovate around a platform to explain the commercial success of its innovation. We 
depart from the existing conceptualization of these ecosystems as multisided markets in 
which firms interact with other actors and benefit from network externalities. Instead, we 
conceptualize them as interconnected technological systems in which the focal 
innovation interacts with other technology elements to create value. We introduce the 
notion of connectedness to refer to the extent to which a given innovation interacts with 
the platform (i.e., platform connectedness) and also with the other complements in the 
ecosystem (i.e., complement connectedness). On the one hand, higher connectedness 
may allow the innovation to leverage a broader set of complementarities in the 
ecosystem. On the other hand, it may subject the innovation to an array of 
interdependencies that may limits its value creation especially when a generational 
transition triggered by the platform firm changes the underlying platform architecture.   
We explore these arguments on app developers that participated in Apple’s 
iPhone ecosystem between 2008 and 2013 in the U.S. market. We find that higher 
platform connectedness and higher complement connectedness is associated with a 
higher likelihood of app’s successful commercialization. However, the benefit of platform 
connectedness is negated during the initial period of the new generation of platform. In 
contrast, the benefit of complement connectedness with respect to platform’s 
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generational evolution is much more nuanced.  The benefit is strengthened when Apple 
introduces the new platform generation and if the complements that the focal app is 
connected to have low platform connectedness whereas it is weakened when Apple 
introduces the new platform generation and if the connected complements themselves 
have high platform connectedness. 
The study contributes to the emerging literatures on ecosystems and platforms, 
examining both the opportunities and the challenges faced by complementors in creating 
value from their innovations (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Kapoor, 
2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Altman, 2016; Cennamo, Gu, and Zhu, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 
2016; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). We show that while participation in platform-based 
ecosystems enables firms to enhance the value of their innovations by leveraging a 
broad set of platform components and other complements, such an interconnected 
architecture of value creation can subject the firm to challenges with respect to 
managing the technological interdependencies. We also contribute to the literature on 
platform architecture (e.g., Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Gawer, 2014). This stream of 
research provides a detailed account of the modular nature of the platform architecture 
and emphasizes its role in spurring innovation. We build on this characterization of the 
platform architecture and elucidate how the modular components of the platform differ 
with respect to their level of hierarchy within the platform architecture. We illustrate that 
the platform components can be decomposed into core and optional components, and 
this difference has important implications for value creation in ecosystems.   
Further, we contribute to the research on complementary assets by focusing on 
complementary technologies that lie outside the firm’s value chain. It has long been 
recognized that complementary assets play an important role in the success of an 
innovation and in the firms’ ability to appropriate value from their innovations (Teece, 
1986; Teece 2006). However, the bulk of the attention to this line of inquiry has been on 
34 
 
complementary assets that either lie within the boundary of the firms or can be accessed 
by firms through alternative means such as licensing or strategic alliances (e.g., Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). The role of 
complementary technologies and assets that reside in the external business ecosystem 
remains relatively underexplored (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Furr, 2015; 
Teece, 2006). In this study, we show how complementary technologies that lie outside 
the firm’s value chain can help support the firm’s focal innovation. Further, we also show 
how complementary technologies can be detrimental to a firm’s performance when a 
platform is relatively new.  
In practical terms, our study offers some guidance for both platform firms and 
complementor firms. A platform firm can enhance the overall value potential of an 
ecosystem by bundling a number of optional components along with the core 
technological architecture. Complementors can combine these optional components with 
their focal innovations and create more value for end users. Further, platform firms can 
also enhance value creation in an ecosystem by attracting participation by the 
“keystone” complementor firms in their ecosystems. These keystone firms represent a 
set of complementors who provide specialized technologies or user networks other 
complementors can leverage. Finally, our results also suggest that platform firms should 
pay more attention to platform generational transition and its impact on the interfaces by 
which complements interact with the platform. As these generational transitions can 
hamper complementor firms, better management of platform interfaces can help platform 
firms preserve the value of the platform during periods of generational transition. 
 The findings of this study are subject to a number of limitations that provide an 
opportunity for future research. First, they are based on a single empirical context, and 
their validity needs to be established through explorations in other settings. Second, our 
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measure for successful commercialization is based on whether the focal app is ranked 
within Top 500 apps in terms of revenue in the iPhone ecosystem.  Although this 
measure is consistent with our theory and is widely accepted as a proxy for successful 
commercialization, it may not represent superior economic performance for firms in 
general.  Finally, the measures for complement and platform connectedness do not 
account for differences between complements or platform components in terms of their 
impact on an app’s value creation.  Despite these and other limitations, the study sheds 
light on the two faces of value creation for firms innovating in ecosystems -- the 
opportunities associated with leveraging complementarities and the challenges associated 
with managing technological interdependencies.   
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Figure 2.1:Different types of connectedness for an innovation in a platform-based 
ecosystem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:Normalized weekly trend of Web search in the U.S. on Google for the 
term “iOS app not working.”  
(Data source: Google Trends; http://www.google.com/trends/) 
 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100 iOS 7 release 
iOS 5 release 
iOS 6 release 
iOS 8 release 
iOS 9 release 
iOS 4 release 
Complement 
connectedness 
Platform 
connectedness 
Complement Innovation 
Platform 
 
37 
 
Figure 2.3: Interaction graphs for complement connectedness 
Complement connectedness 
(Low platform connectedness) 
 
Complement connectedness 
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Table 2.1: Apps with platform and complement connectedness  
Type of Connectedness All Apps % Total 
apps 
Top 500 
apps 
% Total 
Top 500 
apps 
Platform 
connectedness 
Low 126,311 50.67% 1,654 35.56% 
High 122,994 49.33% 2,997 64.44% 
      
Complement 
connectedness 
Low 194,683 78.10% 2,735 58.80% 
High 54,622 21.91% 1,916 41.20% 
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Table 2.2: Description of variables 
Dependent variable 
Successful 
commercialization 
Dummy = 1 for the month in which the app enters the Top 500 list by 
revenue  
Independent variables 
Platform connectedness 
Number of optional platform components with which the focal app 
interacts  
Complement 
connectedness 
Number of complements in the ecosystem that the focal app 
interacts with 
Complement 
connectedness (Low 
platform connectedness) 
Number of connected complements that interact only with the core 
platform module 
Complement 
connectedness (High 
platform connectedness) 
Number of connected complements that interact with optional 
platform components 
Control variables 
Generational newness 
Number of months since the launch of the latest generation of the 
platform; multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation 
App rating Cumulative consumer ratings received by the app 
App size The amount of storage space required by the app (in MBs) 
App content rating Recommended age rating based on the app content 
3-month updates Number of times the focal app was updated in the last three months 
Total number of updates 
Total number of times the focal app was updated since its first 
launch 
In-app purchase Dummy = 1 for apps that have an in-app purchase option 
App price Price of the focal apps (in U.S. dollars) 
Firm experience Number of months since the focal firm launched its first app 
App in Top 500 free 
Dummy = 1 if firm has an app in the Top 500 ranking for the free app 
in a given month 
Category demand 
Total number of apps for the focal category in the Top 500 ranking 
based on revenues in a given month  
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
No. Variables 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Platform connectedness 0.636 0.770 1.000                       
2 
Complement 
connectedness 0.393 0.894 -0.003 1.000                     
3 Generational newness -6.901 3.802 0.031 0.007 1.000                   
4 App rating 1.463 2.068 0.048 0.129 0.003 1.000                 
5 App content rating 139.301 109.943 -0.009 0.024 -0.002 0.039 1.000               
6 App size 47.887 230.691 -0.010 0.010 0.001 0.029 0.039 1.000             
7 In-app purchase 0.308 0.462 0.222 0.068 0.018 0.265 0.055 0.005 1.000           
8 3- months updates 0.534 0.892 0.027 0.068 0.025 0.134 0.025 -0.006 0.077 1.000         
9 Total updates 2.717 2.613 0.025 0.153 0.021 0.257 0.028 -0.016 0.113 0.316 1.000       
10 App price 3.191 19.207 -0.100 -0.029 -0.032 -0.257 -0.091 0.125 -0.117 -0.040 . -0.058 1.000     
11 Firm experience 26.959 16.443 0.165 0.046 0.000 -0.010 0.023 0.047 0.153 -0.107 0.097 0.006 1.000   
12 App in Top 500 free 0.019 0.135 0.018 0.062 -0.001 0.151 0.017 0.036 0.078 0.030 0.012 -0.042 0.061 1.000 
13 Category demand 136.111 186.492 0.273 -0.049 0.049 0.172 0.038 0.016 0.289 -0.025 -0.047 -0.124 0.109 0.084 
 
Correlations greater than 0.01 or smaller than -0.01 are significant at p <0.05, N = 3,797,947 
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Table 2.4: Cox proportional hazard model estimating the likelihood of achieving 
successful commercialization 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Platform connectedness  0.174***  0.226***   0.217*** 
  (0.023)  (0.028)   (0.028) 
Complement connectedness   0.151***  0.131***   
   (0.024)  (0.030)   
Platform connectedness*Gen. newness    -0.177***   -0.175*** 
    (0.056)   (0.056) 
Complement connect.*Gen. newness     0.070   
     (0.062)   
Complement connect.(Low plat. connect.)      0.100*** 0.091*** 
      (0.035) (0.035) 
Comp. connect.(Low plat. connect.)*Gen. 
newness 
     0.182** 0.183** 
      (0.076) (0.076) 
Complement connect.(High plat. connect.)      0.264*** 0.236** 
      (0.093) (0.094) 
Comp. connected (High plat. conn.)*Gen. 
newness 
     -0.365** -0.340** 
      (0.172) (0.172) 
Generational newness 0.227*** 0.181*** 0.203*** 0.369*** 0.154** 0.150* 0.307*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.089) (0.078) (0.078) (0.099) 
App rating 0.831*** 0.836*** 0.826*** 0.835*** 0.825*** 0.827*** 0.834*** 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
App rating * App rating -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.071*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
App content rating 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
App size -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has in-app purchase 0.431*** 0.384*** 0.395*** 0.379*** 0.397*** 0.394*** 0.371*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
3-month updates 0.251*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.248*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Total updates 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
App price 0.189*** 0.206*** 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.201*** 0.199*** 0.205*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Firm experience -0.046** -0.046** -0.052*** -0.044** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.046** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Time effect 0.028 0.028 0.038** 0.027 0.038** 0.038** 0.029 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Top 500 free app 0.832*** 0.832*** 0.834*** 0.831*** 0.833*** 0.834*** 0.830*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) 
Category demand 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Category demand * Category demand -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Category-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observation 3,797,947 3,797,947 3,797,947 3,797,947 3,797,947 3,797,947 3,797,947 
Total apps 244,084 244,084 244,034 244,084 244,034 244,034 244,034 
Total firms 20,174 20,174 20,174 20,174 20,174 20,174 20,174 
Total events 4,213 4,213 4,213 4,213 4,213 4,213 4,213 
Log likelihood -7,050.31 -7,028.78 -7,036.16 -7,025.72 -7,035.74 -7,033.68 -7,011.29 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.5: Robustness checks (Alternative specification) 
 Model 8 
WESML 
Model 9 
Dummy IVs 
Model 10 
High dep. apps 
Model 11 
6-mth window 
Platform connectedness 0.189*** 0.487*** 0.157*** 0.209*** 
 (0.047) (0.091) (0.032) (0.028) 
Complement connectedness (Low platform  
connectedness) 
0.064** 0.219*** 0.085** 0.092*** 
 (0.025) (0.066) (0.037) (0.034) 
Complement connectedness (High platform  
connectedness) 
0.234** 0.239** 0.224** 0.236** 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.097) (0.094) 
Platform connectedness*Generational 
newness 
-0.149* -0.336* -0.127* -0.161*** 
 (0.082) (0.203) (0.067) (0.055) 
Comp. connectedness (Low platform 
connectedness)*Generational newness 
0.269** -0.004 0.181** 0.180** 
 (0.131) (0.151) (0.082) (0.075) 
Comp. connectedness (High platform 
connectedness)*Generational newness 
-0.504* -0.324* -0.254 -0.340** 
 (0.288) (0.190) (0.170) (0.173) 
Generational newness 0.342** 0.455** 0.191 0.270*** 
 (0.158) (0.222) (0.143) (0.099) 
App rating 1.017*** 0.829*** 0.821*** 0.832*** 
 (0.102) (0.088) (0.089) (0.076) 
App rating * App rating -0.083*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.070*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
App content rating -0.083*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
App size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has in-app purchase 0.287*** 0.281*** 0.291*** 0.353*** 
 (0.083) (0.060) (0.060) (0.054) 
3-month updates 0.256*** 0.217*** 0.223*** 0.265*** 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) 
Total updates 0.180*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 
 (0.044) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) 
App price 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.172*** 0.198*** 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) 
Firm experience -0.036*** -0.047** -0.045** -0.045** 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Time effect 1.017*** 0.030 0.030 0.030 
 (0.102) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Top 500 free app 0.843*** 0.890*** 0.861*** 0.814*** 
 (0.106) (0.078) (0.077) (0.070) 
Category demand 0.003 0.006** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Category demand* Category demand -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total observation 1,053,803 3,797,947 2,267,398 2,925,262 
Total apps 50,901 244,034 148,385 244,034 
Total firms 6,412 20,174 15,512 20,174 
Total events 4,246 4,213 3,416 4,213 
Log likelihood -363.87 -5,307.70 -5,319.49 -6,922.18 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.6: Robustness check: Results with Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Platform connectedness 0.474***   
 (0.139)   
Platform connectedness*Generational newness -0.540*   
 (0.316)   
Complement connectedness  (Low platform  
connectedness) 
 0.132  
  (0.169)  
Complement connectedness (Low platform 
connectedness)* Generational newness 
 0.182  
  (0.358)  
Complement connectedness( High platform  
connectedness) 
  0.189** 
   (0.093) 
Complement  connectedness (High platform 
connectedness) * Generational newness 
  -0.352* 
    
Generational newness 0.206 0.226 0.561*** 
 (0.239) (0.263) (0.095) 
App rating 0.925*** 1.225*** 0.846*** 
 (0.177) (0.283) (0.172) 
App rating* App rating -0.054** -0.102*** -0.055*** 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.020) 
App content rating 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
App size 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has in-app purchase 0.349** 0.496*** 0.155* 
 (0.139) (0.152) (0.085) 
3-month updates 0.123 0.323*** -0.176* 
 (0.080) (0.110) (0.093) 
Total updates 0.107 -0.030 0.260*** 
 (0.067) (0.092) (0.085) 
App price 0.139* 0.113 0.243*** 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.046) 
Firm experience -0.112 -0.146** -0.021*** 
 (0.092) (0.072) (0.002) 
Time effect 0.087 0.124* 0.084 
 (0.092) (0.072) (0.102) 
Top 500 free app 0.575*** 0.513*** 0.472*** 
 (0.150) (0.112) (0.149) 
Category demand 0.004 0.010 0.007** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
Category demand * Category demand -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total observation 3,294,869 1,488,883 3,188,760 
Total apps 215,983.41 223,089.98 191,100.68 
Total events 1,571.63 1,134.00 4,750.97 
Log likelihood -2,216.84 -1,163.06 -15,625.77 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.7: Instrument variable analysis along with first stage selection model 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Platform query 17.305***      
 (0.226)      
Platform connectedness  1.047***     
  (0.033)     
Complement query (Low 
platform connectedness) 
  4.293***    
   (0.173)    
Complement connectedness 
(Low platform  connectedness) 
   1.293***   
    (0.005)   
Complement query (High 
platform  connectedness) 
    6.818***  
     (0.792)  
Complement connectedness 
(High platform  
connectedness) 
     0.149*** 
      (0.069) 
Generational newness 0.024*** 0.065** 0.011 0.010 0.036* 0.055* 
 (0.007) (0.032) (0.007) (0.013) (0.020) (0.042) 
App rating -0.091*** 0.454*** 0.038*** 0.023*** 0.154*** 0.510*** 
 (0.004) (0.021) (0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.028) 
App rating * App rating 0.018*** -0.040*** 0.004*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
App content rating -0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
App size -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has in-app purchase 0.176*** 0.166*** 0.052*** 0.028** 0.034** 0.475*** 
 (0.005) (0.026) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) 
3-month updates 0.057*** 0.476*** 0.048*** 0.108*** 0.045*** 0.632*** 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
Total updates 0.005*** -0.071*** 0.063*** -0.061*** 0.023*** -0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
App price -0.039*** 0.253*** -0.005* 0.074*** 0.056*** 0.287*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) 
Firm experience 0.003*** -0.033*** 0.002*** -0.012*** 0.004*** -0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Time effect 0.038*** -0.018*** 0.004*** -0.027*** -0.000* -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Top 500 free app 0.019 0.973*** 0.307*** -0.075*** 0.324*** 1.270*** 
 (0.012) (0.039) (0.012) (0.027) (0.025) (0.059) 
Category demand 0.005*** -0.012*** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Category demand * Category 
demand 
-0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.169*** -2.812*** 0.048*** -0.975*** -2.468*** -3.277*** 
 (0.013) (0.102) (0.013) (0.054) (0.043) (0.066) 
Total observation 244,084 244,084 244,084 244,084 244,084 244,084 
Cragg-Donald statistic  6296.96  615.52  87.31 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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3. SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE IN BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS: 
EVIDENCE FROM APPLICATION SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS IN THE IOS 
AND ANDROID SMARTPHONE ECOSYSTEMS 
 
 
Introduction 
There is growing recognition within the strategy field that the locus of value 
creation has shifted from focal firms to business ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; 
Teece, 2007; Baldwin, 2012; Adner et al., 2013).  Increasingly, business ecosystems are 
characterized by a firm that orchestrates the functioning of the ecosystem by providing a 
platform and setting the rules for other firms to leverage the platform and offer 
complementary products to the users.  Scholars exploring this phenomenon have tended 
to focus on the strategies and performance of platform firms (e.g., Cusumano et al., 
1992; Boudreau, 2010; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009; 
Eisenmann et al., 2011; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).  The emphasis has been on explaining 
how firms can create a platform, attract users and complementors, and achieve market 
dominance.  Hence, the research so far has tended to focus on the unitary actor that 
orchestrates the business ecosystem.  Much less attention has been devoted to 
understanding the performance consequences for complementors who typically 
represent a vast majority of firms in the ecosystem and who are critical to the value 
creation within the ecosystem.  
In this study, we focus on the performance of complementor firms within a 
platform-based ecosystem.  Specifically, we study the extent to which a high performing 
complementor can sustain its superior performance within the ecosystem.  While 
sustainability of superior performance is a critical goal for managers and has been an 
important line of inquiry for strategy scholars (e.g., Porter, 1985; Rumelt et al., 1991), it 
is becoming increasingly difficult for firms to realize it (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002; D’Aveni 
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et al., 2010; McGrath, 2013).  In the context of platform-based ecosystems, sustainability 
of complementors’ superior performance has important implications not only for these 
firms themselves but also for the platform firms whose performance is tied to value 
creation by their complementors.   
To unpack the drivers of sustainability, we offer a novel characterization of 
complementors’ ecosystem-level interdependencies that is rooted in the structural and 
evolutionary features of the ecosystem.  We first consider the structure of the 
complementor’s interdependence within the ecosystem based on the number of unique 
components (or subsystems) that interact with the complementor’s product.  For 
example, in the iOS smartphone ecosystem orchestrated by Apple (the platform firm), an 
application software (app) developer firm (the complementor) is interdependent on the 
specific handset and operating system combination offered by Apple.  In contrast, in the 
Android smartphone ecosystem orchestrated by Google, an app developer is 
interdependent on many unique handset and operating system combinations offered by 
firms such as HTC, LG, Motorola and Samsung.  We use the notion of ecosystem 
complexity to characterize this difference in the structure of interdependence for 
complementor firms.  We then consider the evolutionary features of an ecosystem by 
taking into account the generational transitions that are initiated by platform firms (e.g., 
introduction of new generation of operating system), and the experience that 
complementors gain within an ecosystem over time.  Our theoretical arguments are 
premised on complementors’ search processes with respect to innovation and imitation 
(e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004). We consider how 
ecosystem-level interdependencies impact these processes, and the resulting 
performance dynamics among complementors.  
The empirical setting for the study is the two dominant smartphone ecosystems 
in the U.S. - Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android, and we examine the performance of app 
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developers in these ecosystems from January, 2012 to January, 2014.  The setting 
provides a valuable opportunity to study complementors’ performance dynamics in 
ecosystems with varying levels of complexity and being subject to frequent platform 
transitions.  The diversity in handsets and operating systems among the user base 
makes the Android ecosystem much more complex for app developers than the iOS 
ecosystem.  While the contrast between iOS and Android is stark, we also observe 
varying levels of complexity within both ecosystems over time.  In addition, we observe 
three episodes of platform transitions that entail major updates to the smartphone 
operating system.2  
We assembled a unique monthly panel dataset of top-performing app developers 
in the iOS and Android smartphone ecosystems over the two-year period.  To gain 
insights into the challenges of developing apps and competing in these ecosystems, we 
also interviewed several executives and engineers from app developer firms.  The 
analysis is based on the extent to which app developers sustain their superior 
performance by observing whether their apps continue to be in the top performance 
stratum in a given ecosystem (i.e., Top 500 apps by revenue).  The research setting is 
hypercompetitive and, on average, a firm sustains its superior performance for only six 
months.  Moreover, once a firm exits the top performance stratum in a given ecosystem, 
the likelihood of reappearance in the stratum is very low.  Only 14% of exit events are 
followed by re-entry in the top performance stratum.  Finally, 64% of top-performing firms 
participate in both the iOS and Android ecosystems, which helps us address 
endogeneity concerns due to firms self-selecting into a given ecosystem.  Consistent 
with our arguments, we find that app developers’ ability to sustain superior performance 
                                                          
2
 While smartphone is the dominant hardware for Android and iOS operating systems, these operating systems 
are also used in other hardware categories such as tablets and e-readers.  In this study, we focus on the 
performance dynamics of app developer firms within only the Android and iOS smartphone ecosystems.  For 
Apple, the iOS smartphone ecosystem is effectively the iPhone ecosystem. 
47 
is facilitated by the ecosystem complexity and their ecosystem experience but hampered 
by platform transitions initiated by Apple and Google.  Moreover, ecosystem complexity 
enhances the benefit of ecosystem experience whereas it exacerbates the impact of 
platform transition. 
The study, while limited to a specific empirical context, provides one of the first 
detailed accounts of the drivers of complementors’ performance within a platform-based 
ecosystem.  A key aspect of the study is to offer a novel perspective of complementors’ 
ecosystem-level interdependencies that incorporates both the structural and evolutionary 
features of the ecosystem, and to show that such a perspective is useful in explaining 
performance dynamics among complementors within an ecosystem.   In so doing, it 
contributes to the emerging literature stream examining the challenges and opportunities 
faced by complementors in business ecosystems (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Ceccagnoli et 
al., 2012; Kapoor, 2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013).  More broadly, the study offers a new 
lens on the interactions between firms and their environments.  Existing treatments of 
firms’ environments are typically premised on complexity and uncertainty being a 
general feature of the industry (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson and Tushman, 
2001; Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2009).  However, in platform-based ecosystems, 
environmental complexity and uncertainty for complementors can be shaped by the 
strategies of platform firms, and as a result, complementors in the same industry can be 
subject to significantly different environments.  Accordingly, there are implications for 
both platform firms that orchestrate the ecosystem and for complementor firms that 
leverage the focal platform.  As we show in the study that ecosystem complexity can 
help complementors sustain their superior performance but it can also magnify the 
challenges that complementors face during periods of platform transition.  Our findings 
also contribute to the literature on technological change which has shed light on how 
technology transition impacts the performance of firms in the focal industry (Tushman 
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and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997).   We highlight 
how technological interdependencies between platform firms and complementors in 
related industries can create a ripple effect for complementors when platform firms 
introduce a new generation of the platform.  Finally, the study is also among the first to 
offer systematic empirical evidence about the role of complexity on firm performance as 
theorized within the evolutionary economics perspective of firms (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; 
Rivkin, 2000; Lenox et al., 2010).  
Hypotheses 
We focus on the performance of complementors within a platform-based 
ecosystem.  In particular, we take into account that there are performance differences 
among complementors within an ecosystem, and we explore the extent to which a high 
performing complementor can sustain its performance advantage within an ecosystem.  
Sustainability of superior performance is an important goal for managers (e.g., Porter, 
1985), and it has been studied extensively by strategy scholars (e.g., Rumelt et al., 
1991; Teece, 2007).  We theorize how complementor’s sustainability of superior 
performance is impacted by ecosystem-level interdependencies.   
We first consider the structure of complementor’s interdependence in the 
ecosystem based on the number of unique components that interact with a 
complementor’s product.  We refer to this structural feature as ecosystem complexity.  
The greater the number of unique components that interact with a complementor’s 
product, the greater is the degree of ecosystem complexity faced by the complementor.  
This uniqueness could be driven by different variants of the components that perform the 
same function (e.g., distinct versions of a hardware component) or by different 
components that perform different functions (e.g., a hardware and a software 
component).  Moreover, depending on the architecture of the ecosystem, the same 
complementor could be subject to varying degrees of complexity across two different 
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ecosystems (e.g., an app developer participating in iOS and in Android smartphone 
ecosystems), or two different complementors may be subject to varying degrees of 
complexity within the same ecosystem (e.g., an app developer and a handset 
manufacturer within the Android smartphone ecosystem). 3  Further, the architecture of 
the ecosystem can itself change over time depending on the choices of platform and 
complementor firms.  This characterization of ecosystem-level complexity is distinct from 
existing treatments of industry-level complexity that are rooted in the complexity of firms’ 
internal technological knowledge domains, products and processes (e.g., Ganco, 2013; 
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Lenox et al., 2010; Singh, 1997), or in the concentration of 
firms’ inputs and outputs in the focal industry (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson 
and Tushman, 2001).   
We then consider the impact of generational transitions initiated by platform firms 
(e.g., new generations of gaming consoles introduced by Sony, Nintendo, or Microsoft).  
These transitions represent a common means by which platform firms compete and 
create value over time.  From a complementor’s perspective, however, they necessitate 
significant adaptation, as complementors need to reconfigure their products to leverage 
the performance improvements accorded by the new generation of the platform.  Finally, 
we consider the impact of complementor’s experience in an ecosystem. Given that a 
complementor’s product is closely tied to the ecosystem-specific components, we 
explore the importance of ecosystem-specific learning as it relates to the sustainability of 
superior performance.  
Our theoretical predictions stem from the evolutionary economics perspective of 
firms (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2004).  Drawing on this perspective, we consider the dual search processes of 
                                                          
3 Since our emphasis in this paper is to explore the performance outcomes of complementor firms, we are 
considering the local structural complexity that the complementor firm is subjected to in a given ecosystem.  A 
separate characterization can entail the complexity of the entire ecosystem.   
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innovation and imitation as shaping performance dynamics among firms (e.g., Zott, 
2003; Lenox et al., 2006).  The first process, innovative search, is characterized by firms 
searching for superior solutions to a given problem and improving their performance 
over time (e.g., Levinthal, 1997).  Such a solution comprises of choices that 
complementors may make regarding their products, tasks, or organization with respect 
to the ecosystem, and which collectively represent a superior performance configuration.   
The second process, imitative search, represents firms’ attempting to imitate other high 
performing firms (e.g., Rivkin, 2000).  We assume that complementors are continuously 
searching for superior performance configurations within an ecosystem.  The search 
processes for the new complementors or the existing complementors with inferior 
performance (follower firms) are likely to be characterized by some combination of 
innovative and imitative search, while the search processes for the complementors with 
superior performance (leader firms) are likely to be characterized by innovative search.  
We first explore the role of ecosystem complexity.  We then examine the role of 
complementors’ experience and platform transition and how these factors interact with 
ecosystem complexity. 
Ecosystem Complexity 
To explain how ecosystem complexity influences complementors’ sustainability 
of superior performance, we need to understand how ecosystem complexity impacts the 
search processes of firms in the ecosystem.  As ecosystem complexity increases, 
complementors need to optimize their products so as to account for greater number of 
interactions between their products and other components within the ecosystem.  For 
example, in our empirical context, the large variety of the handset and operating system 
combinations subjected app developers to significantly greater complexity in the Android 
ecosystem than in the iOS ecosystem.  During our interviews, many executives and 
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engineers from app developer firms emphasized this difference.  The quote below from 
an engineer elucidates this: 
“We need to test our app on different OEM devices likes Samsung, HTC to make 
sure our app works on different Android devices.4 This creates a lot of work for 
developer and testing teams.  iOS does not have any such issue…this is our 
biggest technological challenge with Android.” 
Hence, an increase in ecosystem complexity translates into an increase in 
complementor’s internal complexity with respect to its decision variables (i.e., the 
choices that complementors make regarding their products, tasks, and organization).  
For example, as the number of unique components that the complementor’s product 
interacts with increases, there will be an increase in the number of decision variables 
with respect to product design.  These decision variables may also interact with each 
other due to technological interdependence (i.e., hardware and software components) or 
due to performance tradeoffs (i.e., higher value of a design variable that increases 
performance with respect to one hardware component may decrease the performance 
with respect to another hardware component).   
Under conditions of high ecosystem complexity, the search for superior 
performance configuration by follower firms will be difficult (e.g., Levinthal, 1997).  This is 
because higher ecosystem complexity increases the number of possible combinations of 
decisions, which makes the search process intractable.  Moreover, even if a follower firm 
is able to innovate and identify a higher performance configuration, it is more likely that 
the configuration represents a local optimum and may not lead to superior performance.  
                                                          
4 OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacturer.  In our empirical context, it is used to refer to handset 
manufacturers.  Also, as this quote highlights that app developers do not create different apps for different 
OEMs within the Android ecosystem.  Rather they create the same app and try to ensure that it functions on 
devices offered by the different OEMs.  This is also consistent with our characterization of ecosystem 
complexity faced by complementors. 
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Further, such conditions also make it difficult for follower firms to search by incrementally 
changing their decision variables (Rivkin, 2000).5   
Beyond searching for superior configurations through innovation, followers can 
also imitate leader firms.  When ecosystem complexity is high, the focal firm with the 
leadership position is also protected against imitation in two ways.  First, follower firms 
will find it difficult to decipher the exact configuration of the leader firm (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 1982; Rivkin, 2000; Csaszar and Siggelkow, 2010).  Second, even if a follower 
attempts to replicate the exact configuration of the leader, greater complexity will help 
sustain the leader’s superior performance.  This is because a small error in imitation will 
generate large penalties in performance when ecosystem complexity is high (Rivkin, 
2000). 
In summary, ecosystem complexity will help complementors sustain their 
superior performance by making it more difficult for other complementors to search for or 
to imitate higher performance configurations.6  Accordingly, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: A complementor will be more likely to sustain its superior 
performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low. 
Ecosystem Experience 
A complementor’s experience within an ecosystem can also play a significant 
role in its ability to sustain superior performance. Ecosystem experience, which spans 
the entire period of participation in an ecosystem and not just the period of superior 
                                                          
5 It is worth noting that innovative search for superior performance configuration when ecosystem complexity 
is high will be difficult for all firms.  Our focus in this study is to explain the sustainability of superior 
performance. Hence, our theoretical arguments are premised on some firms achieving superior performance, 
and we focus on the difficulty of innovative search for follower firms (e.g., Rivkin, 2000). 
6 It is possible that at very high levels of complexity, complementors with superior performance may also find 
it difficult to innovate and maintain their leadership position.  Hence, the difficulties with respect to innovation 
encountered by both leader and follower firms at very high levels of ecosystem complexity might offset each 
other.  However, imitation by followers will still be difficult at such high levels of complexity.  Therefore, in 
considering the two mechanisms of innovation and imitation, the overall effect at very high levels of 
ecosystem complexity might depend on the relative impact of these individual mechanisms for the leader and 
the follower firms.  We also note that such an extreme scenario of ecosystem complexity is unlikely to occur 
in platform-based ecosystems because of the somewhat modular nature of the interfaces between the platform 
and the complements.  
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performance, will help confer several types of learning-based advantages on leader 
firms. Sustaining superior performance requires leader firms to continuously search and 
identify higher performing configurations. Experience facilitates the development and 
improvement of routines, making search process underlying leader firms’ innovation 
efforts with respect to other interdependent components more reliable (i.e., less prone to 
mistakes) (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  Experience also helps 
improve the efficiency of leader firms’ search processes by reducing the cost of 
experimentation and, hence, making it less costly for firms to innovate over time (Zott, 
2003).  
In addition to the abovementioned learning-by-doing advantages, an important 
type of learning in ecosystems is what Rosenberg (1982) referred to as learning-by-
using.  This type of learning is not a function of the experience in developing and 
producing the product per se, but rather is a function of the experience in the product’s 
utilization by its users in conjunction with the rest of the system.  Rosenberg (1982) 
provided a valuable illustration of learning-by-using by aircraft manufactures and 
suggested that this type of learning is especially important when the use of the product is 
influenced by its interaction with other components.  The existence of numerous 
technological interdependencies within a platform-based ecosystem makes it difficult for 
firms to know in advance how the product will perform during use and, hence, 
experience that is rooted in the usage of the product by the users plays a vital role in 
helping firms innovate and improve their products over time.  A leader firm, by virtue of 
having a large user base for a platform, will derive a significant advantage through 
learning-by-using. 
In our interviews, a senior engineer from a leading app developer firm elaborated 
on the importance of experience as it relates to both learning-by-doing and learning-by-
using: 
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"Experience plays a critical part in our product lifecycle. From pure engineering 
perspective…most of the knowledge and skills are acquired through the 
development efforts over time. It is not easily accessible from outside-firm 
sources, and it [is] essential for building a high quality, user delightful 
application…The application keeps evolving at design and feature level, through 
responding to user feedbacks and data. Engineering team also benefits from this 
mostly capturing edge cases which is rarely producible in the internal 
environment.” 
Finally, experience in an ecosystem enables firms to accumulate knowledge-
based assets such as new product development and marketing capabilities.  Firms 
imitating such assets will be subject to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989), making it easier for the leader firms to sustain their performance superiority.  
Hence, experience in an ecosystem is likely to confer a high performing complementor 
with both learning-by-doing and learning-by-using advantages as well as make it more 
difficult for followers to replicate its knowledge-based assets.7  Accordingly, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the complementor’s ecosystem experience, the 
more likely the complementor will sustain its superior performance within 
the ecosystem. 
 
Complementor’s experiential advantage within an ecosystem may be impacted 
by the level of ecosystem complexity.  Greater ecosystem complexity increases 
complementor’s internal complexity with respect to the choices that complementors 
make regarding their products, tasks, and organization.  This increase in internal 
complexity can raise the opportunities for learning-by-doing (Balasubramanian and 
Lieberman (2010)), making it more difficult for followers to catch up with experienced 
leaders.  In addition, the greater the degree of ecosystem complexity that a focal 
complementor’s product is subjected to, the more uncertain will be the interactions 
                                                          
7 Our focus here is on theorizing with respect to complementors’ experience-based advantages for a specific 
platform-based ecosystem.  These advantages stem from learning-by-doing, learning-by-using and time 
compression diseconomies associated with knowledge-based assets.  Experience-based advantages in an 
ecosystem could also stem from firms’ accumulation of other assets such as brand, customer loyalty, as well as 
firms having a broader portfolio of products over time.  We account for these drivers in our empirical analysis, 
and we also show that complementor’s platform-specific experience (e.g., smartphone apps for iOS platform) 
has a much greater impact on its sustainability than its general experience in the industry (e.g., smartphone 
apps).   
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between the product and the rest of the system and, hence, the more valuable will be 
learning-by-using.  Finally, time compression diseconomies associated with the 
followers’ imitation of knowledge-based assets accumulated by the leader firms are also 
likely to increase in complexity (Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2010).  Hence, we expect that 
complementors’ ecosystem experience would be more valuable in sustaining their 
superior performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of a complementor’s ecosystem 
experience on the sustainability of its superior performance will be 
stronger when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low. 
Generational Transitions by Platform Firms 
Finally, we consider the impact of generational transitions initiated by platform 
firms on the complementors’ ability to sustain their superior performance.  While extant 
literature has explored how technology transitions in the focal industry impacts firm 
performance (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 
1997), we explore how technology transitions initiated by platform firms may impact 
complementors’ performance in the ecosystem.  Therefore, we highlight an important 
evolutionary feature of platform-based ecosystems in which a technological shift 
orchestrated by the platform firm can have important consequences for the 
complementors. 
Transitioning to a new platform generation is an important mode by which 
platform firms compete and create value.  New platform generations typically offer 
improvements in existing functionality and also add new functionality.  In so doing, they 
alter the interactions among components within the ecosystem (Venkatraman and Lee, 
2004; Ansari and Garud, 2009; Adner and Kapoor, 2010).  Hence, a new platform 
generation may represent a case of an architectural change as discussed by Henderson 
and Clark (1990), where the core design concepts and the associated knowledge are not 
overturned but there is a change in the nature of interactions between the platform and 
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the complements.  This renders the strategic configurations of the high performing 
complementors from the previous platform generation less effective.  Put at a more 
abstract level, the fitness landscape (i.e., mapping between strategic configurations and 
performance) is re-specified (Levinthal, 1997).  For example, when Apple introduced the 
new mobile operating system named iOS 6, some of the music apps stopped working.  
After updating to the new operating system, many users found that their music data had 
disappeared.  App developers had to optimize and retest their apps with the new 
operating system to ensure smooth functioning of their apps.  During our interview, a 
senior engineer from an app developer firm also elaborated on this challenge: 
“Although OS [Operating System] upgrades do a good job of the issue of 
backward compatibility, but the new OS will depreciate some APIs from the older 
version.8 If the apps are using the API from the older version, it is going to crash. 
Further, we also try to use latest APIs in the new OS. If the user tries to run the 
latest APIs on the older version, the app is going to crash.” 
 
In another interview, a cofounder of a leading app developer firm discussed how 
a recent transition in iOS impacted the functioning of his firm’s app: 
“In iOS 7 [released in September 2013], Apple changed some parts of the 
background infrastructure [API] the way an app interacts with the 
operating system, in order to enhance the graphics on its new hardware.  
And because of this change, our app literally stopped working on the new 
version, when it was working perfectly in the previous version.” 
 
At the same time, features introduced in the new platform generation can provide 
opportunities for new complementors to enter the ecosystem and to effectively compete 
against leader firms.  Hence, while platform transitions are important for sustaining 
technological progress within an ecosystem, they may present challenges for 
complementors to sustain their superior performance:  
Hypothesis 4: Generational transition initiated by the platform firm will 
make it more difficult for the complementor to sustain its superior 
performance within the ecosystem. 
                                                          
8 API stands for application program interface.  In the context of smartphone ecosystems, these are software 
protocols provided by platform firms such as Apple and Google for app developers to create apps for their 
platforms. 
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In the face of a platform transition, complementors need to adapt so as to identify 
new strategic configurations that can yield high performance.  We now consider how 
ecosystem complexity affects these firms’ ability to adapt — i.e., we explore the 
interaction between platform transitions and ecosystem complexity.  When ecosystem 
complexity is low, adaptation through local search performed in the neighborhood of a 
firm’s previous configuration is effective (Levinthal, 1997).  Hence, a complementor with 
a superior performance configuration in the previous platform generation will find it 
relatively easier to identify and to move to a high performance configuration in the new 
platform generation.  In contrast, when ecosystem complexity is high, adaptation through 
local search might not be very effective.  Successful adaptation would require a greater 
degree of change (i.e., often referred to as a long jump on a fitness landscape).  
However, at the same time, greater complexity among firms’ choices makes such a 
large-scale change very risky, as a small error or miscalculation can result in subpar 
performance (Henderson and Clark, 1990).  Therefore, complementors may find it much 
more difficult to sustain their superior performance in the face of a platform transition 
when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low:   
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of platform transition on the 
sustainability of a complementor’s superior performance will be stronger 
when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low. 
 
Methodology 
The empirical analysis is carried out in the context of the iOS and Android 
smartphone ecosystems within the U.S. market.  The focal complementor firms are 
application software developers who were able to attain superior performance in these 
ecosystems from January 2012 to January 2014.  Smartphones based on iOS and 
Android operating systems represented more than 90% of the U.S. smartphone installed 
base during this period.  Both Apple and Google provide a daily list of Top 500 apps by 
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revenue.  We use that information to identify the focal firms.  The context is 
hypercompetitive, where hundreds of thousands of app developers are frequently 
introducing new apps or improved versions of their existing apps.  Such high intensity of 
competition makes it very difficult for app developers to sustain their superior 
performance, even for a few months. 
This setting also provides a valuable context in which we can observe two 
ecosystems with varying levels of complexity for the app developers within the same 
industrial context.  This difference arises primarily due to the difference in the strategies 
used by Apple and Google for controlling and governing their respective ecosystems.  
Apple’s strategy is often described as a closed strategy, as it exercises strong control 
over the entire ecosystem, with the objective of providing high quality experience to the 
user (Ghazawneh and Henfidsson, 2013).  Most notable is Apple’s strict control and 
ownership of both the handset and the iOS operating system.  In contrast, Google’s 
strategy is premised on Android as an open-source operating system, which allows for 
its development and distribution by various original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
such as HTC, LG, and Samsung.  Hence, an app in the Android ecosystem interacts 
with multiple handset and operating system combinations offered by various OEMs.  As 
a result, an app developer firm in the Android ecosystem operates in a relatively more 
complex ecosystem compared to the one operating in the iOS ecosystem.  The two 
ecosystems also collectively underwent three episodes of platform transitions during our 
observation period, which allowed us to examine the impact of platform transition on 
complementors. 
Data 
The primary sources for our data are App Annie (www.appannie.com) and 
appFigures (www.appfigures.com), two of the leading analyst firms in the mobile 
computing sector.  App Annie has been tracking and archiving information related to all 
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the apps developed for iOS and Android platforms.  Its data is extensively used by app 
developers, venture capital firms, and financial analysts.  Similarly, appFigures has 
developed a comprehensive database of all apps in the iOS and Android ecosystems.  
We used appFigures as a supplementary data source in order to validate the data 
received from App Annie and to also extend the data to incorporate a more recent time 
frame.9  Note that both App Annie and appFigures do not generate their own data, but 
accumulate daily data from Google Play and Apple iTunes App stores over time and 
offer their users easy-to-use tools for analyzing trends. 
The dataset comprises information on app developers whose apps attained top-
ranking positions by revenue (i.e., Top 500) in either the iOS or Android ecosystem from 
January 2012 to January 2014.  The dataset does not include some e-commerce apps 
such as those from Amazon and Walmart, that do not generate revenues through paid 
apps or in-app purchases via Apple iTunes or Google Play App stores.  The revenue 
distribution for smartphone apps is heavily skewed.  For example, based on the survey 
of more than 10,000 app developers, it was found that the top “1.6% of developers make 
multiples of the other 98.4% combined” (VisionMobile, 2014).10  Therefore, having an 
app in the Top 500 list offers clear evidence of performance superiority among hundreds 
of thousands of app developers.  Such a list is also keenly followed by industry 
observers and analysts as a reference for successful app developers.  We use this 
revenue ranking to characterize firms’ superior performance.  Ideally, we would have 
also liked to have information on the actual revenues and profits within an ecosystem for 
each of the app developers in the sample.  However, such data is not made available by 
app developers.  Despite this constraint, rank-based relative performance information 
                                                          
9 Originally, App Annie was the primary source of data for the paper.  We had received data from App Annie 
from January 2012 to June 2013.  We subsequently received data from appFigures that allowed us to extend 
the timeline to January 2014.     
10 The report is available at http://www.developereconomics.com/reports/developer-economics-q3-2014/. Last 
accessed on March 10, 2016. 
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provides us with an approach to capture the relative performance superiority of app 
developers in an ecosystem that is consistent with our theory and is also consistent with 
how industry analysts evaluate performance superiority among app developers.  
The majority of firms whose apps appear in the Top 500 list do not stay in that list 
for more than six months, a finding that is consistent with the context being 
hypercompetitive.  Unpacking such finer-grained performance dynamics requires 
choosing an observation window that is shorter than the annual window typically 
employed in strategy research (D’Aveni et al., 2010).  We chose the period of 
observation to be a given month that would allow us to explain greater variance in the 
app developer’s sustainability of superior performance without being subject to 
exogenous intermittent fluctuations in the Top 500 ranking associated with daily or 
weekly observations.  This required aggregating the daily revenue rank data into monthly 
data.  Because of the skewness of the distribution of revenues across the Top 500 apps, 
taking a simple average of apps’ daily ranks to compute monthly ranks is problematic.  
To adjust for this skewness, we followed a procedure guided by prior research.  
Researchers have attempted to infer revenue and sales data from rank data by 
conducting experiments, collaborating with focal firms, or using publicly available 
information (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester, 2003; Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003; 
Garg and Telang, 2013).  These studies have found that the relationship between 
revenue (or sales) and rank closely follows a Pareto distribution according to which: 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑏 ∗ (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘)−𝑎+ ∈ 
 
where b is the scale parameter that is a function of the total revenue and a is the 
shape parameter of the underlying distribution that drives the difference in revenues 
across ranks.  Moreover, the shape parameter for the Pareto distribution for this 
relationship has been found to be proximate to 1.  For example, in a recent study by 
Garg and Telang (2013), shape parameters for the iOS and Android apps were 
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estimated to be between 0.86 and 1.16.  Hence, to account for the Pareto distribution in 
our data, we assume the daily revenue for an app in the Top 500 list to be inversely 
proportional to its rank.11  Further, we assume the scale parameter for each ecosystem 
to be constant during a given month.  This allows us to calculate an app’s monthly 
revenue rank for both the iOS and the Android ecosystems.  
In addition to data on app developers whose apps achieved a Top 500 rank by 
revenue, we also obtained monthly data on the total number of apps and firms within 
each category of apps (e.g., games, social networking, productivity).  We supplemented 
data from App Annie and appFigures with data from firms’ websites and LinkedIn 
(www.linkedin.com) to gather information on the number of employees and firms’ 
participation in businesses other than smartphone apps.  We also directly contacted 
some firms to obtain information on their number of employees.  To measure ecosystem 
complexity faced by app developers within the Android ecosystem, we obtained data on 
the monthly share of the U.S. installed base for each of the smartphone OEMs from 
comScore (www.comscore.com).  We also used the aggregate statistics on installed 
base, the number of app developers, and the number of apps for both iOS and Android 
to rule out that the observation period (Jan’ 2012 – Jan’ 2014) is not idiosyncratic in 
ways that may impact our inferences.  The level of analysis is firm-ecosystem-month, 
and the final dataset comprises 12,691 observations from 1,516 app developer firms. 
Measures 
Dependent variable: We examine the sustainability of superior performance for 
app developers by observing whether their apps continue to be among the Top 500 apps 
by revenue in the iOS or the Android ecosystem.  These ecosystems represented most 
of the economic opportunities for smartphone app developers during the observation 
                                                          
11 Note that the inversely proportional relationship between app revenue and rank also follows from Zipf’s law 
that is frequently used to approximate actual data from rank data in physical and social sciences.  
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period.  Revenues in other smartphone ecosystems such as RIM’s Blackberry, 
Microsoft’s Windows Mobile and Nokia’s Symbian were relatively negligible.  Hence, 
being ranked in the Top 500 apps by revenue in iOS or Android corresponds to 
significant economic performance for app developers.  For about 80% of the cases, a 
firm had a single app in the Top 500 list in the same month.  Since our level of analysis 
is a firm and not an app, if a firm had more than one app in the Top 500 list in the same 
month, we treated those cases as a single firm-level observation.  A related issue with 
our measure is that for some firms, sustainability in an ecosystem may be driven by 
different apps (i.e., App A is in Top 500 list in month t and App B (not App A) is in Top 
500 list in month t+1).  It is possible that App B may be a close substitute to App A or 
that App B is a “new” app focusing on a different use.  We discuss this issue in the 
robustness checks section and conduct an additional analysis by including firms which 
only had a single app in the Top 500 list.    
Similar to Wiggins and Ruefli (2002, 2005) and Hermelo and Vassolo (2010), we 
consider a firm’s superior performance to be eroded if it exits the superior performance 
stratum (i.e., the Top 500 list).  In order to ensure that the exit is somewhat persistent 
rather than intermittent, we use a window of three months to record the exit event (i.e., 
firm’s app is not present in the Top 500 list for three consecutive months after being in 
that list in the previous month).  Hence, a firm is assumed to sustain its superior 
performance if its app continues to be in the Top 500 list in at least one of the following 
three months.  We also performed sensitivity checks by using windows of two and four 
months respectively.  
On average, an app developer remains in the Top 500 list for a longer duration in 
the Android ecosystem (7 months) than in the iOS ecosystem (5 months).  Moreover, in 
the iOS ecosystem, about half of the firms exit the Top 500 list in less than two months, 
63 
whereas in the Android ecosystem, this duration is about five months.  This pattern is 
consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 1.  
Independent variables:  Complexity has been defined and measured in many 
different ways across different scientific fields (Lloyd, 2001).  This is because no single 
approach can capture what scientists from different fields mean by complex (Page, 
2010).   In general, most definitions and associated measures consider complexity 
based on the difficulty of describing or creating an object, or based on the degree of 
organization with respect to the object (e.g., structural linkages between parts of a 
system).  Our measure of ecosystem complexity needs to account for the technological 
interdependencies that an app developer is subjected to with other components within a 
smartphone ecosystem.  Therefore, our approach here is consistent with characterizing 
complexity in terms of the degree of organization.  For smartphone ecosystem, the most 
obvious interdependencies for an app developer are with respect to the operating 
system and the handset.  Hence, the greater the number of operating system and 
handset combinations that an app developer is subjected to, the greater is the 
ecosystem complexity faced by the app developer.  As Apple controls both the operating 
system and handset, an app in the iOS ecosystem interacts only with the combination 
offered by Apple.  In the case of the Android ecosystem, although the core operating 
system is designed by Google, each smartphone OEM customizes the operating system 
and the handset.  As a result, an app in the Android ecosystem interacts with handset 
and operating system combinations from many different OEMs.  Our interviews also 
confirmed that app developers typically do not develop different apps for different OEMs 
in the Android ecosystem.  It is the same app that works across different handset and 
operating system configurations provided by the OEMs. 
Since ecosystem complexity faced by app developers is rooted in the diversity in 
the operating system and handset combinations offered by OEMs, we use a Simpson 
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index-based diversity measure to operationalize ecosystem complexity (Page, 2010).12  
The measure ecosystem complexity is the sum of the squares of the monthly shares of 
the U.S. installed base for smartphone OEMs in an ecosystem.13  It takes a value of 1 for 
the iOS ecosystem and ranges from 0.28 to 0.40 for the more complex Android 
ecosystem.  We multiplied the measure by -1 so that higher values indicate higher 
ecosystem complexity.    
We measured ecosystem experience as the total number of months that a firm 
gained experience in a given ecosystem.  To obtain this measure, we first identified the 
month in which the firm introduced its first app in the ecosystem (i.e., month of entry) 
and then computed the number of months between the observation month and the 
month of entry.  We identified the effect of platform transition using a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if a new generation of smartphone operating system was 
introduced within the prior three months.14  The reason for the three-month window is 
that it often takes users several weeks to adopt the new generation of operating system 
and a similar time frame for app developers to adapt and reconfigure their apps.  During 
                                                          
12 An alternative could be a measure based on the Shannon index. The two indices differ with respect to the 
relative weights that they ascribe to each OEM’s installed base. The Simpson index uses the proportion of 
each OEM’s installed base as weights to calculate the weighted arithmetic mean of the share of installed base 
for each OEM. The Simpson index thus gives higher weights to the OEMs which have high installed base. In 
contrast, the Shannon index uses weights based on natural logarithm of the proportion of installed base of each 
OEM and thus ascribes relatively higher weights to the OEMs with the low installed base. Hence, the measure 
is somewhat inconsistent with the fact that app developers focus most of their efforts on OEMs with high 
installed base.  The Simpson index is mathematically equivalent to the popular Herfindahl index used in 
economics and management literature to measure industry concentration. Herfindahl index is based on the 
sales of different firms within an industry whereas our measure is based on the installed base of the different 
OEMs within an ecosystem. 
13 Note also that our measure is based on the share of OEMs installed base and not the share of their sales. 
This is because the market for apps is not only confined to new smartphones being sold but it also 
encompasses existing smartphones being used.  As an additional alternative measure, we could have also used 
a count-based measure of the number of smartphone OEMs or the number of the different types of 
smartphones in a given ecosystem.  However, in our interviews, industry participants repeatedly asserted that 
their firms focus their app development efforts on the small subset of more commonly used handsets.  For 
example, in Android, they consistently referred to focusing their efforts so that the same app works on 6-8 
leading smartphones from multiple OEM firms.  The Simpson index-based measure helps to account for this 
concentration effect. 
14 New generations of smartphone operating system were identified based on change in the code name (e.g., 
change from Ice Cream Sandwich to Jelly Bean in the case of Android, and from iOS 5 to iOS 6), a standard 
practice in this industry.  In addition to launching new generations of operating system, both Apple and 
Google also offer minor updates which are predominantly “bug fixes” within the existing generation.  
Therefore, we do not consider these minor updates as platform-level generational transitions. 
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the period of study, there were two major platform transitions in the iOS ecosystem 
(launch of iOS 6 in September 2012 and launch of iOS 7 in September 2013) and one 
major transition in the Android ecosystem (launch of the Jellybean 4.1 operating system 
in July 2012).  Although Google officially launched Jellybean 4.1 in July 2012, it became 
available to the majority of U.S. consumers through the different OEMs only in 
December 2012.  We verified this information by searching for news articles discussing 
the launch of Jellybean 4.1 by OEMs such as Samsung, HTC, and Motorola, often with 
new generations of handsets.  Hence, for the Android ecosystem, we considered the 
period of platform transition to last from January to March of 2013.  
To ensure that our coding of these platform transitions matches with our 
theoretical premise of challenges faced by complementors during such episodes, we 
used data from Google Trends for searches made on Google in the U.S. with the search 
term “app not working.”15  Figure 3.1 plots the normalized weekly trend of search volume 
from January 2012 to January 2014.   It shows clear instances of peaks during the 
months in which new generations of operating system are introduced within the iOS and 
Android ecosystems.  Hence, these trends confirm our coding schema and provide 
evidence of the challenges faced by app developers during periods of platform 
transitions.16 
(Insert Figure 3.1 about here) 
 
Control variables: We controlled for a number of covariates that may influence an 
app developer’s ability to sustain its superior performance.  We used the total number of 
employees as a proxy for firm size and used this variable to control for scale-related 
                                                          
15 Results can include searches containing "app" and "not working" in any order. Other related terms may be 
included in the search results, like "music app not working." 
16  We note that the introduction of new generations of smartphone operating system are also typically 
accompanied by the introduction of new handsets by OEMs.  However, the older handsets still account for the 
majority of users during the transition period.  Hence, for both iOS and Android ecosystems, the major driver 
of app developers’ performance as well as their adaptation requirements during generational transitions stem 
from the change in the operating system rather than from the launch of the new handsets. 
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effects.  Data on the total number of employees was collected from the firm’s website or 
LinkedIn.  For those firms for which this information was not available, we contacted 
them via e-mail and received a 78% response rate.   
About 64% of firms in the sample participated in both the iOS and Android 
ecosystems.  Participation in both ecosystems may create challenges with respect to 
resource allocation over time.  We controlled for this effect through the variable dual 
participation, which takes a value of 1 if the firm had an app in both the iOS and Android 
ecosystems in a given month and 0 otherwise.  We also controlled for the firm’s 
presence in markets other than smartphone apps that may confer advantages such as 
those with respect to brand, customer loyalty, and economies of scope.  The variable 
other online business takes a value of 1 if a firm is active in other web- or PC-based 
businesses like owning a social networking website or developing software for PC.  The 
variable other offline business takes a value of 1 if the firm’s scope of businesses 
expanded beyond the internet and PC domain, such as console games.   
App developers often try to gain visibility by providing free apps.  We controlled 
for this effect through a dummy variable Top 500 free ranking that takes a value of 1 if 
any of the apps developed by the firm were also part of the Top 500 ranking based on 
the number of downloads for free apps in a given month.  We also controlled for the 
overall quality of firms’ apps by using data on consumer ratings received by all apps 
developed by the firm.  We are unable to observe the change in ratings for all apps over 
time.  Hence, we used a time-invariant firm-level control to capture firm-level differences 
in app quality.  Consumers can rate an app from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 being the highest 
quality.  The variable firm app rating is the average rating of all apps developed by the 
firm in a given ecosystem as of March, 2014.  We also controlled for the price of the 
focal app that is in the Top 500 list (by revenue).  For firms that had more than one app 
in the Top 500 list in the same month, we used the price for the app with the highest 
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rank.  Many app developers derive their revenues through in-app purchases, and hence, 
their revenues include recurring revenues from existing customers.  To account for this 
feature of the business model, we include a variable In-app purchases, which takes a 
value of 1 if the focal app has an in-app purchase option.  This would also help us to 
control for the benefits that firms may derive from customer loyalty or customer switching 
cost.  
Firms predominantly offered apps in a specific category such as games, music, 
social networking or productivity.  We controlled for this category-level heterogeneity 
through category fixed effects and other category-level time-varying controls.17  A firm 
can continue to have its apps in the Top 500 ranking if there is a high level of demand 
for a particular category of apps in which the firm is active in.  We account for this 
possibility using the variable apps in top 500, which is the total number of apps in the 
Top 500 list in a given month within the same category as the focal firm’s app.  While the 
context in general is hypercompetitive, there may be differences in the competitive 
intensity across categories over time.  We included two variables to account for these 
differences.  First, we included the total number of new apps that were introduced in a 
category in a given month.  This variable captures apps launched by both new and 
existing firms.  Second, we included the total number of new firms that entered the 
category in a given month.  The two variables are log-transformed to account for 
skewness. 
Analysis 
We tested our hypotheses using continuous time event history analysis to 
estimate the hazard rate of app developers exiting the superior performance stratum.  
This approach is consistent with prior studies which have focused on studying the 
                                                          
17 In the few cases where firms offered apps in multiple categories, we used information for the highest 
ranking app to calculate values for the category-level control variables.  
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sustainability of firms’ superior performance (e.g., Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002, 2005; 
Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010).  Many firms in our sample did not exit the superior 
performance stratum during the observation period.  Hence, our data is right censored.  
Event history models are well suited to account for right-censored observations (Allison, 
1984).  Since we are studying only those firms that made it to the Top 500 ranking and 
were subjected to the risk of exiting the superior performance stratum, our data does not 
have left censoring.  Some firms in our sample entered the superior performance 
stratum before the start of the observation period.  Hence, our data is left truncated.  We 
checked for potential biases due to left truncation through an additional robustness 
check.  We did this by including observations for firms that only entered in the iOS or 
Android ecosystems from January 2012 onwards.  We report this analysis in the 
robustness checks section after presenting our main results. 
We constructed data in the long form to account for time-varying covariates.  We 
used the Cox proportional hazards model, a robust technique for hazard rate analysis 
that does not require making an additional assumption about the shape of the baseline 
hazard, which may be increasing, decreasing, constant, or non-monotonous (Cox, 
1975).  This helps address concerns with respect to incorrect distributional assumptions 
yielding biased estimates (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002), and the choice of parametric 
specification based on observed data generating inconsistent results (Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000).  Further, we tested for proportionality hazard assumption by checking if 
the slope of the regression equation of scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time is nonzero 
for full model as well as for all predictor variables (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). We 
found that the proportionality hazard assumption was not satisfied for Top 500 free 
ranking and price variables.  To overcome this issue, we followed the recommended 
approach in the literature by including interaction terms between time (in months) and 
the respective variables to allow for the effect of these variables to vary over time.  As a 
69 
robustness check, we also performed our estimations using the piecewise constant 
model with month-specific effects.  The estimates from these models were consistent 
with those obtained from the Cox model. 
Results 
We report the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates in 
Table 3.1.  We report the results from the Cox model in Table 3.2.  The model estimates 
the hazard rate that a firm exits the superior performance stratum and, hence, its inability 
to sustain its superior performance.  The reported coefficients can be exponentiated to 
obtain hazard ratios, which are interpreted as the multiplier of the baseline hazard of the 
firm exiting the superior performance stratum when the variable increases by one unit 
(Allison, 2000).  An increase in hazard can also be interpreted as shortening the time 
period for which a firm sustains its superior performance.  All standard errors reported 
were corrected for non-independence across multiple observations faced by the same 
firm by clustering observations for each firm.  Model 1 is a baseline model. Models 2, 3, 
and 4, include ecosystem complexity, ecosystem experience, and platform transition to 
test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, respectively.  Model 5, includes the interaction term 
between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience to test Hypothesis 3.  Model 
6, includes the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform transition to 
test Hypothesis 5.  Model 7 is the fully specified model with all of the independent 
variables and the interaction terms. 
(Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here) 
The results from the baseline model (Model 1) suggest that the likelihood of app 
developers sustaining their superior performance increases with their firm size, if they 
offered in-app purchases, and if they had other web- or PC-based online businesses.  
Also, app developers who offered apps in both ecosystems and who offered free apps 
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that were ranked among the Top 500 free apps in terms of downloads were likely to 
sustain their superior performance.  
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that higher ecosystem complexity will be 
associated with greater likelihood of complementors sustaining their superior 
performance.  This prediction was supported in all of the models (Models 2, 5, 6, 7).  The 
coefficient for ecosystem complexity is negative and statistically significant (p-value < 
0.01).   In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficient in Model 2, we find that an 
increase in ecosystem complexity by one standard deviation reduces the app 
developer’s likelihood of exiting the superior performance stratum by 22%.  
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that firms with greater experience within the 
ecosystem will be more likely to sustain their superior performance. We find support for 
Hypothesis 2, as the coefficient for ecosystem experience is negative and statistically 
significant in Models 3, 5, and 7 (p-value < 0.01).  In considering the magnitude of 
estimated coefficients, an increase in an app developer’s experience by one standard 
deviation (16 months) decreases its likelihood of exiting the superior performance 
stratum by 13%.  In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that generational transitions initiated by 
platform firms will make it more difficult for complementors to sustain their superior 
performance.  We find support for this prediction as the coefficient for platform transition 
is positive and statistically significant in Models 4, 6, and 7 (p-value < 0.01).  In 
considering the magnitude of estimated coefficient in Model 4, we find that an app 
developer’s likelihood of exiting the superior performance stratum increases by about 
44% during the platform transition.  
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effect of complementor’s ecosystem 
experience on the sustainability of its superior performance will be moderated by 
ecosystem complexity such that the effect will be stronger when ecosystem complexity is 
high than when it is low.  We find support for Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient for the 
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interaction term between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience is negative 
and statistically significant (p < 0.10) in both Models 5 and 7.  Finally, the coefficient for 
the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform transition is positive 
and statistically significant in both Models 6 and 7 (p < 0.05).  Hence, we find support for 
Hypothesis 5 that platform transitions make it more difficult for complementors to sustain 
their superior performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates these interaction effects by plotting the average marginal effects of 
ecosystem complexity for different values of ecosystem experience and platform 
transition based on estimates in Model 7, holding all other variables at their mean 
values.  The standard errors for the average marginal effects are estimated using the 
delta method and are calculated by the margins routine in STATA.  
 
(Insert Figure 3.2 about here) 
 
Robustness checks 
We conducted a number of additional checks to establish the robustness of our 
findings.  The robustness checks are summarized in Table 3.3 and the results are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.  In Table 3.4, we explore alternative 
explanations that could drive our main results, and in Table 3.5, we focus on the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative measures and operationalization.  
(Insert Table 3.3 about here) 
Alternative Explanations  
Firms may be self-selecting into the iOS or Android ecosystems, and this may 
subject our estimates to a firm-level selection bias.  To address this concern, we 
estimated a model by including data for only those firms that participated in both 
ecosystems.  The coefficient estimates are reported in Model 8 and exhibit similar 
patterns as our main results. The only exception was that the interaction term between 
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ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience is marginally insignificant (p-value = 
0.15).  Another type of a “selection” issue is that that certain types of firms (unobservable 
to us) are more likely to achieve superior performance in an ecosystem of a given 
complexity.  If we are not able to characterize the type based on the observables, our 
inferences with respect to ecosystem complexity might be particularly problematic.  To 
address this concern, we ran an additional check by using the sample of 278 firms that 
achieved superior performance in both iOS and Android ecosystems, and we included 
firm-fixed effects in that analysis.  The results are reported in Model 9 and are 
qualitatively similar to our main results.  The standard errors for a fixed-effects model 
with a much smaller sample size are somewhat higher with the interaction terms being 
marginally insignificant. 
(Insert Table 3.4 about here) 
 
In order to ensure that the significant effect of app developers’ ecosystem 
experience is not simply an artifact of their general experience with apps, we performed 
a supplementary analysis on firms that participated in both ecosystems.  We controlled 
for the app developers’ general experience – the total number of months that an app 
developer has been active in the smartphone app market for iOS and Android apps.  
Firms with greater general experience may benefit through superior app development 
and marketing capabilities as well as having a stronger brand.  The results are reported 
in Model 10.  While the coefficient for general experience is negative and statistically 
significant, the coefficient for ecosystem experience remains statistically significant, and 
its magnitude is almost twice as that of the coefficient for general experience.  Hence, 
this check helps to reinforce that complementors’ experiential benefit has a strong 
ecosystem-specific component.18 
                                                          
18 We performed an additional check to ensure that the experience effect is not simply driven by customer 
loyalty resulting in high app revenues through continued in-app purchases.  To do so, we re-ran Model 5 on a 
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We also explore other possible explanations with respect to different types of 
firms and their strategies.19  Firms in our sample include those that are pure app firms 
which derive all of their revenues from app stores and those firms which also have other 
online or offline businesses.  To check if there are any systematic differences between 
these firms, we estimated separate models for pure app firms (Model 11) and for firms 
which also had other businesses (Model 12).  The coefficient estimates are qualitatively 
similar to our main results.  The interaction term of ecosystem complexity*experience 
loses statistical significance possibly because of smaller sample size and the fact that 
pure app firms are generally younger than the other firms.  It is also possible that app 
developers may differ in terms of their innovations and investments in apps, and the size 
of their app portfolio.  These differences may be correlated with their experience or 
ecosystem complexity.  To rule out these explanations, we collected additional data on 
the total number of apps and the number of updates to the focal apps for the firms which 
were active in Jan’ 2016.  For this sample of firms, we included controls for the total 
number of updates, and the total number of updates in the previous three months (Model 
13), and the total number of apps in a given month (Model 14).  Finally, while both iOS 
and Android were dominant smartphone platforms during the observation period, there is 
variation in their overall sales growth over time.  To ensure that our results are not 
impacted by the relative differences in sales growth between iOS and Android, we 
obtained quarterly unit sales data from IDC (the data was not available at monthly 
intervals), and included it as an additional control in Model 15.  The results with these 
additional control variables continue to support our predictions, and give us greater 
confidence in our findings. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sample of 467 firms whose apps in the Top 500 list did not include an in-app purchase option.  The experience 
effects continued to be significant even for a very small sample, giving us additional confidence with respect 
to our inferences.  
19 We thank the two anonymous reviewers for suggesting these analyses in order to rule out alternative 
explanations. 
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Alternative Measures 
A potential concern with the analysis could be that our measure for ecosystem 
complexity, based on the OEMs’ installed base, does not account for the diversity of 
handset configurations within OEMs.  For example, in the case of iOS ecosystem, the 
measure remains constant throughout the observation period and does not capture 
differences with respect to the types of phones, especially does with different screen 
sizes (e.g., iPhone 4s and 5).  For an app developer, screen size in addition to OEM 
operating system configuration can be an important driver of the variety of the handset 
and operating system combinations that their app interacts with.  While designing an 
app, the developer needs to carefully ensure that its app fits and works seamlessly 
across the different screen sizes of the different OEMs (Panzarino, 2012).  Further, since 
the measure of ecosystem complexity is significantly correlated with the type of platform 
(i.e., iOS or Android), it might be capturing some unobserved differences with respect to 
platform firms’ strategies or user-characteristics across these platforms.  These 
differences may impact the relative ease with which app developer firms can sustain 
their superior performance in a given ecosystem, and may make some of our inferences 
problematic.  To address this possibility and to account for OEM-level screen size 
variations faced by app developers, we obtained detailed data on installed base of 
handsets and user characteristics from comScore.  comScore conducts a monthly 
survey of about twelve thousand U.S. smartphone users and collects data on their 
handset profiles, user demographics and the app usage patterns.  The survey data for 
each month is then adjusted to account for national demographics.  Due to high cost of 
this survey data, we were only able to obtain this information for the period from 
January, 2012 to May, 2013, which also resulted in the exclusion of observations for an 
iOS platform transition (i.e., iOS 7). 
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We explore the robustness of our results by including a finer-grained measure of 
ecosystem complexity based on the number of unique OEM firm and screen size 
combinations.  The use of this measure also allows us to control for the focal platform.  
The variable iOS takes the value of 1 if the app developer is participating in the iOS 
platform and 0 if it is participating in the Android platform.  To account for differences in 
demographics and app usage between the iOS and Android users, we include three 
control variables.  The variable App download measures the percentage of users who 
download 5 or more apps in a given month in the focal platform.  The variables Female 
user and Age measure the percentage of female users and the percentage of users of 
age between 18 and 45 years.  We report the results in Models 16-18.  Model 16 
includes the new measure of ecosystem complexity and with controls for user 
characteristics.  Model 17 includes the additional control for iOS.  The coefficient 
estimates continue to support our predictions.  Model 18 includes the interaction terms.  
The coefficients for the interaction terms have large standard errors possibly because of 
multicollinearity with respect to some of the key variables with individual variance 
inflation (VIF) factors well above the recommended cutoff level of 10 (VIF is 47 for 
ecosystem complexity, 46 for iOS, and 13 for the ecosystem complexity and experience 
interaction term), and the fact that there are fewer episodes of platform transitions.   
Moreover, our theory and our measures are at the level of the firm in an 
ecosystem.  However, in our empirical design, it is possible that for some firms, 
sustainability in an ecosystem may be measured across different apps i.e., App A is in 
top 500 list in month t and App B (not App A) is in top 500 list in month t+1.  In our 
sample, of the 9672 sustainability events for iOS and Android ecosystems (i.e., focal firm 
has an app in the Top 500 list for two consecutive months), there were only 661 
sustainability events where the focal firm had a different app in the Top 500 list in the 
subsequent month.  As an additional robustness check, we only used the sample of 
76 
firms that had a single app in the Top 500 list in a given ecosystem.  The estimates 
reported in Model 19 continue to support all of the predictions.   
In our main results, we considered a firm to be in the superior performance 
stratum if its app appeared in the Top 500 list by revenue, and we used a three-month 
observation window to assess whether the firm sustains its superior performance or not.  
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to these choices, we used a higher 
performance threshold based on a firm’s app in the Top 250 list by revenue (Model 20), 
and we also used windows of two and four months (Models 21 and 22).  The coefficient 
estimates for all the three models continue to support our predictions.   
 
(Insert Table 3.5 about here) 
 
Finally, some firms in our sample entered the superior performance stratum 
before the start of the observation period.  Hence, our data is left truncated.  We tested 
for any potential biases due to left truncation by only including observations for those 
firms that entered these ecosystems from January 2012 onwards (Model 23).  The 
coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar as our main results with the exception of the 
interaction term between ecosystem complexity and firm experience exhibiting similar 
magnitude and sign, but the estimates are not precise enough for statistical significance.  
This is possibly due to the fact that these estimations are based on a smaller sample 
and that too of younger app developer firms.  Overall, these additional analyses with 
alternative measures help to further establish the robustness of our findings.   
Discussion 
We study the increasingly prominent phenomenon of platform-based ecosystems 
in which value is created through a network of firms offering complementary products 
and services around a platform.  Value creation in such ecosystems is shaped by 
platform firms who own the underlying technical architecture and set the rules for 
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complementors’ participation.  We explore the strategic implications for complementors 
by considering how ecosystem-level interdependencies affect the extent to which 
complementors can sustain their value creation in an ecosystem.  We offer a novel 
perspective of complementors’ ecosystem-level interdependencies that is rooted in the 
structural and evolutionary features of the ecosystem.  The structural feature is based on 
the technological interdependence between complementors’ products and other 
components in the ecosystem.  We refer to this feature as ecosystem complexity faced 
by the complementor.  We incorporate the evolutionary features by taking into account 
the technology transitions initiated by platform firms and the experience gained by 
complementors in an ecosystem over time.   
We test our arguments on app developers in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android 
smartphone ecosystems from January 2012 to January 2014.  During the period of 
study, both of these ecosystems were populated by hundreds of thousands of app 
developers that offered a wide variety of specialized software applications to smartphone 
users.  The stark contrast between Apple’s “closed” model and Google’s “open” model, 
in addition to several episodes of platform transitions initiated by these firms, allowed us 
to examine how ecosystem complexity and platform transitions faced by app developers 
impacted the ease with which they could sustain their superior performance within an 
ecosystem.  Consistent with our arguments, we find that higher ecosystem complexity 
and ecosystem experience helps app developers sustain their superior performance 
whereas platform transition makes it more difficult. We also find that on the one hand, 
ecosystem complexity enhances the benefit of ecosystem experience whereas it 
exacerbates the impact of platform transition 
Our study's findings make important contributions to the literature streams in 
strategy on business ecosystems, platforms, technological change and to the 
evolutionary economics perspective in general.  Scholars studying business ecosystems 
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have focused on the coordination and technological challenges with respect to 
complementors and the resulting implications for firms’ organizational choices and value 
creation (e.g., Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2014; Kapoor and Lee, 
2013; Kapoor, 2013).  Scholars studying platforms have focused on the strategies used 
by platform firms to attract complementors and to compete against rival platforms 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010; 
Eisenmann et al.; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).  While these literature streams have shifted the 
theoretical emphasis from industries and products to business ecosystems and 
platforms, the primary mode of inquiry is to illustrate how firms manage their 
interdependence with complementors so as to create and appropriate value.   
In this study, we focus on the other side of the phenomenon, beyond the platform 
firms and illustrate how complementors’ value appropriation is shaped by the structural 
and evolutionary features of the ecosystems.  Our findings have implications for both 
platform firms such as Apple and Google that set the rules and own the platform and 
complementors such as app developers that follow the rules and leverage the platform.  
We show how the strategies of the platform firms may play a significant role in the 
complementors’ ability to appropriate value over time.  While major technological 
changes within the platform are important for sustaining the progress of the ecosystem 
over time, these platform transitions can create high uncertainty and disrupt the 
leadership position of complementors who are significant contributors to value created in 
the ecosystem.  At the same time, platform transitions can present new opportunities for 
other complementors to create value in the ecosystem.  Hence, we shed light on the 
challenges and the trade-offs that platform firms and complementors face in their quest 
for value creation and appropriation over time.  
By showing how platform firms’ strategies can  shape the level of complexity and 
uncertainty faced by complementors, we depart from the existing treatments of firms’ 
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environments that are typically premised on complexity and uncertainty being a general 
feature of the industry (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson and Tushman, 2001; 
Eisenhardt, 1989).  In so doing, we offer a new lens on the interactions between firms 
and their environments through which complexity and uncertainty faced by 
complementors is explicitly determined by the strategies of platform firms.  This can also 
result in the same firm being subject to different types of environments in the same 
industry.  Further, literature on technological change has shed light on how technology 
transitions impacts the performance of firms in the focal industry (e.g., (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997).  We contribute to this 
literature by highlighting how technology transitions initiated by platform firms can impact 
the performance of complementor firms within an ecosystem.  Hence, we highlight that 
technological interdependencies between platform firms and complementors in related 
industries can have important consequences for complementors during periods of 
platform transitions. Relatedly, the evidence in the study also points to the difficulties of 
coordinating technology transitions at the level of the ecosystem. Even if platform firms 
intend to create a smooth generational transition for all of their complementors, the 
system-level interdependencies and technological uncertainties make such coordination 
difficult. 
The study is also among the first to provide systematic empirical evidence 
regarding the role of complexity on firm performance as theorized within the evolutionary 
economics perspective (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti 
and Levinthal, 2004).  While scholars have drawn on a variety of theoretical approaches 
to model firms’ search processes and their performance outcomes at different levels of 
complexity, empirical evidence regarding the role of complexity on firm performance has 
been somewhat lacking (Lenox et al. (2010) is an important exception). We show that 
complexity plays an important role in sustaining superior performance in business 
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ecosystems, and its impact is especially strong for firms with greater ecosystem-specific 
experience and during periods of platform transitions.  Finally, we also offer an empirical 
contribution to the strategy literature by going beyond the typically used annual datasets 
to shorter temporal windows of months. We show that finer-grained observational 
periods can be useful in deciphering performance dynamics in hypercompetitive settings 
such as the smartphone context.  
The findings and the inferences from the study are subject to a number of 
caveats that offer opportunities for future research.  First, they are limited to a single 
empirical context, and their validity needs to be established across other settings.  
Relatedly, Apple’s closed model and Google’s open model played a significant role in 
determining the extent of ecosystem complexity faced by smartphone app developers.  
However, theoretically, this correlation does not imply that a closed model will always 
result in low ecosystem complexity for complementors.  The origins of ecosystem 
complexity might not only be rooted in the choices of the platform firms across different 
ecosystems but also in the choices of the complementors within the same ecosystem 
(Agarwal and Kapoor, 2017).  Further, while we focus on the short-run impact of platform 
transitions on complementors, platform transitions can also have a long-run impact on 
the ecosystem complexity faced by complementors.  Second, our measure of superior 
performance is premised on whether firms’ apps are ranked within Top 500 apps in 
terms of revenue in the two dominant smartphone ecosystems.  Although this measure 
is consistent with our theory and is widely accepted as a proxy for superior performance 
in these ecosystems, it may not represent superior economic performance for firms in 
general.  Specifically, the measure does not account for the costs of participation in an 
ecosystem, and is not sensitive to the differences between ecosystems in terms of total 
revenue.  It is possible that a firm may have a high revenue-based rank in an ecosystem 
with low total revenue (i.e., large share of a small revenue pie), or a firm may incur high 
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cost of participation.  Both of these possibilities might result in firms with low 
performance (revenue/profits) at the level of the industry being categorized as ones with 
superior performance at the level of the ecosystem.  Hence, the applicability of our 
measure with respect to overall economic performance for the firm is subject to some 
important boundary conditions.  Our finding with respect to the interaction effect between 
ecosystem experience and ecosystem complexity is less robust than our other findings.  
This could imply that our theorized mechanism may be subject to some boundary 
conditions or that our measures are somewhat limited in their ability to tease out this 
effect.  Finally, our dataset is limited to only 25 months, and while we observe significant 
fluctuations within the competitive landscape over this relatively short period, we are 
unable to draw inferences over longer time frames.   
Despite these and other limitations, the study offers one of the first explorations 
of performance of complementor firms in platform-based ecosystems.  We propose a 
novel perspective of complementors’ ecosystem-level interdependencies that is rooted in 
the structural and evolutionary features of the ecosystem, and show that such a 
perspective is useful in explaining the extent to which complementors can appropriate 
value within an ecosystem over time.  In so doing, the study also sheds light on how the 
performance of complementors in business ecosystems can be shaped by the rules and 
the actions of the platform firms that orchestrate the ecosystem.  
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Figure 3.1: Normalized weekly trend based on Google’s search data for the term 
“app not working” for US-based searches  
(Data source: Google Trends; http://www.google.com/trends/: Data last accessed on 
August 29, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Average marginal effects of ecosystem complexity with 95% 
confidence intervals 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
No. Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 
Ecosystem 
complexity 
-0.66 0.34 1.00 
           
 
 
2 
Ecosystem 
experience 
22.91 16.07 -0.55 1.00 
          
 
 
3 
Platform 
transition 
0.18 0.38 -0.14 0.13 1.00 
         
 
 
4 New apps 7.84 0.97 -0.14 0.07 0.11 1.00 
        
 
 
5 New firms 6.35 0.77 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.95 1.00 
       
 
 
6 
Apps in Top 
500 
199.01 162.78 0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.76 0.71 1.00 
      
 
 
7 
Firm size 
(employees) 
6.22 17.92 -0.04 0.17 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 1.00 
     
 
 
8 
Other online 
business 
0.59 0.49 -0.03 0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.23 1.00 
    
 
 
9 
Other offline 
business 
0.30 0.46 -0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 0.40 0.29 1.00 
   
 
 
10 
Dual 
participation 
0.63 0.48 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.17 1.00 
  
 
 
11 
Firm app 
rating 
4.01 0.49 0.25 -0.29 -0.03 0.17 0.16 0.22 -0.23 -0.14 -0.18 -0.05 1.00 
 
 
 
12 
Top 500 free 
app 
0.56 0.50 -0.17 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.01 1.00  
 
13 
In-app 
purchases 
0.82 0.38 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.29 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.08 0.06 0.20 1.00  
14 App price 3.55 30.90 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.10 1 
 
Correlations greater than 0.01 or smaller than -0.01 are significant at p <0.05, N= 12,691 
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Table 3.2: Cox proportional hazards estimates for firms exiting the superior 
performance strata 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ecosystem complexity  -0.740***   -0.691*** -0.784*** -0.751*** 
  (0.125)   (0.181) (0.134) (0.182) 
Ecosystem experience   -0.008***  -0.027***  -0.027*** 
   (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Platform transition    0.365***  0.763*** 0.839*** 
    (0.082)  (0.258) (0.263) 
Ecosystem complexity*experience     -0.016*  -0.016* 
     (0.008)  (0.009) 
Ecosystem complexity*transition      0.661** 0.785** 
      (0.317) (0.325) 
New apps
 
0.074 -0.485** 0.220 0.016 -0.350* -0.483** -0.346* 
 (0.164) (0.193) (0.166) (0.166) (0.194) (0.194) (0.195) 
New firms
 
-0.182 0.272 -0.295 -0.104 0.206 0.274 0.200 
 (0.207) (0.233) (0.206) (0.210) (0.230) (0.235) (0.232) 
Apps in Top 500 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
(Apps in Top 500)
2 
-0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (employee) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other online business -0.217*** -0.224*** -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.226*** -0.223*** -0.226*** 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) 
Other offline business 0.125 0.146 0.122 0.127 0.149 0.148 0.152 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Dual participation -0.481*** -0.436*** -0.472*** -0.474*** -0.410*** -0.436*** -0.410*** 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) 
Firm app rating -0.089 -0.013 -0.135** -0.081 -0.072 -0.012 -0.070 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) 
Top 500 free app
 
-0.678*** -0.826*** -0.613*** -0.686*** -0.743*** -0.831*** -0.749*** 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.103) (0.101) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
Top 500 free app*time 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
In-app purchases
 
-0.582*** -0.568*** -0.573*** -0.577*** -0.542*** -0.562*** -0.536*** 
 (0.101) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) 
App price -0.089 -0.117* -0.069 -0.090 -0.090 -0.118* -0.090 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) 
App price*time 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Category fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observation 12,691 12,691 12,691 12,691 12,691 12,691 12,691 
Total firms 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 
Total exit events 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 
Log likelihood -10,601.36 -10,571.66 -10,592.50 -10,592.08 -10,545.74 -10,545.74 -10,539.44 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01  
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Table 3.3: Summary of robustness checks reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
  
Model  Robustness check Rationale 
8 Included data for only those firms that 
participated in both ecosystems 
Firms may be self-selecting into the iOS or 
Android smartphone ecosystems 
9 Included only those firms that achieved 
superior performance in both iOS and Android 
ecosystem with firm-fixed effects 
Certain types of firms may be more likely to 
achieve superior performance in an ecosystem 
of a given complexity 
10 Controlled for firm’s general industry 
experience in smartphone apps 
Ecosystem experience may simply be an 
artifact of general industry experience 
11, 12 Ran separate models for pure app firms and 
firms with other businesses 
There might be systematic difference between 
firms based on their business scope 
13 Controlled for total number of updates and 
updates in the last 3 months for the focal app 
Firms’ investments in apps might be 
impacting sustainability 
14 Controlled for firm’s app portfolio Firms’ app portfolio size might be correlated 
with their ecosystem experience or ecosystem 
complexity 
15 Controlled for unit handset sales for both iOS 
and Android 
Results may be driven by relative differences 
in sales growth between iOS and Android 
16 Used alternative measure for ecosystem 
complexity based on the number of unique 
OEMs and screen size combinations.  
Main measure for ecosystem complexity does 
not account for the diversity of handset 
configurations within OEMs 
16, 17, 18 Used alternative measure for ecosystem 
complexity and controlled for the focal 
platform, and user characteristics  
Main measure for ecosystem complexity 
might be capturing  unobserved differences 
with respect to platform firms’ strategies or 
user-characteristics across these platforms 
19 Included data for only those firms that had a 
single app in Top 500 list 
Sustainability of superior performance at firm-
level may be due to different apps launched by 
the same firm 
20 Used a higher performance threshold based on 
a firm’s app in the Top 250 list by revenue 
Results might be sensitive to the choice of 
Top 500 list to measure superior performance 
21, 22 Used two- and four-month windows 
respectively to measure sustainability 
Results might be sensitive to the choice of the 
three-month window to measure sustainability 
23 Included data for only those firms that entered 
an ecosystem after January 2012 
Left truncation 
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks (Alternative explanations) 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Ecosystem complexity -0.814*** -1.011* -0.595*** -0.790*** -0.963*** -0.760*** -0.657*** -0.592*** 
 (0.216) (0.567) (0.230) (0.254) (0.255) (0.199) (0.212) (0.204) 
Ecosystem experience -0.029*** -0.068* -0.020* -0.023* -0.022* -0.019** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Platform transition 0.768** 1.281** 0.769** 0.696* 0.993*** 0.726*** 0.969*** 0.722*** 
 (0.303) (0.565) (0.304) (0.389) (0.362) (0.274) (0.308) (0.267) 
Ecosystem complexity * Experience -0.015 -0.047 -0.015 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.021** -0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.032) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Ecosystem complexity * Transition 0.705* 1.245 0.711* 0.629 0.946** 0.707** 1.015*** 0.627* 
 (0.375) (0.983) (0.375) (0.478) (0.450) (0.339) (0.377) (0.333) 
New apps -0.256 0.179 -0.208 -0.444* -0.309 -0.489** -0.313 -0.453** 
 (0.257) (0.808) (0.255) (0.270) (0.295) (0.205) (0.220) (0.217) 
New firms 0.013 0.074 -0.015 0.138 0.312 0.447* 0.139 0.046 
 (0.301) (0.916) (0.298) (0.335) (0.341) (0.246) (0.264) (0.301) 
Apps in Top 500 0.010 -0.023 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.015* 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
(Apps in Top 500)2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (employee) -0.011***  -0.011*** -0.067** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.030) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other online business -0.201**  -0.196**   -0.220*** -0.158* -0.228*** 
 (0.097)  (0.097)   (0.081) (0.089) (0.080) 
Other offline business 0.155  0.168   0.146 0.130 0.161* 
 (0.105)  (0.106)   (0.097) (0.104) (0.096) 
Dual participation    -0.447*** -0.322*** -0.429*** -0.515*** -0.387*** 
    (0.115) (0.100) (0.080) (0.087) (0.078) 
Firm app rating 0.004 0.464 0.001 -0.226** 0.111 -0.016 -0.003 -0.028 
 (0.086) (0.326) (0.086) (0.094) (0.091) (0.068) (0.077) (0.068) 
Top 500 free app -0.791*** -0.792* -0.803*** -0.629*** -0.871*** -0.808*** -0.724*** -0.742*** 
 (0.125) (0.425) (0.125) (0.155) (0.148) (0.116) (0.130) (0.118) 
Top 500 free app*time 0.002*** 0.005* 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
In-app purchases -0.573*** -0.321 -0.574*** -0.475*** -0.635*** -0.507*** -0.513*** -0.491*** 
 (0.133) (0.507) (0.133) (0.145) (0.132) (0.104) (0.118) (0.099) 
App price -0.205*** 0.072 -0.195** 0.025 -0.180** -0.076 -0.089 -0.080 
 (0.077) (0.272) (0.077) (0.096) (0.078) (0.066) (0.078) (0.072) 
App price*time 0.009** -0.017 0.009** -0.002 0.007* 0.001 0.004 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
General experience   -0.010**      
   (0.004)      
Update last 3m      0.041***   
      (0.012)   
Total updates      -0.025***   
      (0.005)   
Platform sales growth        5.009* 
        (2.936) 
Portfolio size        0.002  
       (0.002)  
Category fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect  Yes       
Total observation 9,999 4,253 9,999 5,228 7,463 11,351 9,510 11,121 
Total firms 993 278 993 766 750 1,409 1,095 1,396 
Total events 1,236.00 361 1,236 864 910 1,587 1,290 1,568 
Log likelihood -7,117.13 -1,503.29 -7,112.86 -4,346.84 -4,927.98 -9,241.47 -7,281.61 -9,306.81 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 3.5: Robustness checks (Alternative measures) 
 Model 16  Model  17  Model 18 Model 19  Model 20  Model 21  Model  22  Model 23  
Ecosystem complexity -0.665*** -1.055* -1.439* -0.779*** -0.436** -0.714*** -0.734*** -0.866*** 
 (0.223) (0.565) (0.769) (0.234) (0.207) (0.178) (0.186) (0.298) 
Ecosystem experience -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.024** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.058*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) 
Platform transition 0.302** 0.312** 0.065 1.388*** 0.831** 0.644*** 0.817*** 1.145** 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.298) (0.344) (0.357) (0.239) (0.281) (0.489) 
Ecosystem complexity 
*Ecosystem experience 
  -0.008 -0.019* -0.022*** -0.016* -0.013 -0.030 
   (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.024) 
Ecosystem complexity * 
Platform transition 
  -0.579 1.341*** 0.982** 0.581** 0.705** 1.116* 
   (0.642) (0.425) (0.416) (0.295) (0.344) (0.578) 
New apps
 
0.194 0.191 0.209 -0.207 -0.357* -0.410** -0.383* 0.066 
 (0.276) (0.277) (0.278) (0.231) (0.210) (0.187) (0.196) (0.386) 
New firms
 
-0.205 -0.234 -0.244 0.074 0.293 0.340 0.209 -0.174 
 (0.306) (0.311) (0.310) (0.265) (0.265) (0.220) (0.235) (0.446) 
Apps in Top 500 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.014 0.016** 0.008 0.008 0.021 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) 
(Apps in Top 500)
2 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (employee) -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** 0.000 -0.006** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.025 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) 
Other online business -0.271*** -0.270*** -0.274*** -0.226** -0.078 -0.219*** -0.225*** -0.333*** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.092) (0.086) (0.076) (0.079) (0.116) 
Other offline business 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.049 -0.032 0.167* 0.114 0.316** 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.121) (0.100) (0.093) (0.098) (0.157) 
Dual participation -0.405*** -0.407*** -0.408*** -0.316*** -0.217*** -0.382*** -0.435*** -0.199* 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.095) (0.081) (0.074) (0.077) (0.121) 
Firm app rating -0.206** -0.205** -0.203** -0.034 -0.100 -0.067 -0.063 0.075 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.079) (0.074) (0.065) (0.068) (0.110) 
Top 500 free app
 
-0.788*** -0.800*** -0.809*** -0.564*** -0.466*** -0.680*** -0.758*** -0.853*** 
 (0.126) (0.128) (0.129) (0.147) (0.144) (0.107) (0.108) (0.211) 
Top 500 free app*time 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
In-app purchases
 
-0.578*** -0.577*** -0.578*** -0.484*** -0.377*** -0.513*** -0.519*** -0.451*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.128) (0.108) (0.093) (0.098) (0.164) 
App price -0.120* -0.121* -0.129* -0.025 -0.038 -0.056 -0.079 -0.015 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.071) (0.046) (0.058) (0.062) (0.096) 
App price*time 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 -0.120* -0.121* -0.129* (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Female Users
a 
1.778 3.260 3.627      
 (3.736) (4.240) (4.281)      
User Age
a
  -0.169 1.107 0.312      
 (3.163) (3.614) (3.701)      
User App Downloads
a 
-4.301 -3.458 -1.813      
 (4.201) (4.370) (4.730)      
iOS  -0.361 -0.864      
  (0.496) (0.731)      
Category fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observation 8,715 8,715 8,715 5,290 6,565 12,691 12,691 3,662 
Total firms 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,081 933 1,516 1,516 651 
Total events 996 996 996 1,179 1,188 1,996 1,641 611 
Log likelihood -5,926.75 -5,926.49 -5,925.63 -5,975.38 -6,255.50 -11,864.49 -9,755.62 -2,847.90 
aVariables are calculated based on proportion of total users in the ecosystem. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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4. PARTNERING IN A HAZE: INTERDEPENDENCE MISSPECIFICATION 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The strategic alliance literature points to inter-firm task interdependencies as a key link 
between alliance governance choice and firm performance (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Aggarwal, Siggelkow and Singh, 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). Alliances 
involve the need to coordinate interdependencies across organizational boundaries 
(Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), as well as the need to 
select governance mechanisms for inter-firm decision making (Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). The nature of inter-firm interdependence has been 
shown to influence governance mode choice (Kale and Puranam, 2004; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005) as well as the performance implications of this choice (Sampson, 2004; 
Mayer and Teece, 2008). 
Prescriptive managerial advice stemming from this stream of the extant alliance 
literature generally makes the implicit assumption that in the course of deciding on a 
mode of governance, allying firms are “correct” in their representations of inter-firm 
interdependencies. In practice, however, managers often enter into alliances with an 
imperfect ex ante understanding of their true patterns of inter-firm interdependence 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Doz, 1996). This makes selection of a “correct” 
structure likely to be an unrealistic assumption. Our aim in this paper is thus to better 
understand the implications of relaxing the assumption that managers correctly 
understand inter-firm interdependencies when selecting an alliance governance mode. 
We focus on two forms of such interdependence misspecifications—over-specification 
and under-specification—analyzing how these incorrect managerial representations of 
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inter-firm task interdependencies influence firm performance in an alliance setting, under 
varying interdependence and governance mode conditions. 
A small set of studies lends credence to the notion that managers do not have a 
fully correct understanding of their inter-firm task interdependencies when entering into 
alliances (Doz, 1996; Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004; Gokpinar, Hopp and Iravani, 
2010). Although these studies have made important strides in expanding our 
understanding of the role of interdependence misspecifications, relatively little large-
sample empirical research has addressed this issue (many of these studies are single 
case-based). One reason for the lack of research on this topic is the difficulty in 
measuring managers’ ex-ante understanding of interdependencies. We consequently 
have very little understanding of the relative performance implications of different forms 
of interdependence misspecifications. To remedy this gap we develop a computational 
model that allows us to simulate managers’ understanding of underlying task structures 
under different scenarios. This approach, we believe, offers a first step in pushing the 
literature toward a deeper understanding of how interdependence misspecifications 
influence firm performance in the context of alternate governance mode choices. 
A key benefit of employing a computational model is that such models naturally 
overcome the limitation of not being able to observe counterfactuals, a critical constraint 
in empirical work. Examining the antecedents of alliance governance choice (e.g., Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005), for example, very often relies on observing only realized transactions. 
A computational modeling approach allows us to develop insights by creating 
counterfactuals and specifying scenarios that are difficult (or impossible) to observe 
empirically. 
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We build on a rich body of work that has used computational methods to develop 
insights into issues in strategy (e.g. Levinthal, 1997). Such an approach enables us to 
abstract away from industry and firm-level factors such as resource complementarity, 
trust, and prior experience (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002), and 
to focus instead on isolating the performance effects of errors associated with task 
interdependence structure assessment. In particular, we model various task 
interdependence structures and their associated errors, a goal that would not be 
possible to accomplish with empirical methods alone.20 
Our results lead to several sets of insights. First, we find that interdependence 
misspecifications lead to a loss in firm value, with the relative magnitude of this loss 
varying by governance mode. Across-mode differences further suggest that normative 
advice regarding governance mode selection in alliances should be conditional on the 
relative level of ex-ante managerial certainty regarding the nature of inter-firm 
interdependence. Second, we find that increases in the actual (correct) level of 
interdependence reduce the underperformance penalty associated with interdependence 
misspecifications. Finally, we find that under- and over-specification influence alliance 
performance through their effect on the extent of exploration and the magnitude of 
coordination failures experienced by the firms in the alliance. While over-specification 
increases both exploration and coordination failures, under-specification decreases 
these two effects.  The relative magnitude of the two effects explains the resulting impact 
on firm performance. When exploration and coordination itself are outcomes of interest 
in an alliance setting, our insights further point to the possibility of a tradeoff between 
                                                          
20
 Our study complements recent work examining misspecification of interdependencies in a single firm 
setting (Martignoni, Menon and Siggelkow, 2015). This work differs from ours in important ways, with one 
key difference being that Martignoni et al. (2015) focus on misspecification in a single-firm setting (versus 
an inter-firm setting like ours in which governance mode issues are paramount). 
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performance and non-performance outcomes, which may condition alliance governance 
mode choice. 
In the next section we briefly highlight the literature which serves to motivate and 
frame our research question. In the subsequent sections we detail our computational 
model and associated analyses, with the aim of more deeply understanding the 
implications of interdependence misspecifications for firm performance in an alliance 
setting. We end by discussing the implications of our study for theory and for future 
research. 
  
MOTIVATING LITERATURE 
  
Alliances are complex inter-organizational relationships with high failure rates (Kale, 
Dyer and Singh, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2009; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). A key 
challenge in an alliance context is governing the joint set of activities of the partnering 
firms. Recent work on alliance governance has underscored the importance of 
coordination among partner firms as a critical determinant of relationship success (e.g, 
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005; Reuer and Arino, 2007). 
Coordination is often necessary as partners must engage in joint tasks without the 
benefits of the structures and systems available in traditional hierarchies (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). Difficulties arise from decomposing tasks and from ensuring the division of 
labor outside organizational boundaries, and coordination challenges persist even with 
perfect alignment of self-interest among the interacting parties (Heath and 
Staudenmayer, 2000; Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008). 
While firms can address coordination challenges through a variety of 
mechanisms, including the use of detailed contracts that specify tasks, roles and 
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responsibilities (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Reuer and 
Arino, 2007), contingency plans and responses (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), and 
information sharing and feedback (Argyres and Mayer, 2007), explicit governance 
mechanisms are an over-arching channel through which coordination challenges are 
often resolved in alliance settings (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Inter-firm interdependencies 
influence both the nature of the desired alliance governance structure, as well as the 
consequent performance of the relationship in the context of such a structure (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Mayer and Teece, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 
2015; Kim, Zhao and Anand, 2015). 
What are the implications of employing particular alliance governance structures 
when interdependencies are not correctly understood by managers? Though the 
literature on this question is limited, as the typical assumption is one of perfect 
knowledge regarding the nature and extent of task interdependencies (which in turn 
dictates appropriate governance structure choice), several studies have used case 
examples to illustrate the consequences of incorrect ex ante assessments of such 
interdependencies (e.g. Doz, 1996; Sosa et al., 2004; Gopkinar et al., 2010). In a study 
of the R&D alliance between Ciba Geigy and Alza to develop a drug called OROS, for 
example, Doz (1996) finds that the allying firms started with an incorrect understanding 
of the nature of interdependencies among their underlying tasks. Their assumption was 
that the alliance would involve a simple “handover” of the drug from Alza to Ciba Geigy. 
In reality, however, the alliance required a high level of coordination between the 
downstream functions of both firms. Over the course of the alliance, as the firms realized 
the need for tighter coordination, they then ended up over-specifying the level of 
interdependence, selecting a governance structure that provided greater levels of 
coordination than actually required. As a consequence of the firms’ interdependence 
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misspecifications (and sub-optimal governance choices), joint development of the drug 
was slowed, and the alliance failed to meet its intended objectives. 
Under-specified representations of task interdependencies can likewise be 
problematic. Sosa et al. (2004; 2007) address the under-specification issue in their study 
of a large commercial aircraft engine project. They find that a significant number of 
interdependencies between sub-systems were invisible to system architects. As a 
consequence, system architects did not set up appropriate structures to deal with 
underlying interdependencies, with the misalignment in structure and task 
interdependence resulting in significant cost and program delay. 
Despite the fact that over- or under-specification of inter-firm task 
interdependencies is likely to be common in practice across many types of inter-
organizational relationships, there is little systematic evidence in the literature (with the 
exception of a small set of case-based examples, two of which we mention above) as to 
how interdependence misspecification might affect the performance of firms, particularly 
under alternate modes of governing the alliance relationship itself. Our methodological 
approach in this paper, therefore, is to employ a computational model to investigate the 
link between misspecified levels of interdependence and alliance performance in a 
systematic manner. This approach enables us to develop a set of theoretical insights 
that might then serve as the basis for future empirical research. We turn to the details of 
our computational model in the next section. 
 
MODEL 
 
Tasks and interdependencies 
 
We draw on the NK approach to modeling firm decision making (Kauffman, 1993, 
Levinthal, 1997), which conceptualizes firms as consisting of a set of inter-related 
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activities, N, that can represent various organizational decisions such as those related to 
firm strategy, organizational form, product design, and so forth (Rivkin, 2000).21 The 
canonical NK model assumes that these N activities are interrelated so that a change in 
one activity affects the payoff to the other K activities. Firm performance is based on the 
unique configuration of these N activities, with the topography (“ruggedness”) of the 
performance landscape determined by the degree of interaction among the firm’s 
activities (Levinthal, 1997). 
We build on Aggarwal et al. (2011), who extend the canonical NK approach to a 
two-firm alliance setting. In this model there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, each of 
which makes decisions over a set of binary activities denoted by 𝐹1 and 𝐹2. A subset of 
the activities of each firm is considered to be part of the alliance relationship (the 
“alliance activities”), denoted by 𝐴𝑖, while the remainder of the activities are outside the 
scope of the alliance (the “non-alliance activities”), denoted by 𝑁𝑖. Firm 1’s activities are 
thus denoted by 𝐹1 = {𝑁1, 𝐴1} while Firm 2’s activities are denoted by 𝐹2 = {𝑁2, 𝐴2}. The 
two-firm system we model consists of a total of 12 activities, each of which is denoted by 
𝑑𝑗, with 𝑗 running from 1 to 12.
22 Figure 4.1 illustrates the allocation of each of the 𝑑𝑗 
activities to the four activity sets {𝑁1, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝑁2}. For Firm 1, for example, the non-alliance 
activities are represented by 𝑁1 = {𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3, 𝑑4} and the alliance activities are 
represented by 𝐴1 = {𝑑5, 𝑑6}. Interdependencies among particular activities, which can 
be either intra-firm or inter-firm, are indicated with an “X”.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE] 
We then consider five different patterns of interdependence, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, each of which contains a different set of interdependencies among the four 
activity sets described in Figure 4.1. We select these patterns in order to model the 
                                                          
21
 We use the term “activities” interchangeably with “choices” and “tasks” throughout this paper. 
22
 This value for N is consistent with prior NK literature (e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; Aggarwal et 
al., 2011). 
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characteristics of a broad range of interdependence forms. The patterns not only 
increase in the overall level of interdependence, but each successive pattern introduces 
a particular class of interdependence among the activity sets {𝑁1, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝑁2} (e.g., going 
from Pattern 1 to Pattern 2 introduces interdependencies within the alliance activities) so 
that we can more easily isolate the implications of interdependencies of different types. 
While these patterns are certainly not exhaustive, they collectively enable us to conduct 
a set of analyses that can generate insights into the mechanisms underlying our core 
research question around the impact of interdependence misspecifications. 
Pattern 1, which we refer to as fully decomposable, has interactions only within 
each of the four activity subsets {𝑁1, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝑁2}: the activities within the 𝑁1 subset only 
affect other activities in 𝑁1, and the same holds for activities within 𝐴1, 𝐴2 and 𝑁2. In 
Pattern 2, pure alliance interaction, we introduce interactions within each of the sets of 
alliance activities of both the firms (i.e., within 𝐴1 and 𝐴2). In Pattern 3, firm own-alliance 
interaction, we introduce interactions within the firm’s own non-alliance and alliance 
activities so that activities within 𝑁1 interact with activities within 𝐴1, and activities within 
𝑁2 interact with activities within 𝐴2. In Pattern 4, firm partner-alliance interaction, the 
alliance activities of one firm interact with the non-alliance activities of the partner 
(activities within 𝐴1 interact with activities within 𝑁2, and activities within 𝐴2 interact with 
those of 𝑁1). And finally, for Pattern 5, full interdependence, there is complete 
interdependence, with all activities interacting with one other. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE] 
Performance landscapes 
 
Each unique configuration of the N activities in the two-firm system (in which, as 
discussed above, the full set of N activities is divided into the subsets {𝑁1, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝑁2}) 
has associated with it a particular performance level. To create the performance 
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landscape we follow the standard approach in the NK literature (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; 
Rivkin 2000): for each of the N activities, 𝑑𝑖, in the system, we define a contribution 
value function 𝐶𝑖. Each 𝐶𝑖 takes as parameters the state (either 0 or 1) of 𝑑𝑖, together 
with the state of the 𝑘𝑖 other policies with which 𝑑𝑖 interacts (these interactions are 
defined, as described above, by the interaction matrix associated with the particular 
interdependence pattern being considered), and is initialized with a value drawn at 
random from a uniform 𝑈[0,1] distribution for each possible combination of the various 
states of 𝑑𝑖 and its 𝑘𝑖 interacting policies. The set of N contribution value functions 𝐶𝑖 is 
defined at the outset, and remains unchanged as the simulation progresses. 
The overall performance of the entire two-firm system for any given configuration 
of activities 𝑑∗ (i.e., the N-dimensional vector of 𝑑𝑖 values) is the sum of the N 𝐶𝑖 values 
for that particular configuration i.e. ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . We can define the performance of Firm 1 for 
a given 𝑑∗ as the sum of the contribution values of the activities specific to the firm itself, 
plus a portion, 𝛼, of the alliance activities (we set 𝛼 = 0.5 throughout). The performance 
of Firm 1, for example is ∑ 𝐶𝑖(𝑑
∗) +  𝛼 ∑ 𝐶𝑖(𝑑
∗)6𝑖=5
4
𝑖=1 . To reduce statistical artifacts we 
follow the commonly employed approach in the NK literature in which the reported 
performance values are normalized by dividing the raw performance by the performance 
value at the highest peak in the landscape (see e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow [2003]). 
 
Interdependence misspecifications 
 
Modeling misspecifications in managerial representations of task interdependencies 
requires that we model not only the true underlying interaction matrix among the firms, 
but also that we model the misspecified representation of the interaction matrix that is 
taken into account by managers as they make decisions. We do so by modeling two 
matrices, with the true matrix used to determine the actual performance that managers 
97 
observe as a consequence of their choices, and the misspecified matrix used to 
determine the choice that managers actually make as they search the landscape. 
 More formally, we define two interaction matrices. The first interaction matrix, 𝑀0, 
represents the true structure of the underlying pattern of inter-firm task interdependence, 
and is used to determine the performance landscape as discussed in the prior section. 
The second interaction matrix, 𝑀1, represents firms’ own representation of the inter-firm 
task interdependencies, and can differ from the true matrix 𝑀0. The performance 
landscape for 𝑀1 is derived from the true performance landscape 𝑀0 to ensure that the 
(potentially misspecified) performance values are correlated with the true performance 
values via the processes described later in this section.  
Firms search by evaluating alternatives and making choices with respect to their 
activities based on a set of governance structures which we describe in a subsequent 
section. In the process of evaluating alternatives and making changes to their activities 
𝑑𝑖, the firms take into account performance values as determined by the (misspecified) 
interdependence matrix, 𝑀1. Once a choice is made in any given period, however, the 
performance that firms actually experience is defined by performance values stemming 
from the (true) interdependence matrix, 𝑀0. While searching for high performing 
configurations, firms compare the performance values of the alternatives based on the 
𝑀1 matrix with the observed performance of the current configuration based on the 𝑀0 
matrix.   
Firms are said to have an under-specified view when the misspecified matrix 𝑀1 
has a lower degree of interdependence than the true matrix 𝑀0; and firms are said to 
have an over-specified view when the misspecified matrix 𝑀1 has a higher degree of 
interdependence than the true matrix 𝑀0. For the purpose of our analysis we will 
consider misspecifications that differ by a single pattern difference as defined by the 
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patterns in Figure 4.2. As an example, with a true Pattern 3 interdependence matrix (i.e., 
where 𝑀0 is based on Pattern 3), under-specification is defined as a situation where 
there is an 𝑀1 based on Pattern 2, while over-specification is defined as a situation 
where there is an 𝑀1 based on Pattern 4.  
In the remainder of this section we discuss the processes for calculating the 
performance values of the landscapes as a function of the under- or over-specification of 
the 𝑀1 pattern. The performance levels for 𝑀1 (whether under- or over-specified) are 
derived from the 𝑀0 performance levels. To accomplish this we first define the 
performance landscape for 𝑀0 via the process described in the previous section; and we 
then derive the performance landscapes for the under- and over-specified cases using 
the procedures described next. 
Under-specified interdependence matrix 𝑴𝟏. What is the procedure we use to 
construct a performance landscape for an under-specified matrix? The performance 
values of the under-specified landscape should be correlated with the true landscape in 
such a way that the under-specified landscape appears to be a slightly “blurry” (or less 
rugged) version of the true landscape. How do we accomplish this? When the matrix 𝑀1 
is under-specified, each decision 𝑑𝑖  is affected by ?̅?𝑖 other decisions, with ?̅?𝑖 < 𝑘𝑖, where 
𝑘𝑖 is the number of interdependencies associated with 𝑑𝑖 in the true matrix 𝑀0. In order 
to calculate the performance landscape for 𝑀1 we take averages of the contribution 
values from the true interaction matrix 𝑀0 for each fixed configuration of 𝑑𝑖 and its ?̅?𝑖 
interacting choices, an approach consistent with Gavetti and Levinthal (2000). 
We can illustrate this process with an example. Assume that in the true matrix 𝑀0 
a particular activity 𝑑1 interacts with activities 𝑑2, 𝑑3, and 𝑑4. Also assume that in the 
misspecified matrix 𝑀1 the activity 𝑑1 is represented by managers as interacting only 
with activity 𝑑2. The performance landscape 𝑀1 thus requires that we generate 
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contribution values for each unique combination of the 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 activities. For ease of 
notation, let 𝐶𝑖 refer to the contribution value function for activity 𝑑𝑖 for the true matrix 𝑀0. 
Furthermore, let the four arguments of 𝐶𝑖( ) refer to the states (which can be either 0 or 
1) of each of the activities 𝑑1 through 𝑑4. Thus 𝐶1(0,0,0,0) refers to the contribution value 
assigned to the true (𝑀0) matrix for activity 𝑑1 where activities 𝑑1 through 𝑑4 are all set 
to 0. In our example, we would define the contribution values for 𝑑1 in the misspecified 
matrix 𝑀1 for each of the four possible configurations of the 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 activities as 
follows: 
𝑑1 = 0 and 𝑑2 = 0: Average {𝐶1(0,0,0,0), 𝐶1(0,0,0,1), 𝐶1(0,0,1,0), 𝐶1(0,0,1,1)} 
 
𝑑1 = 0 and 𝑑2 = 1: Average {𝐶1(0,1,0,0), 𝐶1(0,1,0,1), 𝐶1(0,1,1,0), 𝐶1(0,1,1,1)} 
 
𝑑1 = 1 and 𝑑2 = 0: Average {𝐶1(1,0,0,0), 𝐶1(1,0,0,1), 𝐶1(1,0,1,0), 𝐶1(1,0,1,1)} 
 
𝑑1 = 1 and 𝑑2 = 1: Average {𝐶1(1,1,0,0), 𝐶1(1,1,0,1), 𝐶1(1,1,1,0), 𝐶1(1,1,1,1)} 
 
Over-specified interdependence matrix 𝑴𝟏. Having discussed the procedure 
for constructing an under-specified performance landscape, we turn next to the 
procedure for constructing the performance values of an over-specified landscape. In 
this case, rather than being a slightly “blurry” (or less rugged) version of the true 
landscape (as it was in the under-specified case), the over-specified landscape can be 
thought of as a more “granular” (or more rugged) version of the true landscape. 
How do we accomplish this? When the matrix 𝑀1 is over-specified, each activity 
𝑑𝑖  is affected by ?̿?𝑖 other activities, with ?̿?𝑖 > 𝑘𝑖 (where 𝑘𝑖 is the number of 
interdependencies associated with 𝑑𝑖 in the true matrix 𝑀0). This implies that for each 
unique combination of 𝑑𝑖  and the 𝑘𝑖 other activities affecting it in the baseline 𝑀0 matrix, 
there are 2 ?̿?𝑖−𝑘𝑖 additional contribution values in the 𝑀1 matrix that must be created to 
account for the additional 𝑀1 matrix interdependencies. To generate these additional 
contribution values we follow the following process. First, we generate 2 ?̿?𝑖−𝑘𝑖−1 random 
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numbers 𝜀𝑗 from the uniform distribution 𝑈[0, 𝑎], where 𝑎 is min(𝑐𝑖 , 1 − 𝑐𝑖), and 𝑐𝑖 is the 
particular contribution value for 𝑑𝑖 for the specific configuration of 𝑑𝑖 and the 𝑘𝑖 other 
policies affecting it (note that 𝑐𝑖 is based on the 𝐶𝑖 function that defines the landscape for 
the 𝑀0 matrix). Second, for each random number 𝜀𝑗 we generate two contribution values 
𝑐𝑖𝑗1 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗 and 𝑐𝑖𝑗2 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝜀𝑗. Finally, we randomly assign 𝑐𝑖𝑗1 and 𝑐𝑖𝑗2 to the additional 
2 ?̿?𝑖−𝑘𝑖 activity combinations for which we need the additional contribution values. 
Constructing the landscape for the over-specified matrix in this way allows us to ensure 
that the true and misspecified landscapes are correlated with one another in the same 
way as they are in the under-specified case. More specifically: under-specifying (by one 
pattern) an over-specified (by one pattern) landscape results in the original (correct) 
landscape. 
We can illustrate the over-specification procedure with an example. Assume that 
in the true matrix 𝑀0 the activity 𝑑1 interacts with 𝑑2 and 𝑑3, while in the over-specified 
representation 𝑀1, in addition to these interactions there are two additional interactions, 
with activities 𝑑4 and 𝑑5. In this case it is necessary to define four additional contribution 
values for each possible configuration of 𝑑1, 𝑑2 and 𝑑3. In the case where the activity 
configuration of (𝑑1,𝑑2, 𝑑3) is (1,0,0), for example, we need to construct contribution 
values for activity 𝑑1 where the (𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3, 𝑑4, 𝑑5) values take on the following set of four 
possible configurations: (1,0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). To do this we 
start with 𝑐1 = 𝐶1(1,0,0). That is, we start with 𝑐1, which is the specific contribution value 
in the 𝑀0 matrix for the 𝑑1 activity where the configuration of (𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3) is (1,0,0). We 
define 𝑎 = min(𝑐1, 1 − 𝑐1), and then generate two error terms 𝜀1  and 𝜀2 from the uniform 
distribution 𝑈[0, 𝛼]. These two error terms then allow us to generate the four contribution 
values 𝑐11  =  𝑐1  +  𝜀1 , 𝑐12  =  𝑐1 −  𝜀1 , 𝑐13  =  𝑐1  +  𝜀2 , and 𝑐14  =  𝑐1 −  𝜀2, which we 
then assign at random to the four configurations noted above, (1,0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0,1), 
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(1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). E.g., if 𝐶1
𝑀1(𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3, 𝑑4, 𝑑5) represents the function that 
maps the particular configuration of 𝑑1 through 𝑑5 to a particular contribution value for 𝑑1 
in the 𝑀1 matrix, then after generating the contribution values through the process 
described above, the random allocation could generate the following: 𝐶1
𝑀1(1,0,0,0,0) =
𝑐11; 𝐶1
𝑀1(1,0,0,0,1) = 𝑐13; 𝐶1
𝑀1(1,0,0,1,0) = 𝑐14; and 𝐶1
𝑀1(1,0,0,1,1) = 𝑐12. 
 
Governance modes 
 
We turn next to the governance modes that determine how agents in our model search 
the performance landscape. We draw on Aggarwal et al. (2011), considering four 
governance modes that represent varying points along the spectrum of alliance 
integration (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer et al., 2004; 
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). At the opposite ends of the spectrum we have what we 
refer to as the modular and integrated modes of governance. As hybrid forms we 
consider what we refer to as the self-governing alliance and ratification modes. We 
describe each of these modes in detail in the remainder of this section. 
In the modular mode of governance both firms make choices simultaneously 
within a given period and only consider the profits associated with the particular activities 
within their scope. We model a 12 activity system, with performance values normalized 
by the total value of the system at the highest peak of the landscape (performance at the 
landscape peak is denoted by Π∗). In the modular mode Firms 1 and 2 control their 
respective alliance and non-alliance activities independently, with each firm thus 
controlling 6 of the 12 activities in the system. In each period Firm 1 evaluates 
alternatives for activities 𝑑1through 𝑑6 based on the expected value of the configuration 
stemming from 𝑀1, comparing these alternatives against the realized performance from 
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the prior period as determined by 𝑀0, and selecting a choice if it increases their 
expected performance. Firm 2 does the same for its own set of policy choices. 
More precisely, in the modular mode, Firm 1 evaluates alternatives based on its 
expected profit, ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
6
𝑖=1 / Π
∗, comparing this against the prior period realized 
performance, ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
6
𝑖=1 / Π
∗. Similarly, Firm 2 evaluates its alternatives based on 
its expected profit ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
12
𝑖=7 / Π
∗, comparing this against ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
12
𝑖=7 / Π
∗. In this 
notation 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0 and 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1 respectively represent the contribution values for activity 𝑑𝑖 based 
on the 𝑀0 and  𝑀1 matrices respectively. Vector ?̅?𝑡 refers to the configuration of the 
activities being evaluated in the current period, while vector ?̅?𝑡−1 refers to the existing 
configuration of activities, as of the end of the prior period. Firm 1 and Firm 2 can 
change up to two activities in any given period, and agents for each firm evaluate all 
possible alternatives when making decisions in a given period. For each agent, and for 
each alternative being considered by each agent, the vector ?̅?𝑡, which represents the 
vector being evaluated by the agent, is thus allowed to differ from the prior round’s 
realized configuration ?̅?𝑡−1 by up to two activities. 
23 
While the modular mode can be conceptualized as a simple case of an arms-
length relationship where both firms work independently with full control of their 
activities, the integrated mode lies at the other end of the spectrum. In the integrated 
mode Firms 1 and 2 operate as a single entity that makes decisions with respect to all 
12 policy choices. Examples of integrated governance structures can be found in long-
term equity-based alliances where decision making is fully integrated, and where firms 
                                                          
23
 Prior work has parameterized the number of activities that can be changed in any given period, as well as 
the number of alternatives considered, referring to these values as “search radius” and “alternatives” 
(Siggelkow and Rivkin [2005]; Aggarwal et al. [2011]). In our study we hold these parameters constant, 
allowing each agent to have a search radius of 2, and to evaluate all possible alternatives associated with 
this search radius in any given period. We thus map to what Aggarwal et al. (2011) refer to as “Capability 
Level D”. Our results and insights, however, are qualitatively similar and robust to variation in these 
parameters. For ease of exposition we report all results based on these fixed settings of “search radius” and 
“alternatives.”  Results on alternative settings are available upon request. 
103 
behave as if they were a single entity (e.g., the alliance between Renault and Nissan, in 
which there is an integrated governance structure under a single leadership).  
In our model of the integrated mode, the single agent takes into account the total 
combined profit of Firms 1 and 2 when evaluating alternatives, comparing this against 
the profit from the prior round’s full configuration. Formally, the quasi-integrated entity 
evaluates alternatives based on ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
12
𝑖=1 / Π
∗, comparing these against 
∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
12
𝑖=1 / Π
∗, where ?̅?𝑡 is the vector being evaluated, which differs from the prior 
round’s configuration ?̅?𝑡−1 by up to two activities. Though profit is calculated at the level 
of the system, we can also report profit for each firm; since the firms are symmetric in 
our analyses, profit for each individual firm is simply ½ of the the profit of the entire 
system. 
In addition to the modular and integrated governance modes which lie on 
opposite ends of the governance spectrum, we consider two hybrid modes: self-
governing alliance and ratification, in line with Aggarwal et al. (2011). In both cases the 
alliance function is managed independently by a third agent (e.g., a joint committee 
formed by both firms to manage the alliance). The agents for Firms 1 and 2 are 
responsible solely for their respective non-alliance activities (𝑑1 through 𝑑4 and 𝑑9 
through 𝑑12 respectively), but in the process of evaluating alternatives and making 
decisions each takes into account their individual total profit, which for each firm is 
defined as the profit of the firm’s non-alliance activities plus a portion, 𝛼, of the profit 
from the alliance activities (we set 𝛼 = 0.5 throughout).  The alliance agent considers 
profit from only the alliance activities (i.e., 𝑑5 through 𝑑8) when evaluating alternatives 
and making decisions. 
More precisely, with the self-governing alliance and ratification modes, in each 
period the Firm 1, Firm 2, and Alliance agents each make the following comparisons 
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when evaluating alternatives, with each agent able to make up to two changes to the 
(four) activities under each of their individual purview (i.e., in each case the N-
dimensional vector of binary values ?̅?𝑡 differs from ?̅?𝑡−1 by at most two activities): 
Firm 1 compares:  ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
4
𝑖=1 / Π
∗ + 0.5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
8
𝑖=5 / Π
∗ 
 
against: ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
4
𝑖=1 / Π
∗ +0.5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
8
𝑖=5 / Π
∗ 
 
Firm 2 compares:  ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
12
𝑖=9 / Π
∗ + 0.5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
8
𝑖=5 / Π
∗  
 
against: ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
12
𝑖=9 / Π
∗ +0.5 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
8
𝑖=5 / Π
∗ 
 
Alliance compares:  ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀1(?̅?𝑡)
8
𝑖=5 / Π
∗  
 
against: ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑀0(?̅?𝑡−1)
8
𝑖=5 / Π
∗ 
 
Although the way the self-governing alliance and ratification modes compare 
alternatives is the same, the two modes differ in the level of independence and degree of 
oversight over the alliance agent. In the self-governing alliance mode, the alliance agent 
operates independently, without any oversight from the firms. In any given period the 
alliance agent makes its decisions. Firms 1 and 2 then select their policies 
simultaneously, taking into account the policy choice made by the alliance agent. 
In the ratification mode, by contrast, in any given period the Firm 1 and Firm 2 
agents decide on their activity set changes, followed by the alliance agent. Firm 1 and 
Firm 2 then have veto power over the activity changes suggested by the alliance agent. 
That is, before implementing any activity change, the alliance agent needs to have its 
proposed change ratified by the agents of the two firms. Ratification requires that both 
firms accept the proposed policy change, with a firm accepting any proposed policy 
change only if it does not reduce the firm’s own profit. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
We model a 12-policy choice system of two firms, with four activity subsets 
{𝑁1, 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝑁2}, sub-divided as depicted in Figure 4.1, and with patterns of 
interdependence as depicted in Figure 4.2. The model is symmetric for both firms such 
that the performance results of each are equal when run over a large number of 
landscapes. We thus focus on analyzing the difference in overall performance of the 
two-firm alliance system under varying combinations of interdependence pattern and 
governance structure. We are interested in situations of over- or under-specification, 
which we define as a single pattern higher or lower, respectively in interdependence (for 
example, with the patterns in Figure 4.2, over-specification for Pattern 3 would be 
Pattern 4, while under-specification for Pattern 3 would be Pattern 2). We assume that 
both firms and the alliance agent (in the case of self-governing alliance and ratification) 
have the same misspecified view of the underlying task structure. Each time period in 
the simulation consists of agents making a set of decisions with respect to their activities 
(per the mode governing their decisions as described in the previous section). We run 
the simulation for 200 periods on a particular landscape in order to observe the long-run 
performance of firms in the system, and then take an average over 10,000 different 
simulation runs in order to minimize the effects of any statistical artifacts. 
 
Performance implications of over- and under-specification  
 
As a starting point for our analysis we compare long-term performance outcomes, i.e. 
performance at the end of period 200, for the alliance system in the case of 
misspecification to the case where all the agents in the system have a correct 
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understanding of their task interdependencies. We refer to the percentage decline in 
overall performance as the “value-loss” due to the misspecification of task 
interdependence. 
Over-specified case. We begin with the situation where the firm agents (and 
alliance agent in the case of the self-governing alliance and ratification modes) have an 
over-specified view of the underlying task structure. We consider performance for the 
four different forms of governance under the various interdependence patterns. Table 
4.1 compares the performance outcomes of the four governance modes under Patterns 
1 through 4 for firms with the over-specified view. We find that the average long-run 
performance for firms with an over-specified view decreases for all patterns. Pattern 1 
has a lower value loss compared to the rest of patterns, due primarily to the difference in 
the additional number of interdependencies agents consider in the search landscape.24 
Moving on to the rest of the patterns, we find that the overall value loss decreases as we 
move from Pattern 2 to Pattern 4. For example, for the modular governance mode, the 
overall value loss is -18.6% for Pattern 2 as compared to -14.8% for Pattern 4. Similarly, 
for the self-governing alliance mode the overall value loss is -15.0% for Pattern 2 
whereas it is -4.6% for Pattern 4. Further, for the ratification mode the overall value loss 
is -18.8% for Pattern 2, while it is -8.3% for Pattern 4. For the integrated mode the 
overall value loss is -20.0% for Pattern 2 and -11.3% for Pattern 4.  
Our findings on the effects of over-specification are consistent with intuition. The 
overall loss in value for the firm with an over-specified view is directly linked to the error 
introduced into the search process as a consequence of the over-specification. For 
                                                          
24
 Pattern 1 differs from other patterns with respect to the total number of interdependencies that the agents 
consider in their search landscape (an additional 8 interdependencies with an over-specified view). For the 
other patterns the search landscape has an additional 32 interdependencies. 
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example, in the case of Pattern 1, while searching for higher performance the firm 
assumes that the alliance activities of the two firms are interdependent, impacting its 
performance. In reality, however, the underlying task is fully decomposable, with no 
interdependence between the alliance activities of the two firms. This misspecification of 
interdependence leads to an error in the search process, decreasing performance. 
Under-specified case. We turn next to examining how under-specification 
affects the performance of both firms. Table 4.2 shows performance outcomes of the 
various modes under Patterns 2 through 5 for firms with the under-specified view. We 
find that under-specification leads to lower performance on average. Similar to the over-
specification results we find that Pattern 2 has a lower value loss compared to the other 
patterns with under-specification, primarily due to the difference in the characteristics of 
interdependencies that agents consider to be missing in the case of Pattern 2 and the 
other patterns.25 
In the under-specified case we also find that the overall value loss decreases as 
we move from Pattern 3 to Pattern 5.  In fact, for Pattern 5, we find that the overall 
performance increases for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. For example, 
in the case of the modular governance mode, the overall value loss is -19.1% for Pattern 
3 as compared to a 7.8% gain for Pattern 5. Similarly, the overall value loss for Pattern 3 
in the case of the self-governing alliance is -17.3%, while it is -1.0% for Pattern 5. For 
other modes the overall value losses for Pattern 2 with the ratification and integrated 
modes are -15.6% and -21.6% respectively, while they are -2.5% and -9.5% for Pattern 
5 with the ratification and integrated modes.  
                                                          
25
 Firms consider a total of 8 interdependencies within the alliance agent to be missing when considering 
the under-specified view of Pattern 2. For the rest of the patterns, firms consider their search landscape to 
have 32 fewer interdependencies as compared to that of the true landscape.  
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We can then observe the governance structure that provides the highest 
performance level when agents have the correct view as compared to when they have a 
misspecified view. Interestingly, we find that misspecification of task structure often 
results in a different governance mode providing the optimal level performance. For 
example, the integrated governance mode provides the highest performance for Pattern 
4 when firms have the correct view, while the self-governing alliance mode provides the 
highest performance with both under- and over- specified views. On average, we find 
that the self-governing alliance mode provides the highest performance across patterns 
for both forms of misspecification (Pattern 1 with the over-specified view is an exception 
where the modular governance mode performs better). We turn to the mechanisms 
driving these results in the next section.  
[INSERT TABLES 4.1 AND 4.2 HERE] 
Coordination failures and exploration as intermediate explanatory mechanisms 
 
To more deeply understand the reasons for the differences in value loss among the 
various interdependence pattern-governance mode combinations, we turn next to the 
mechanisms that may influence firm performance in an alliance setting, building on 
Aggarwal et al.’s (2011) discussion of the role of coordination and exploration in 
influencing the performance effects of alliance governance. Figure 3 illustrates the over-
arching conceptual framework we explore in the remainder of this section: coordination 
failures and exploration achieved are intermediate measures that link misspecification, 
governance mode and level of interdependence with firm performance in an alliance 
setting. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
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 Why do we focus in particular on the dimensions of coordination and exploration? 
Coordination concerns are pervasive in an alliance context (Litwalk and Hylton, 1962), 
influencing governance mode decisions (Gulati and Singh, 1998). The ability to 
effectively coordinate activities among alliance partners, moreover, influences alliance 
performance (Zollo, Reuer and Singh, 2002; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005). In 
addition to effective coordination, exploration is a key determinant of alliance 
performance as well (Child, 2001; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 
2006). We thus aim to understand how interdependence misspecifications, together with 
governance modes and actual patterns of interdependence, link to firm performance via 
the mediating effects of coordination and exploration. 
Constructing the intermediate measures of coordination and exploration. 
We construct the measure, coordination failures, which we define, in any given period, to 
be the total number of incidences up to and including the current period in which firms (in 
total) experience a profit decline as compared to the previous period due to 
simultaneous decision making by the two firms.  Total (Firm 1 + Firm 2) profit can decline 
both because of simultaneous movement of the agents, as well as because of errors in 
the search process due to landscape misspecification. We isolate the former by stripping 
out situations of search-related error.26 For our analyses in this paper we consider 
coordination failures at period 200, which is the point at which the two-firm system has 
reached a steady-state level of performance. 
                                                          
26
 Due to differences in the contribution values between the search (𝑀1) and true (𝑀0) landscapes, 
configurations leading to high performance on the search landscape may not lead to high performance on 
the true landscape. An agent using a misspecified landscape for search may commit to a policy 
configuration that can lead to a decline in performance on the true landscape. We refer to this decline in 
performance due to differences in contribution values between the true and search landscapes as “search-
related error.” We strip out such search-related errors from the measure of coordination failures so that the 
measure reflects only situations where agents simultaneously make a choice that may be correct for each 
firm individually, but that ends up being performance reducing for the total profits of both firms as a whole. 
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We also construct the measure exploration achieved by calculating the total 
number of unique contribution values (𝐶𝑖’s) evaluated by the agents in the system over 
time, normalized by the total number of possible contribution values that exist for the 
given landscape (Aggarwal et al., 2011).27 The evaluated and total contribution values 
used as inputs to our exploration achieved measure come from the true landscape (𝑀0), 
and are based on the agents’ search history on the misspecified landscape (𝑀1). More 
precisely, for each policy configuration evaluated by the agents on the search landscape 
(𝑀1) up to and including the focal period, we take the corresponding configuration on the 
true landscape (𝑀0) and identify whether the contribution values for that policy 
configuration, as derived from the 𝑀0 landscape, have been considered by the agents in 
the search process up to and including the focal period.28 We count the total number of 
such cases where a particular contribution value has been evaluated, and divide this by 
the total number of distinct contribution values based on 𝑀0. As we do with coordination 
failures, we consider exploration achieved in the steady-state at period 200. 
 Implications of over-specification for intermediate measures. How does 
over-specification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and 
exploration? In the over-specified case the landscape searched by the agents becomes 
more rugged than that of the true landscape. Additionally, values of adjacent locations 
on the landscape are less correlated as compared to that of the true landscape. This 
increases the number of alternatives the agent considers, as well as the duration of the 
                                                          
27
 For instance, the total number of possible contribution values for Pattern 1 is 144, and for Pattern 5 it is 
49,152.   
28
 Note that any given policy configuration will exist on both landscapes (M0 and M1). However, whether or 
not the corresponding contribution values are “distinct” is a function of the interdependence structure of 
that landscape (which of course differs between M0 and M1). As an example, suppose we take a simple 
system in where there are only two possible binary policy choices {d1, d2}. When an agent evaluates the 
move from the existing policy configuration {0,0} to a new policy configuration {0,1}, the number of 
distinct contribution values she considers will differ depending on whether the two policy choices are 
interdependent or not. If they are interdependent, then there would be two unique contribution values, 
C1(0,1) and C2(0,1),  which would be taken into account; if they are not interdependent, then only one 
unique contribution value, C2(0,1) would need to be considered. 
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search process before an agent locks itself into a policy configuration. While this 
increase in the number of alternatives considered leads to a higher degree of exploration 
achieved, the increase in search time also leads to higher levels of coordination failure. 
With multiple agents searching the landscape at the same time, the chances of 
coordination failure increases as policies selected by one agent may not be optimal for 
the other. The degree of coordination failures between agents thus depends on the 
duration over which agents search the landscape simultaneously. 
 We report the results of the effect of over-specification on exploration achieved 
and coordination failures in the middle two columns of Table 4.3 (falling under the 
heading “symmetric view”). Similar to Tables 4.1 & 4.2, we compare the performance 
metric (in this case exploration achieved or coordination failures) for the misspecified 
case relative to the correctly-specified case at the end of period 200. The table shows 
that the overall degree of exploration achieved by the agents increases with the over-
specified view. Furthermore, the effect of over-specification is more prominent at 
patterns with a higher degree of interdependence, and with the modular and self-
governing alliance modes. In addition, agents with the over-specified view face a higher 
level of coordination failure. For example, under Patterns 3 and 4 with the self-governing 
alliance mode, coordination failures increase by 3.5% and 1.6% respectively.  
 Implications of under-specification for intermediate measures. How does 
under-specification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and 
exploration? In the under-specified case the search space for the agent is simplified. The 
agent searches on a landscape with a lower degree of interdependence that is 
consequently less rugged as compared to the true landscape. Each policy on the search 
landscape corresponds to a cluster of policies on the actual landscape. This 
simplification of the search landscape speeds the agent’s search processes (e.g., 
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Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), enabling the agent to relatively quickly identify a peak with 
respect to its search landscape. Thus, the degree of exploration achieved with the 
underspecified-view decreases, as Table 4.4 (middle two columns, under the heading 
“symmetric view”) reports. The increase in search speed is particularly helpful in 
reducing coordination failures: with an increase in search speed agents identify optimal 
performance configurations with relatively fewer activity changes, reducing the overall 
number of associated coordination failures.  
[INSERT TABLES 4.3 AND 4.4 HERE] 
 
Concordance with conceptual framework. Having discussed the implications 
of misspecification for coordination and exploration, we now return to Figure 4.3, with the 
aim of testing the conceptual framework depicted there. To do so we construct a dataset 
based on our simulation results at period 200 with 320,000 observations: we run 10,000 
trials for each combination of misspecification-pattern-governance mode combination; 
and we then employ seemingly unrelated regression (SUREG) to analyze the results, 
using the framework depicted in Figure 4.3. We estimate three equations 
simultaneously: (1) the impact of misspecification on exploration achieved; (2) the impact 
of misspecification on coordination failures; and (3) the impact of exploration achieved 
and coordination failures on total performance. Seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUREG) allows for correlation between the error terms of these equations (Zellner, 
1962, 1963), a likely situation given the approach used to construct our dataset. 
In our SUREG models the variable, misspecification, takes the value of one when 
the observation is under a misspecified view, and 0 otherwise. We estimate models for 
over- and under- specification separately. To control for the effects of patterns and 
governance modes we include dummy variables for these factors. The modular 
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governance mode is used as the base mode against which to compare the effects of the 
other modes; and Pattern 2 is used as the base pattern against which to compare the 
effects of the other patterns.29 
Estimated standardized coefficients for the two models (over- and under-
specified) are reported in Table 4.5. We do not show p-values of the estimated 
coefficients to avoid redundancy, as all the p-values are less than 0.001 (with the 
exception of the effect of misspecification on coordination failures in the case of the 
over-specified view). As Model 1 shows, the coefficient of misspecification on exploration 
is positive, suggesting that over-specification of task structure is associated with higher 
exploration. On average, firms with the over-specified view tend to explore more by 0.10 
standard deviation. Similarly, in Model 2, the coefficient of misspecification on 
coordination failures is negative, suggesting that under-specification is associated with 
fewer coordination failures. Though we do not find statistically significant effects of over-
specification on coordination failures, we do find that under-specification increases 
coordination failures by 0.19 standard deviations. Furthermore, consistent with earlier 
research we find that the coefficient of exploration on overall performance is positive, 
and the coefficient of coordination failures on overall performance is negative, for both 
Model 1 and Model 2. We find that a standard deviation increase in coordination failures 
decreases overall performance by -0.21 and -0.37 standard deviations for over- and 
under-specification respectively. Similarly we find that a standard deviation increase in 
exploration increases overall performance by 0.38 and 0.45 standard deviations for over- 
and under-specification respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE] 
                                                          
29
 Since we do not have any observations for Pattern 1 in the case of the under-specified view, and for 
Pattern 5 in the case of the over-specified view, we use Pattern 2 as the base pattern, as it is common across 
both forms of misspecification.  
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Implications for governance mode choice: asymmetric view 
 
In a final set of analyses we consider the situation in which only one partner has either 
an under- or over-specified view. The results of the “asymmetric” perspective on 
coordination and exploration outcomes are shown in the right two columns of Tables 2A 
and 2B (under the heading “asymmetric view”). The asymmetric view is one in which the 
focal firm has the correct representation, while the partner has the misspecified view. 
These results help address the question of what governance mode managers should 
choose (or rather, negotiate for ex ante), conditional on their assessment of their 
partners’ likely representation of interdependencies. 
As Table 4.3 suggests, if managers believe their partner to be over-specified, 
higher levels of exploration can be obtained by selecting the modular governance mode, 
and coordination failures can be minimized by selecting the self-governing alliance 
mode. If on the other hand managers believe their partner to be under-specified, as 
Table 4.4 illustrates, they can minimize exploration losses by using the modular mode 
when in a lower interdependence situation (Patterns 2 and 3) and by using the 
ratification mode when in a higher interdependence situation (Patterns 4 and 5). 
Governance choice thus depends on managers’ understanding of their task structure, 
their partner’s level of misspecification, and the ultimate objectives of the alliance 
(whether this is firm performance itself, achieving high levels of exploration, or avoiding 
coordination failures). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our aim in this paper was to use a computational model to understand the implications 
of incorrect managerial representations of inter-firm task interdependencies in the 
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context of alliance relationships, focusing on the effects of under- and over-specification 
under varying combinations of true inter-firm task interdependence and modes of 
alliance governance. We derive three sets of results. 
First, we find that managerial misspecification of interdependence structures 
leads to a decline in firm performance, a result consistent with prior case-based work 
(Doz [1996]; Sosa et al. [2007]). Our results suggest a number of interesting nuances. 
We find that while over- and under-specification of interdependence have similar effects 
on performance, the degree of value loss due to misspecification varies by governance 
mode. The decline in performance is on average lower for the modular and self-
governing alliance modes. This difference in the effect of misspecification on various 
governance modes has important implications. When both firms have a correct 
understanding of their interdependencies, the integrated mode provides better 
performance at patterns with higher interdependence (Patterns 4 and 5). As we relax the 
assumption of a correct understanding, however, we find that the self-governing alliance 
mode provides better performance than the integrated mode. The degree to which firms 
have an understanding of their underlying interdependencies is thus important in 
deciding on the optimal mode of governance. 
A second set of results is that the pattern of interdependence has a crucial 
impact on the level of decline in alliance performance due to misspecification. 
Interestingly, the decline in performance decreases with an increase in the degree of 
interdependence in the underlying task structure.  As illustrated in Tables 1A and 1B, the 
value loss for the alliance is lowest with Patterns 4 and 5 for both forms of 
misspecification. We are able to explain these results using the intermediate measures 
of coordination and exploration. 
Our analysis of these intermediate measures leads to our final set of conclusions, 
which relates to the possibly competing objectives relating to coordination and 
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exploration. Our study lends insight into the consequences of misspecification for these 
two objectives, as we find that the two forms of misspecification affect each differently. 
The overall level of exploration achieved by the alliance increases with an over-specified 
view; in the case of an under-specified view, however, the overall exploration level 
decreases (though with a few exceptions for low complexity patterns). Similarly, we find 
that coordination failures increase when both firms share an over-specified view. 
Although in the case of the under-specified view coordination failures are limited, they 
decline at higher levels of interdependence. This presents an interesting trade-off 
between paying attention to firm performance versus other alliance objectives such as 
exploration. Firms with an over-specified view of interdependence may achieve higher 
exploration, yet trade this off with lower performance. Likewise, with higher levels of 
interdependence firms can take on an under-specified view in order to achieve fewer 
coordination failures. 
From a managerial perspective our results underscore the importance of paying 
attention to task interdependencies when structuring alliances.  Decision makers should, 
in particular, make attempts to identify the true structure of their inter-firm 
interdependence. While estimating ex ante the magnitude and direction of 
misspecification may be difficult, managers may be able to reduce the magnitude of 
such errors by investing in efforts to identify the true interdependence structures in 
alliances: e.g., pre-alliance discussions and alliance management capabilities can help 
reduce the likelihood of any misspecifications. Such investments in understanding the 
true structure become particularly important because, as our results suggest, firms’ task 
structure representations are significant inputs to the choice of alliance governance 
mode. 
Before concluding we discuss some of the assumptions embedded in our model, 
and their implications for our results. First, our model assumes that both firms are 
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symmetric with respect to their views on interdependence. However, it may not be 
uncommon to have an alliance where both partners have different views of their 
interdependencies. We conducted robustness checks to understand the implications of 
this assumption. As noted in our discussion of coordination and exploration, we 
evaluated an ‘asymmetric view’ scenario in which only one of the partner firms has an 
incorrect view of their interdependence. The overall performance implications were 
consistent with our main findings, with the magnitude of value loss decreasing when only 
one partner has an incorrect understanding.  
As a second assumption embedded in our analysis, note that we pre-specify 
firms’ understanding regarding their interdependence structure, and assume that this 
remains constant for the entire period (i.e., there is no learning by agents about the true 
nature of their interdependence). It is likely, however, that firms update their 
understanding based on feedback received over the course of the alliance. While our 
purpose in the present paper was solely to examine the implications of relaxing the 
assumption of a correct specification of inter-firm task interdependencies (a gap that the 
literature has not yet addressed), it would be a natural extension to relax this assumption 
and to extend our model in order to study how the process of learning about 
interdependencies over time (and possibly modifying the alliance governance structure 
accordingly) influences our results.   
As a final assumption, note that we use a pre-defined set of patterns of 
interdependence to represent task structures and firms’ understanding of these 
structures. The current patterns represent discrete points on the continuum of increasing 
task complexity. These patterns characterize ideal configuration types that are useful for 
exposition; hybrid patterns may arise in reality, however, and future research might thus 
examine such patterns. We did run our results using a “random K” scenario to evaluate 
the implications of increasing levels of interdependence, where these interdependencies 
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were randomly scattered throughout the task matrix. The results on this analysis were 
broadly consistent with our findings. 
Our paper leads to a number of implications for work in the area of alliance 
governance. While the issue of governance structure choice has been examined both 
implicitly and explicitly in the alliance literature, with significant progress being made 
using empirical indicators, ours is the first effort to attempt to understand the implications 
of relaxing the common assumption that managers operate with a “true” representation 
of inter-firm interdependencies. Because in practice managers are unlikely to have 
perfect ex ante representations of their interdependencies, as we discuss up-front with 
the example from Doz (1996), such an assumption is likely to be unrealistic. Using 
empirical methods alone, however, is unlikely to allow to us fully address the implications 
of interdependence misspecifications, as empirical data is unlikely to be structured so as 
to allow simultaneous and deep observation of managerial representations, 
interdependencies, and governance structures. As a consequence, computational 
modeling provides an effective tool with which to examine the implications of managerial 
errors in interdependence representations in a structured way. The insights we gain from 
our model can complement future empirical work, and more importantly serve to inform 
the core theorizing that can guide these future empirical examinations of this topic. 
In conclusion, we make an important set of contributions to the literature on 
alliance governance by highlighting how a partial understanding of task 
interdependencies can be detrimental for alliance performance. We go beyond prior 
work to explicitly study the effect of errors on various patterns of interdependence, a task 
that would be difficult to accomplish using empirical methods alone. In so doing we 
contribute to the literature on governance choice (e.g. Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005), shedding new insights into the link between interdependence, 
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governance modes, and firm performance in alliance settings, and offering a promising 
set of avenues for future research. 
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Figure 4.1: Interaction matrix example 
 
              Firm 1 Firm 2 
                  
                      Alliance         
                                
              N1 A1 A2 N2 
                      
              d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 d12 
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N
1
 
  
d1 X X X X                 
    d2 X X X X                 
    d3 X X X X                 
    d4 X X X X                 
A
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A
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d5         X X             
d6         X X             
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m
 2
 
  
A
2
 
  
d7             X X         
d8             X X         
      
  
d9                 X X X X 
    N
2
 
d10                 X X X X 
      d11                 X X X X 
      d12                 X X X X 
 
Note: This example corresponds to “Pattern 1” as described in Figure 4.2 
  
121 
Figure 4.2: Patterns of interdependence 
Pattern 1:  
Fully decomposable 
  
Pattern 2:  
Pure alliance 
interaction 
  
Pattern 3:  
Firm own-alliance 
interaction 
  N1 A1 A2 N2     N1 A1 A2 N2     N1 A1 A2 N2 
N1           N1           N1         
A1           A1           A1         
A2           A2           A2         
N2           N2           N2         
                                  
Pattern 4:  
Firm partner-alliance 
interaction   
Pattern 5:  
Full interdependence             
  N1 A1 A2 N2     N1 A1 A2 N2             
N1           N1                     
A1           A1                     
A2           A2                     
N2           N2                     
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Framework for understanding the effect of misspecification 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Coordination failures 
Exploration achieved 
Firm performance 
Misspecification 
Governance mode 
Pattern of interdependence 
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Table 4.1: Value loss, over-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Performance with 
correct view 
Performance with 
over-specified view 
% value loss 
Pattern 1 Modular 0.991 0.949 -4.1% 
 
Self-Governing  0.993 0.927 -6.8% 
 
Ratification 0.993 0.912 -8.0% 
 
Integrated 0.989 0.926 -6.4% 
Pattern 2 Modular 0.948 0.771 -18.6% 
 
Self-Governing  0.989 0.842 -15.0% 
 
Ratification 0.989 0.802 -18.8% 
 
Integrated 0.986 0.785 -20.0% 
Pattern 3 Modular 0.950 0.783 -17.0% 
 
Self-Governing  0.932 0.793 -14.9% 
 
Ratification 0.908 0.765 -15.2% 
 
Integrated 0.949 0.763 -19.5% 
Pattern 4  Modular 0.884 0.747 -14.8% 
 
Self-Governing  0.884 0.845 -4.6% 
 
Ratification 0.879 0.803 -8.3% 
 
Integrated 0.922 0.816 -11.3% 
 
Table 4.2: Value loss, under-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Performance with 
correct view 
Performance with 
over-specified view 
% value loss 
Pattern 2 Modular 0.944 0.921 -2.6% 
 
Self-Governing  0.990 0.928 -6.2% 
 
Ratification 0.990 0.918 -7.2% 
 
Integrated 0.985 0.919 -6.6% 
Pattern 3 Modular 0.950 0.773 -19.1% 
 
Self-Governing  0.931 0.773 -17.3% 
 
Ratification 0.902 0.770 -15.6% 
 
Integrated 0.949 0.751 -21.6% 
Pattern 4 Modular 0.873 0.745 -15.6% 
 
Self-Governing  0.884 0.795 -10.3% 
 
Ratification 0.877 0.755 -14.7% 
 
Integrated 0.927 0.749 -19.0% 
Pattern 5 Modular 0.747 0.808 7.8% 
 
Self-Governing  0.828 0.829 -1.0% 
 
Ratification 0.780 0.757 -2.5% 
 
Integrated 0.910 0.823 -9.5% 
 
Note: Values in bold indicate the governance mode providing superior performance for each combination of 
pattern and managerial representation (either correct or misspecified). For example, in Table 4.1, with the 
combination of [Pattern 1, Correct View], both the self-governing and ratification modes provide the highest 
performance. 
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Table 4.3: Changes in coordination and exploration, over-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Symmetric view Asymmetric view 
Exploration Coordination Exploration Coordination 
Pattern 1 Modular 0.9% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 
 
Self-Governing  3.4% 0.0% -0.9% 0.0% 
 
Ratification 2.3% 0.0% -0.6% 0.0% 
 
Integrated 1.6% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 2 Modular 0.6% -14.3% 1.6% -5.6% 
 
Self-Governing  5.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
 
Ratification 0.5% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
 
Integrated 1.8% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 3 Modular 7.7% 0.1% 2.6% 2.4% 
 
Self-Governing  9.4% 3.5% 0.9% 1.0% 
 
Ratification 0.2% 6.2% -0.3% 5.9% 
 
Integrated 3.7% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 4  Modular 3.4% -0.5% 0.7% 2.5% 
 
Self-Governing  0.5% 1.6% 0.4% 0.9% 
 
Ratification 0.3% 3.9% 0.0% 4.1% 
 
Integrated 1.6% 0.0% - - 
 
Table 4.4: Changes in coordination and exploration, under-specified 
representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode Symmetric view Asymmetric view 
  
Exploration Coordination Exploration Coordination 
Pattern 2 Modular -1.4% -11.7% -0.5% -10.0% 
 
Self-Governing  0.6% 0.0% -1.6% 0.0% 
 
Ratification 0.1% 0.0% -1.4% 0.0% 
 
Integrated -1.2% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 3 Modular 2.3% 1.1% 0.1% 1.0% 
 
Self-Governing  -1.8% 3.4% -0.8% 0.5% 
 
Ratification 1.3% 5.1% 0.1% 3.6% 
 
Integrated 3.0% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 4 Modular -2.1% -11.0% -1.8% -8.7% 
 
Self-Governing  -0.6% 2.4% -0.5% 0.1% 
 
Ratification 0.0% 4.6% -0.1% 0.9% 
 
Integrated 1.1% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 5  Modular -2.6% -24.3% -1.7% -17.6% 
 
Self-Governing  -1.3% -1.1% -0.9% -1.8% 
 
Ratification -0.6% -13.9% -0.4% -12.1% 
 
Integrated 0.0% 0.0% - - 
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Table 4.5: Effect of misspecification on exploration, coordination failure and total 
profits 
Dependent variable Independent variable 
(all dummy variables 
except for constant) 
Model 1 
(Over-specification) 
Model 2 
(Under-specification) 
Exploration Misspecification 0.098 -0.009 
 Self-governing -0.147 -0.221 
 Ratification -0.234 -0.250 
 Integrated 1.055 0.787 
 Pattern 1 0.293  
 Pattern 3 -1.053 -1.328 
 Pattern 4 -1.629 -1.958 
 Pattern 5  -1.988 
 Constant 0.379 1.244 
 
 
R
2 
0.874 0.818 
Coord. failures Misspecification 0.003 -0.193 
 Self-governing -0.694 -0.801 
 Ratification -0.600 -0.561 
 Integrated -0.768 -0.916 
 Pattern 1 -0.278  
 Pattern 3 -0.077 -0.081 
 Pattern 4 0.282 0.117 
 Pattern 5  0.478 
 Constant 0.532 0.537 
 R
2
 0.132 0.179 
Performance  Exploration 0.383 0.459 
 Coordination failures -0.212 -0.375 
 Misspecification -1.116 -0.830 
 Self-governing 0.116 0.012 
 Ratification -0.005 -0.127 
 Integrated -0.423 -0.445 
 Constant 0.636 0.555 
 R
2
 0.413 0.390 
 Observations 320,000 320,000 
 
Note: All independent variables are dummy variables, except for exploration, coordination 
failures, and the constant. The misspecification dummy variable refers to the over-specified view 
for Model 1 and to the under-specified view for Model 2. 
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5. DISCUSSION  
 
This final section concludes by summarizing the core results from three essays 
and discussing their contribution to theory and practice. Together, the three essays had 
the broad objective of systematically examining the structure of interdependencies that 
underlie the success of a firm’s innovative efforts, particularly in the context of platform-
based ecosystems. The dissertation starts with the premise that firms are situated in a 
complex web of interdependencies that often lies outside their boundaries. It then builds 
on this premise to offer novel characterizations of these interdependence structures 
based on the interaction between a firm’s products and other elements of the ecosystem 
and to explore how these characterizations help explain firms’ performance dynamics.  
The first essay takes a granular view of the interdependence structure and starts 
with examining the interdependencies that lie at the level of a firm’s innovation. It 
conceptualizes a platform-based ecosystem as an interconnected technological system 
in which a firm’s innovation interacts with the platform and other complements to create 
value. It introduces the notion of ‘connectedness’ to describe an innovation’s 
interdependence with other elements in the ecosystem. It explicitly distinguishes 
between an innovation’s connectedness with the platform and other complements. In so 
doing, it examines how these two types of connectedness help firms leverage 
complementarities from the ecosystem, as well as create challenges that may limit an 
innovation’s value creation. In the context of the Apple iPhone ecosystem, I find that the 
higher connectedness with the platform and complements increases the likelihood of 
successful commercialization. However, the benefit of platform connectedness is 
negated during the initial periods of the new generation of the platform. The effect of 
complement connectedness during the initial periods of the new generation of the 
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platform is more nuanced and varies with the extent to which the connected complement 
is interdependent on the platform itself.  
The second essay zooms out to the interdependencies that lie at the level of an 
ecosystem and are primarily driven by the structural properties of the ecosystem. 
Specifically, it examines how the ecosystem-level interdependencies, characterized by 
the number of components that interact with a firm’s product, shape the extent to which 
complementors can sustain their value creation. The empirical context is Apple’s iOS 
and Google’s Android ecosystems, which provides a nice opportunity to study 
complementors’ dynamics in ecosystems with varying levels of interdependence. 
Overall, I find that greater ecosystem complexity helps firms sustain their value creation. 
Further, the firms’ ability to sustain superior performance is facilitated by their experience 
within the ecosystem, but hampered by transitions initiated by platform firms.  
While the first two essays are focused on the structure of interdependencies in 
explaining firm performance, the third chapter takes a more behavioral perspective and 
addresses the implications of a partial understanding of these interdependence 
structures by decision makers. I use a computational model to understand the 
implications of over- and underrepresentation of interfirm task interdependencies in the 
context of the alliance relationships. The results suggest that both types of 
misrepresentation of task structure are, on average, detrimental to alliance performance. 
However, the degree of value loss varies by governance mode. The decline in 
performance is lower for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. Interestingly, I 
also find that the decline in performance decreases with an increase in the degree of 
interdependence in the underlying task structure.  
Collectively, these essays make several theoretical and empirical contributions to 
the strategy and innovation literatures. First, this dissertation contributes to the emerging 
strategy literature on platforms and ecosystems by providing a detailed account of 
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interdependencies that exist within an ecosystem (e.g., Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010, 2014; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Kapoor, 2013). Scholars studying 
platforms have focused on the strategies used by platform firms to attract 
complementors and to compete against rival platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; 
Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et al.; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). 
In this dissertation, I look at the other side of the phenomenon, beyond the platform 
firms, and illustrate how the performance of complementor firms is shaped by the 
structure of interdependencies faced by them within the ecosystem. I show that 
complementor firms can enhance the value of their innovations by leveraging a broad 
set of complementary technologies provided by platform and other complementor firms, 
but they must consider the platform-level generational transitions that may offset the 
benefits. This finding provides practical implications to both the platform firms and the 
complementor firms. From the platform firm’s perspective, a platform firm can increase 
opportunities for value creation for the complementor firms by integrating additional 
components along with the core module of the platform. From the complementor firms’ 
perspective, they can increase the utility of their innovation for the users by connecting it 
with additional platform components and other complements available in the ecosystem. 
Further, I also show that the sustainability of a complementor firm’s performance is 
driven by the number of components that its product interacts with within the ecosystem. 
This finding highlights how platform firms’ strategies with respect to the design of the 
platform architecture and governance of the ecosystem can shape complementor firms’ 
performance.   
Further, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on technological 
change, which is typically premised on how technological transitions impact the 
performance of firms in the focal industry (e.g., Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997). In this dissertation, I show how 
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technology transitions initiated by platform firms can impact the performance of 
complementor firms within an ecosystem. It highlights that technological 
interdependencies between platform firms and complementors in related industries can 
have important consequences for complementors during periods of platform transitions. 
Relatedly, the evidence in the study also points to the difficulties of coordinating 
technology transitions at the level of the ecosystem. Even if platform firms intend to 
create a smooth generational transition for all of their complementors, the system-level 
interdependencies and technological uncertainties make such coordination difficult. 
This dissertation also makes an important set of contributions to the literature on 
alliance governance by highlighting how a partial understanding of task 
interdependencies can be detrimental to alliance performance. It goes beyond prior work 
to explicitly study the effect of errors on various patterns of interdependence—a task that 
would be difficult to accomplish using empirical methods alone. In so doing, it contributes 
to the literature on governance choice (e.g., Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 
2005), shedding new insights into the link between interdependence, governance 
modes, and firm performance in alliance settings and offering a promising set of 
avenues for future research. 
Finally, I also briefly note several avenues for future research given the 
theoretical and empirical results of the essays in this dissertation. While this dissertation 
is a first attempt to shed light on the microstructures of interdependencies that exist in a 
platform-based ecosystem, it has not accounted for the vast heterogeneity that exists 
with respect to the interdependent elements. For example, in the case of an iPhone 
ecosystem, an app interacts with different actors present in the ecosystem, such as 
handset providers and wireless providers. These actors differ from one another in many 
aspects, such as their added value in the ecosystem and their bargaining power. In 
future work, I hope to further characterize the structure of interdependencies introduced 
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in this dissertation by explicitly taking into account these differences. Finally, while I 
show the role of the structure of interdependencies in value creation, it would be 
important to understand how these interdependencies arise and evolve over time. In 
future work, I also hope to explicitly consider firm-level factors to understand how they 
drive the benefits and challenges posed by the interdependence structures that firms are 
subjected to in an ecosystem.   
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